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THE GIFT OF
JAMES WALKER,
(Class of 1814.)
LATELY PRESIDENT OF
HARVARD COLLEGE.

Received 31 Jan. 1860.







CONTRIBUTIONS TO LINGUISTICS

Volume 1, Number 1, 1955




FIGURE 1

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OBJECTIONS TO PHRENOLOGY,

BEING

The substance of a Series of Papers Communicated

TO

The Calcutta Phrenological Society,

WITH

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

BY **DAVID DRUMMOND,**
OF
THE DURRUMTOLLAH ACADEMY.

He, who will not reason, is a bigot; he, who cannot, is a fool; and he, who dares not, is a slave.—*Drummond's Academical Questions.*

Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri.—*Hor.*



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Gift of

James Walker

late Pres. of New Coll.

(Class of 1814)

INTRODUCTION.

The Calcutta Phrenological Society was established in March 1825, under very promising auspices; and included several gentlemen of literary and scientific distinction. Its numbers, however, did not increase as was at first anticipated—not, as I believe, because the subject did not excite interest—but only not sufficient interest to metamorphose apathy into exertion. There are many talented individuals in Calcutta, but the division of *Caste*, which is almost as strictly observed by Europeans as by Hindoos, is destructive of every attempt at general association; added to this, far other matters than intellectual improvement are the *Alpha* and the *Omega* of Indian existence.

I was an original member of the Society, and regular in my attendance; but, after patiently hearing all that Dr. Paterson and others could bring forward in its defence, and having perused some works on Phrenology, I soon became convinced that its foundation was totally insecure; and having frequently declared this in the Society, and being requested by the President, to put my objections on paper, I did so—This small Volume is the consequence.

Since presenting my first paper in July 1827, the Society has met only *twice*; at these two meetings, however, several “Replies” were offered, and, although I had no opportunity of laying my “Examination” of these before the Society, a printed copy was furnished to every mem-

ber—I have heard nothing more of the controversy. Some of the members assert, that the Society “is not dead but sleepeth.” I have only to remark, that its *nap* has been a long and a sound one.

If the system of Phrenology were, indeed, the “true interpretation of nature,” and sufficiently accounted for all the phenomena of mind, it would be, unquestionably, the greatest discovery made since the beginning of the world—in so far, as man’s knowledge of *himself* is so much more important than his knowledge of any thing besides. But, I humbly trust that, in the succeeding pages, I have fully proved that this system is altogether inadequate, and that it throws no new light whatever on this dark and mysterious enquiry.

Gall and Spurzheim are admitted by all to be Anatomists of no common merit.—Had they kept to their own profession—had they continued *Crani*-ologists and not aspired to be *Phren*-ologists, they might very probably have benefited mankind. But, throughout all their works, they have exhibited such ignorance and delusion regarding the science of *Mind*, as fully justifies the application of the old adage, “*Ne sutor ultra crepidam*”!

Two thousand years ago, Plato assured the tyrant of Syracuse, “that there was no royal road to Geometry.” But Phrenologists pretend to have found out a “royal road” to a far more intricate science. It is, no doubt, gratifying both to the great vulgar as well as the small, to imagine that they can, by a new process, solve and elucidate, and that with the utmost ease and simplicity, all those abstruse and complicated problems which the greatest Philosophers have, heretofore, approached with fear and trembling.—The vanity of ignorance is its greatest curse!

Although it has long been my conviction that Phrenology is a gross deception, I should, nevertheless, have conceived it high presumption to have taken up the gauntlet, had the particular position which I have assumed, and which appears to me to be invulnerable, been previously occupied by any other. Having lately met, however, with, what is considered at this distance, a recent article in the Foreign Quarterly Review, formidably defending the "new science," and, at the same time, enumerating all the arguments which have been hitherto opposed to it, and finding that no objection is noticed on the plea of *personal identity*—and also finding, from this and other sources, that the doctrine continues rapidly to spread over Europe and America—that Dr. Spurzheim, in his late progress, was every where hailed as the apostle of glad tidings, and was even received at one of the English Universities with high honours and uncommon privileges—that one-thousand copies of Mr. Combe's "Reply to Mr. Jeffrey," was sold in Edinburgh in a few weeks, and another edition called for—and still more—that the contagion had insinuated itself into some of the Mechanic's societies, where the evil is likely to prove most dangerous and lasting—all these considered—although situated far from the field of action, and without a name to give weight to the effort—I conceived that, in the cause, which I believe to be that of truth and philosophy, I also might shoot my arrow.

ERRATA.

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**"THE PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND
CANNOT BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON
PHRENOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES."**

*An Address read by Mr. Drummond, to the Calcutta
Phrenological Society, 28th July 1827.*

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN,

When this Society was first established, it was explicitly understood, that no Member pledged himself further, than to give the claims of Phrenology a candid and a patient hearing; nor do I think there is yet among us so devout and confirmed a Phrenologist, as not to "be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh him a reason for the faith that is in him." I trust, then, it will not be conceived presumptuous or invidious in me, if I frankly unfold to you the difficulties I have encountered in endeavouring to elucidate the phenomena of the human mind on Phrenological principles. Truth is not of easy acquisition. Her visits are "few and far between;" and even when the holy light is vouchsafed to man, seldom are its glories permitted to expand; until, after much effort and many obscurations, the heavy clouds of prejudice are finally dissolved. Truth, however, has nothing to fear from candid opposition. Tyranny may silence her voice—her votaries may become her victims; but, like the gold of Ophir, she comes triumphantly forth,

and with seven-fold refinement, from every furnace of investigation. Imagine not, then, Gentlemen, that any feeble remarks of mine can injure Phrenology—*if Phrenology be true*. The offering I now make, may be the nucleus of future discussion; and should it rouse or stimulate the talent, which the Calcutta Phrenological Society unquestionably possesses, it will not, perhaps, be considered altogether unprofitable.

Until the promulgation of Phrenology, mind had been uniformly contemplated as *one* homogeneous existence. In the course of my reading, I do not recollect of any philosopher,—even among the numberless theorists that have dazzled in their day,—who has seriously called this in question; neither (as you are all aware) did the original Apostle of Phrenology, Dr. Gall, deduce *his* doctrine from reflecting on the thinking principle. Metaphysicians, it is true, had endeavoured to classify and denominate the powers and energies of this incomprehensible substance; but these were never understood to result from the operation of separate and distinct *parts*, but were merely considered to be different *states* or *modes* of the one indivisible mind. The world had long slumbered in this belief, when Phrenology broke the dream,—loudly proclaiming that this indivisibility of mind, this datum, upon which the sages of the earth, from the deepest antiquity, had rested their sublimest speculations and most abstruse inductions, was utterly false and absurd!

When the Reformers, as they are termed, of the Christian Religion first called in question the *indivisibility* of the Roman Catholic Church, (which opinion had been until then the undisturbed belief of ages,) they commen-

ced, as naturally they should, by exposing the fallacy of the established creed. They were, of course, necessitated to be deeply acquainted with all the doctrines previously held, and with all the arguments by which these doctrines had been so long supported.—I wish Phrenologists had so proceeded, and had carefully digested what was already established in the most intricate and exalted of all sciences—that of the human mind, before they commenced, so unsparringly, the demolition of a superstructure, raised by the labour, and supported by the wisdom, of the greatest of philosophers and the best of men.

Let it not, however, be inferred, that the "*Wisdom of our Ancestors*" is any idol of my "*Veneration.*" On the contrary, I hail, with gladness of heart, the noble efforts the present age is making, to throw off every trammel which Time has spun: and in the war of truth against antiquity, I should not long hesitate in choosing my standard. But, Gentlemen, little as I respect the opinions of our forefathers, *en masse*, I would separate the diamond from the dross; retain what was useful and nourishing, and consign the rest (the far greater portion I confess) to eternal oblivion; and it must be allowed that, from the science of Metaphysics, some useful knowledge has been elicited, some inductions formed, which have already benefited the cause of man; and which, it may be fondly hoped, will triumph and prevail, until bigotry and oppression are "withered from the world!"

Yet, after all, it is not probable that man, by his utmost efforts, will ever arrive at any thing like certainty, regarding the operations of his own mind. His intellect, that can know so much of the universe, when turned into the

contemplation of *itself*, recoils back in sorrow and disappointment! Our Philosophical Bard, addressing a fellow child of mortality, has beautifully said,—

“ Go, wondrous creature ; mount where science guides,
 Go, measure earth, weigh air, and state the tides ;
 Instruct the planets in what orbs to run,
 Correct old Time, and regulate the Sun ;
 Go, soar whith Plato to the empyreal sphere,
 To the first good, first perfect, and first fair ;
 Go, teach Eternal Wisdom how to rule—
 Then drop into thyself, and be a fool ;”*

Phrenologists affirm, that mind is a heterogeneous existence ; and that its aggregate is not concerned in, nor at all necessary to, any process of its operations. Agreeing with the pre-established opinion, that the brain is its organ, they maintain, that to certain portions of the cerebral mass are allotted certain duties and functions ; and that the mental economy is managed by a division of labour, similar to that which, political economists inform us, is capable of producing in a community, the greatest results of wealth and prosperity.

Phrenologists affirm, further, that not only is the business of mind conducted by separate and independent portions of the brain, (to each of which they have assigned “ a local habitation and a name,”) but that their individual positions are so unquestionably manifested on the external cranium, that it requires only patient examination, with some share of experience, to enable one to determine what manner of man he was, whose brain inhabited any particular skull which may have survived the corroding influence of centuries!†

* Essay on Man.—† See NOTE [A.]

Gentlemen, I have divided the affirmations of Phrenologists into these two heads, in order to exhibit, in a few words, a fair outline of the science. The former, as it entirely regards the mind, may be strictly termed *Phrenology*; and the latter, as it only relates to the mind's earthly tenement, may be properly denominated *Craniology*. I have been thus minute, Gentlemen, in separating these portions of the doctrine, because, while I occupy your attention this evening, it is the *first* only, or that which entirely regards *the mind*, that I shall particularly investigate. And I may here observe, that the objections which I conceive to be involved in the principles of Phrenology, as illustrated by Gall, Spurzheim and Combe, (so far as I am aware,) have not been hitherto advanced by any of their opponents.

These Professors of the science maintain, that the brain consists of a certain number of distinct and separate portions, which they term the organs of an equal number of faculties; and that each of them, like the keys of a piano-forte, produces, when played upon, its own peculiar note; by means of which, they assure us, the harmony (or whatever else it may be) of thinking is beautifully performed! —But, Gentlemen, they have left us sadly in the dark regarding the most essential properties of this important instrument; and I rather think some of you will be surprised when I declare, that, after devoting the most elaborate attention to the subject, I have been totally unable to discover, from all they have said, what one might naturally expect should have been unfolded at the commencement, *viz.* whether two or more organs can, or cannot, be excited simultaneously,—whether *one* alone

must have the preponderance for the moment, or whether more than one can act either in opposition or in conjunction at the same individual instant, producing, thereby, *one specific and undivided result.*

Phrenologists, I admit, say enough concerning the combination of faculties; nay, by such instrumentality, they expound, with the utmost nicety, the *why* and the *wherefore* of all the most delicate shades, and, heretofore, most inscrutable contradictions, in the human character; extending their *manipulations*, not only to the dead as well as the living, but to many who never lived but in the Poet's imagination! Yet have they never deigned to explain what they really mean by this "*combination of faculties,*" which is, nevertheless, trumpeted forth as the fruitful source of such astonishing illustrations. They have never deigned even to insinuate, whether each performs its own individual task in its own period of time, the rest, alternately and successively, assisting or resisting its predecessor; or whether a certain number of them, like sailors bracing the yard, are conjoined, at the same moment, in a single impulse; or, *vice versa*, like pugilists in the ring, are mutually doing their utmost to knock their adversaries down.

I leave it, however, to Phrenologists to fill up the blank entirely as it suits themselves: their choice is but Scylla or Charybdis. If they affirm that one organ *only* can be excited at a time, I shall ask of them, whether this individual excitation can produce, by its own sovereign energy, unsubjected to any amendment or veto whatever, a positive act of the will? and also whether the *remem-*

* See NOTE [B.]

brains of this is exclusively retained by the particular organ so excited?—and to these questions, I shall expect a direct and explicit answer. If the reply be, that each organ does possess, exclusively and independently, these powers and faculties, I shall proceed thus. If the human mind consists of thirty-five organs, each of which is entirely unconnected with, asks no advice from, and is as ignorant of the “sayings and doings” of its neighbours, as if they were all inhabitants of different skulls, how has the foolish pronoun *I*, so cunningly, and yet so unnecessarily, obtruded itself into every human language, since the thirty-five organs are exactly so many identities, or in other words so many different beings; and taken in the aggregate, are as logically and as royally entitled to the plural *we*, as any thirty-five Kings that ever peopled the world? Gentlemen, this may savour of jesting, but *I* am in sound earnest. There is nothing so evident to the human mind as its own identity; which, although not demonstrable by any process of ratiocination, must, nevertheless, be assumed as a truth, anterior to the commencement of any other induction; and I challenge every Phrenologist on the globe, to reconcile the possibility of his own personal identity, or, in other words, the consciousness he possesses of being, at all times, *himself*, to the hypothesis which declares he is an assemblage of thirty-five existences, each independently possessing the faculties of perception, volition, and memory.

On the other hand, should it be asserted that more organs than one can “labour in their vocation” at the same instant, the advocates of Phrenology will not find that this, by any means, improves their position.

First.—It is demonstrable that if two organs so act, *in opposition*, they might as well save themselves the trouble of acting at all; for, the consequence must be, that, like an acid and an alkali, they would mutually neutralize each other; or, (to borrow an illustration from another science) as in the contact of two opposing bodies possessed of equal momentum, the impetus of both would be annihilated.

Secondly.—If a certain number of organs are conjoined in one individual impulse—*why not the whole bundle of them?* and if this be admitted, there is, at once, an end of Phrenology; and this branch of the science of mind remains exactly where it was in the days of Aristotle! Gentlemen, I will not thank you for admitting that “a whole is equal to all its parts,” for it is not in your power to conceive the contrary. It must, therefore, follow, that if all the faculties are in action at the same instant, mind is as much a *unit* as any Philosopher, since the beginning of the world, imagined it to be: and as it is an acknowledged law in philosophizing, that more shall not be assumed as a cause than is necessary to its consequent, a variety of organs must be rejected as a useless and unnecessary complication.

Should the Phrenologists adopt a middle course, and say, that the various organs sometimes act the one way, and sometimes the other, this resort will not avail them much. I shall request to be informed how it happens that, when under a raging fit of jealousy, or any other violent passion, with the trusty steel grasped in my hand, and the object of my wrath entirely in my power,—I shall request to be informed, I say, how it happens that, when

so situated, I am restrained from striking the deadly blow, by the dread of something that may follow it! It will not be nearly enough for me to be told that, at this critical moment,—when least it was to be expected, and certainly not at all desired, the organ of “*Cautiousness*,” should, so opportunely and instantaneously,—yet at the same time so impertinently,—not only intermeddle in the affairs of a neutral, and not even contiguous territory, but all at once swallow up the whole force of the fiercely armed despot of “*Destructiveness*!” I must know the medium and the method, whereby things so absolutely unconnected and adverse, are, nevertheless, so reciprocal and obedient?—I must have it explained to me, how it comes to pass, that the excitation of any organ whatever, can have the smallest influence, even on its *nearest* companion? And should I be told that they are all *wired* together, and that each of them, like puppets in Punch’s opera, starts into activity exactly when it should do so, I shall not yet be satisfied. I will still insist on having it made evident how all this is *managed*. Every spring and pulley must be described; and, unless the Phrenologists condescend to superadd *another* faculty to the thirty-five—making thereby even dozens of them—ay, and a very different one, too, in importance, from all its predecessors, I am afraid I shall have a long time to wait before I be made the wiser.

Gentlemen, this grand desideratum,—this No. 36, which I contend is absolutely necessary, to render Phrenology worthy of a moment’s rational notice, is not vagary of my fancy, created to amuse by its novelty, or puzzle by its subtlety. . . It is what, both in character and

in name, we have all been familiar with since we knew ourselves; and the proof of whose existence is indelibly impressed upon us at every step of our journey, from the cradle to the grave; but which, strange to tell, we must reject, as the tale of an idiot, the instant we admit Phrenology. I conceive, Gentlemen, you anticipate me, and scarcely need be told that this grand desideratum is neither more nor less than the REASONING faculty.

I am prepared to hear it denied, that Phrenology rejects the existence of this paramount principle. I am prepared to hear it asserted, that certain organs of the *thirty-five*, perform all the duties of this important office. I shall not stop at present, however, to refute assertions that *may* be made; but I shall be found at my post in the hour of need; and I do not think it will cost me much to prove, that the very essence of Phrenology involves the entire abandonment both of reason and memory!

Can it be doubted that all the waywardness of our passions,—all the eagerness of our desires,—all the infinity of our associations, by which the mind, “from the very instant of its first existence, is constantly exhibiting phenomena more and more complex,—sensations, thoughts, emotions, all mingling together, and almost every feeling modifying, in some degree, the feelings that succeed it,”—can it be doubted, I say, that all these, unceasingly, operate upon, and influence, even the minutest item of conscious existence? And is it not equally palpable that there is a “Divinity which stirs within us,”—that, sitting on the throne, and exercising dominion over ALL the intellect, sums up, examines, weighs, and determines, every conflicting claim which this astonishing complexity,

generates?—And shall we, in the face of this intuitive and hallowed conviction, be expected to receive a doctrine which declares, that all these wonderful results are produced by the undefinable operation of *thirty-five portions of the brain*,—not one of which, more than another, is allowed to possess the shadow of general control, but is strictly limited to the mechanical performance of its own solitary duty?

D. DRUMMOND.

The foregoing has been honoured with no less than *six* different replies; but as five of these were communicated to the Society, I am not authorized to publish them. It is necessary, however, to a proper understanding of the discussion, that before I proceed to the examination of these papers, the reader should be made acquainted with the following—

EXTRACT FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CALCUTTA
PHRENOLOGICAL SOCIETY, 28TH JULY 1827.

“Mr. DRUMMOND then proceeded to read a Paper, the object of which was “To shew that the Phenomena of Mind cannot be accounted for on Phrenological Principles.”

After an animated discussion of nearly two hours' duration, the Vice President submitted the following motion:

“That the Thanks of the Society be given to Mr. DRUMMOND, for his very ingenious Paper,—Further; that as soon as he has furnished the Society with some distinct idea (some notion not utterly unintelligible) of what he

means by the term "*Reasoning Faculty*"—frequently employed in his communication—and in fact so often as to be the key to the intelligibility of the whole of it—it shall be open to any Member of the Society, to point out the respects in which the various parts of it neutralize each other."

This was seconded by the President and carried unanimously, with the exception of Mr. DRUMMOND.

Mr. DRUMMOND then expressed a wish to place on the Records of the Minutes of the Society this, his definition of the term "*Reasoning Faculty*."

"That principle which every man is conscious of possessing, whereby he makes a choice from the innumerable and complex claims which are constantly presented to his mind."

Shortly after which, there being no further business before the Society, the President dissolved the Meeting at 11 P. M.

Mr. DRUMMOND, by permission of the President, subsequently handed the following to be inserted as an amplification of his definition.

Puzzled, as I am, to conceive why I should have so failed in making myself understood, I am nevertheless, afraid it is beyond my power, or that of any other person, to define, more clearly, that principle of the human mind, termed the "*Reasoning Faculty*." I have already stated it to be that which, amidst the infinity of our conflicting associations, sensations, and emotions, determines the will to a particular choice. I may add, that no volition, or act of the will, can possibly exist without a motive. The motive governs the will, and the Reasoning faculty

governs the motive. It is evident that every motive must depend on the state of the mind *at the particular moment*; and that this state is not simply the result of any *immediate* perception, sensation, or emotion, but is modified by the combined influence of *all* the reflections, and *all* the judgments that have preceded. And, finally,—*that*—whereby the sum of the mind's experience is made to act upon, and modify, every individual portion of its operations—I denominate the "*Reasoning Faculty*."

After writing the above, I met, in Dr. REID'S "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man" some remarks on the same subject, which I beg leave to add:—

"The power of reasoning is very nearly allied to that of judging; and it is of little consequence in the common affairs of life to distinguish them nicely. On this account, the same name is often given to both. We include both under the name of reason."

"What reasoning is, can be understood only by a man who has reasoned; and who is capable of reflecting upon this operation of his own mind. We can define it only by synonymous words or phrases, such as inferring, drawing a conclusion, and the like. The very notion of reasoning, therefore, can enter into the mind by no other channel than that of reflecting upon the operation of reasoning in our own minds."

"Judging is an operation of the mind so familiar to every man who has understanding, and its name is so common and so well understood, that it needs no definition."

"As it is impossible by a definition to give a notion of colour to a man who never saw colours; so it is impos-

“sible by any definition to give a distinct notion of judgment to a man who has not often judged, and who is not capable of reflecting attentively upon this act of his mind. The best use of a definition is to prompt him to that reflection; and without it the best definition will be apt to mislead him.”—*Vol. 8, Pages 252, 254, 74 & 75.*”

—————, *Secretary.* —————, *President.*

EXAMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S OBSERVATIONS.

Read to the Calcutta Phrenological Society, 27th October 1827,

Our worthy President declares himself at a loss to know, “whether, by the Reasoning Faculty, I mean a part, or the whole of the mind;” and I am equally at a loss to know upon what ground he can rest any doubt on the subject.

In the preliminary part of my paper, I imagined I had fully explained myself on this point, by stating, that, although “Metaphysicians had endeavoured to classify and denominate the powers and energies of this incomprehensible substance, these were never understood to result from the operation of separate and distinct parts, but were merely considered to be different *states* or *modes* of the one indivisible mind.” It is true, I have spoken of the *Reasoning Faculty* as discharging a most important function in the mental economy, and that I have termed

it, in the emphatical language of Addison, "*the divinity which stirs within us*;" and it is equally true, that I have personified this principle as "sitting on the throne, and exercising dominion over all the intellect;" but I cannot discover why it should be inferred from this, that any individual function has been described, either as *a whole or a part*; and the more particularly so, as all my arguments are in direct hostility to the divisibility of mind.

I am willing, however, to admit, that the terms we are compelled to introduce, in speaking of mind and its attributes, if taken literally, and in their common acceptation, may be very obnoxious to misconstruction. But this results from the imperfection of human language, and cannot be avoided, when *sounds* must be used as archetypes of notions and ideas, so entirely different in their nature from those they were originally intended to express. The great *Locke* was deeply sensible of this; and in his immortal "Essay" has strongly cautioned his readers against such misconception.*

But, as it appears that I *have* been misunderstood, let not this be the case again. The faculties of the mind are only different *modes* in which the *same* principle acts. Perception is the mind perceiving; Reason, the mind reasoning; Will, the mind willing; and Memory, the mind remembering. The Reasoning faculty, therefore, like every other, is neither *the whole* nor *a part* of the mind. It certainly requires no great effort to imagine the same person to be exercising the several professorships of Law, Physic, and Divinity; but it would be rather whimsical to assert, that any of these *functions* was either the pro-

* Essay on Hum. Understanding, Book 2d Chapt. 21 Sect. 20.

fessor himself, or a specific portion of him. Had the question been, whether the whole mind is employed in the exercise of any particular function, I should, without hesitation, have replied that there is no evidence to the contrary. But, notwithstanding this, it would be very incorrect language to say, that any function of the mind is the mind itself: for this might be conceived to imply, not merely that the function *engaged* the whole mind during a particular portion of time, but that the whole mind is *bona fide* an individual function of itself! The question then, "whether, by the Reasoning faculty, I mean a part, or the whole of the mind," which has been so often sounded in my ears, and concerning which so much wit has been elicited, is, in its nature, an absurdity; and cannot be replied to either in the affirmative or negative. It would be no greater inconsistency to demand whether a Horse was Cow, or a Cow was a Horse; and, with equal propriety, might it be a subject for merriment that no direct answer is possible.

It is objected to my definition of the Reasoning faculty, that there are certain acts of the Will, with which Reasoning has no concern; and our worthy President has instanced the case of a murder, perpetrated on his master and mistress, by a man named Nicholson, who declared, on the scaffold, that, until the very moment when, starting from his sleep, he rushed upstairs where the aged couple lay in bed, and, with the poker, committed the bloody deed,—no such idea or intention had ever presented itself to his mind!

Our worthy President insists, that this is a proof, not only that the Reasoning faculty had no concern with the

murderer's volition, but that the act was committed without any motive at all! Had our worthy President attended to the conclusion to which this doctrine inevitably leads, he would have paused in giving it utterance. An act without a motive, is an effect without a cause,—“a supposition” (as the eloquent Dr. Priestley says) “which overturns all appearances in nature, and especially the foundation of the only proper argument for the being of a God. For if any thing whatever, even a thought in the mind of man, could arise without an adequate cause, any thing else,—the mind itself, or *the whole universe*—might exist without a cause.”*

My conviction is, that, in the present instance, our worthy President has been confusing his naturally transparent intellect, by confounding the different applications of *a word*: for he admits that the murderer was governed by an “*uncontrollable impulse* ;” and further says, alluding to the horrid deed, “there we have an act without a motive, unless motive and impulse are proved to be synonymous ;”—synonymous they unquestionably are, or as much so, as any two words can be: for, although, in general language, impulse is applied to physical, and motive to mental causes of action, they are often used indiscriminately by our best writers and speakers.† Here, then, our worthy President and I are only at issue about *a word*! Vulgar language generally applies the term motive to a *just and proper* cause for human conduct, but, philosophically, it implies neither more nor less than

* Illustrations of Philosophical Necessity. 2d Edit. page 26.

† “Bodies produce ideas in us manifestly by impulse.” *Locke*.

“IMPULSE, Influence acting upon the mind: MOTIVE; idea impressed.”
Johnson's Dictionary.

that which impels a moral agent to do either a *good act* or a *bad one*. So much in defence of that portion of my definition which asserts, that "no volition, or act of the will, can possibly exist without a motive."

The remaining objection of our worthy President is, that the Reasoning Faculty does not govern human motives. Instead of *arguing* against this, however, he contents himself with exclaiming, "Where was the Reasoning Faculty when this man committed the murder? If the Reasoning Faculty is the whole mind—then this Nicholson, impelled by the Reasoning Faculty, committed a foul murder."

Our worthy President, in assuming that an act cannot be impelled by the Reasoning Faculty, because it is a foul and a murderous one, is evidently again puzzling himself by adopting the unphilosophical acceptance of a *word*; and, as in the former instance, an explanation of the terms will completely reconcile us.

In common parlance, Reasoning means that process whereby moral truth and propriety are necessarily educed; and the word is generally identified with its derivative *Reasonable*, although, in fact, it is not in human nature to imagine any thing more unreasonable than many actions which are, undoubtedly, the result of the most complex ratiocination! Dr. Johnson defines Reason, "*the director of man's will.*" Reasonable, he explains, by the word "*just,*" which two ideas are "wide as the poles asunder,"

"We can but reason but from what we know,"

and, a man, who commences the process upon false premises, may reason altogether correctly, yet every conclusion he arrives at will be unjustifiable and absurd. The ferocious outlaw, emerging from his midnight den,—whose

trade is blood,—whose solace is destruction,—reasons as accurately,—appropriates means to ends as minutely,—and balances his chances of success and defeat as nicely, as does the most enthusiastic philanthropist, who devotes fortune, fame and existence, to the benefit of his species!

Our President says “Taking it for granted that this man (meaning the murderer) told the truth, and what interest,” he asks, “had he to serve by the contrary—when he had the halter round his neck?” Is it really such a rare occurrence for a man to withhold the truth with a halter round his neck? Did not *John Thurtell* eloquently proclaim his innocence of the crime which brought him there, when in the same awful situation? and such an affirmation, so far as conscience is concerned, is certainly as difficult to be accounted for, as the declaration of an illiterate man regarding his ignorance of *a motive*. Before I believe that a *sane* human being committed so foul a murder, with no purpose of self-gratification whatever, (a fact, which if satisfactorily established, would overturn every induction both of philosophy and common sense,) I must have much better evidence before me than his own assertion, even if all the torments that tyranny has invented had been employed to extract confession from him.

Reason is God’s best gift to man—the created image of Himself; and that by which we become but “a little lower than the angels;” yet, this noblest gift, like all others, may be abused. Every pleasure has its pain, every rose its thorn;—honey and poison are in the same leaf: so, every capability bestowed on man, whereby he may dignify and refine his nature even into something almost above humanity, can be—alas! too often is, employed to brutify and

degrade him beneath the surly tiger of the desert! The latter only tears his prey to appease the clamorous calls of nature, and defends himself that he may perpetuate his species;—

While reasoning man, without a cause,
 Nor urged by hunger's madd'ning jaws,
 With cool intention, treach'rous fause,
 And art refin'd,
 Perverting Nature's sacred laws,
 Devours his kind!

Having now replied to all our worthy President's objections, may I be permitted, in return, to request that he, *as a Phrenologist*, will account for the conduct of the murderer Nicholson,—“taking it for granted that the man told the truth.” *Demonology*, I am aware, would settle the question in a moment, by simply informing us, that the *sane, sober and temperate* individual was suddenly and instantaneously possessed of an evil spirit! Phrenology, of course, will affirm that he was only possessed of an evil *organ*; but it can scarcely maintain, I should think, that he became so possessed, the very instant he committed the crime. I shall not, however, anticipate our worthy President's explanation, although I cannot help remarking it, as rather singular, that this horrible propensity, which its unfortunate victim must have carried about with him from infancy, should have remained peaceable so long;—that amid the whips and scorns, as well as the temptations of life, it should have continued quiescent, or at least manageable; and, at last,—without signal or warning, and when under no excitement whatever, it should have burst forth in such a deadly explosion!

D. DRUMMOND.

EXAMINATION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REPLY.

Read to the Calcutta Phrenological Society, 27th October 1827.

The paper entitled a reply to mine, with which our worthy Vice President has favoured the Society, is, altogether, such an extraordinary production, that, had it not appeared *in print*, and with his name affixed, nothing could have convinced me he was in sober earnest. The worthy member, it evidently appears, was determined to raise a laugh—by fair means, perhaps, if he could—but, by *any means* to raise a laugh; forgetting that wit—even genuine wit, is not argument; and that it is, besides, a weapon, which, of all men in the world, a Phrenologist should be the last to wield.

His paper, upon the whole, is about as much a reply to mine, as it is to the last *firman* from Constantinople! Nor should I have noticed it at all, but for the possibility of my silence being construed into defeat. I shall, therefore, proceed to examine it—not, however, forgetting the tender qualities of mercy—that it is

“twice blest.

Blest in the giving, and blest in the receiving.”

It is, no doubt, owing to the opacity of my intellect, that the first two sentences of paragraph 1st are as inscrutable to me, as was the handwriting on the wall, to the wise men of Babylon! To say they contain no meaning however were to speak widely from my belief,—they comprehend, unquestionably, the *very essence* of wisdom; but, wrapt up, as it is, in such mystic sublimity, it may

easily be conceived how an understanding, like mine, has been quite unable to discover it.

The next paragraph consists of dark insinuations regarding certain definitions of the Reasoning faculty, not, in the least, bearing on the question at issue; and as nothing is affirmed, there is nothing to be denied. There is, however, *one* assertion, dimly discoverable amid the mass of words, and which, unfortunately, is a misrepresentation. "Admitting" it is said "*that the hypothesis from which Mr. Drummond's definition starts, namely, that what every body believes must be true.*"—I have said nothing whatever to warrant such an assumption; and the worthy member should be cautious, in this respect, however much he may expand himself in others.

The 3rd paragraph is occupied by a quotation from Spurzheim, describing the great importance of the organ of Comparison; and by distantly insinuating that this No. 34 performs the duties of the Reasoning faculty. If the worthy member would distinctly affirm that Phrenology recognizes an individual Reasoning faculty, and that its organ is the organ of Comparison, I should, with much pleasure, enter the lists with him. But I cannot waste my time in replying to *inuendos*. He has taken up no position, and cannot, therefore, be dislodged. So far from asserting that the organ of Comparison is identified with the Reasoning faculty, he is entirely, dubious, to use his own words, "*whether the portion of the brain here alluded to, possesses those capabilities or not.*" Yet he seems to confess the necessity of "*a principle adapted for choosing amongst all possible contingencies,*" and in not daring to fix it in any of the 35 organs, he admits, by

implication, that "The Phenomena of Mind cannot be accounted for on Phrenological principles."

The next paragraph commences, thus "*as the sum of the mind's experience must necessarily too be involved in making a Comparison, it must be apparent, &c.*" Now, if it be really admitted that the sum of the mind's experience is necessary *at all*, the worthy member yields, at once, all he seems to be contending for. A splendid display of Logic follows, but which I am saved the trouble of dissecting, as nothing whatever is attempted to be deduced or established from it. Besides, a syllogism which assumes for its premises, that the Reasoning principle, *at the same time, is and is not the whole mind*, affords its own exposition; and the pompous conclusion of "*the whole of itself assisting a part of itself in doing that which the whole could not do,*" is the necessary consequence of one absurdity producing another! The remainder of this paragraph, including the doggerel verses, being nothing to the purpose, I pass in silence.

It is next asserted that; "*if there is on earth one man who, more than another, discredits, the evidence of his own senses, it is your Metaphysician: if there is on earth one man, who more than another, appeals to facts, it is the Phrenologist.*" This is the first comprehensible sentence I have yet arrived at: and as it is, perhaps, better to have meaning without argument, than argument without meaning, we must be content, for the present, to waive every thing like *proof*, and be thankful with even intelligible *assertion*.

Lastly, it is affirmed, although in rather a whimsical manner, that "*fact loving Phrenologists*" have done as

much in twenty years, as *Metaphysicians* in two thousand; and, that during that long period, the latter "*have occupied themselves in doing nothing, or less than nothing.*" There is little doubt that a follower of *Joanna Southcote* would make a similar bold declaration—only substituting the divine mother of Shiloh for the divine science of *Phrenology*! There is little doubt that he would assert (and believe it too) that all the science and philosophy in this dark world, had "*done nothing or less than nothing*" compared to the precepts of the inspired *Joanna*. It might be replied to him, that until he made himself better acquainted with science and philosophy, his bare word would be scarcely sufficient to establish this,—but the better course would be, not to reply at all. But what does the worthy member mean by *Phrenology* having done so much, in so short a time? Is it the number of its *proselytes* he boasts of?—if so, he has favoured the world with a new mode of estimating truth; the inference from which is—*the greater the absurdity, the greater the truth!* The multiplying numbers of *Jumpers, Shakers, Ranters, and New Jerusalemites*, sufficiently illustrates this.

I have now followed the worthy member through all his eccentricities; and without finding it necessary to defend a single out-post of the arguments which he buckled on his armour to destroy: for, in all the meanderings of his fancy, whether from chance or method, *these* have entirely escaped him! One word more. The worthy member, at the close of his lucubration, has done me the honor, (I know not why) of coupling my name with that of *Mr. Jeffrey*. It is my duty to return the compliment; and, I trust, it will be deemed a full equivalent, if I place

the Vice President alongside of that great philosopher and Jurisconsult, Jeremy Bentham—whose writings, in his mother tongue, as it is well known, are utterly incomprehensible; but, which, when translated into French, and from that again into English, instruct and enlighten the world! I trust, at the same time, that our worthy Vice President will take this friendly hint in good part; and that, when he would again instruct and enlighten this Society, he will not rest satisfied with pouring out mere *words*—but kindly recollect, that it is in some degree necessary that whatever is *written* should be also *understood*.

D. DRUMMOND.

These two "*replies*," which I have taken the trouble to examine, have, certainly, very little reference to my difficulties and scepticisms. There is, however, one of a different character, and from a great authority in Phrenology, too,—no less a man than G. M. Paterson, M. D. and, which, having been published by him in the Calcutta John Bull newspaper, I make no scruple of inserting in full:—

THE PHENOMENA OF MIND CAN ONLY BE
ACCOUNTED FOR ON PHRENOLOGICAL
PRINCIPLES.

Being an Answer to the Address, read by Mr. Drummond to the Phrenological Society, on Saturday Evening, 23th July, 1827.

On the publication of Mr. Drummond's Address in the *John Bull*, I was requested by several persons to reply to

it. This I declined for a considerable time, not doubting but some of the Members of the Society, with more health and ability than myself, would undertake the reply. But a medical friend, for whose opinion I have a great esteem, having suggested, that the Address of Mr. Drummond might probably make an improper impression on the public mind, if it remained unanswered; I no longer hesitated to put the few following remarks together, for the purpose of supporting those great truths concerning the Philosophy of the human mind, which have been discerned by comprehensive comparisons of the different cerebral organizations of animal nature.

As human creatures born in ignorance and designed by the Almighty Father of the Universe to pass thro' various states and stages of intelligence and affection, from the obscurity of merely sensual propensity, to the splendour of intellectual truth, we are in our first conditions of existence continually obnoxious to error and deception. Unless, indeed, we tread the ground of inquiry with the utmost "cautionsness," paying every "veneration" that is due to the sentiments of others, as well as entertaining the most scrupulous distrust of our own abilities, instead of discovering the object of our researches, we shall only bewilder ourselves in the mazes of conjecture and "self-esteem." Previous, however, to my entering on the subject, I beg leave to add that it behoves every one who is in earnest to obtain the prize of psychological wisdom to be perpetually on his guard against the delusions of self-love and vanity, holding his mental capacities open for *years and years* to the reception of further light and just information.

To prevent the imputation of unfair conduct in misrepresenting any of Mr. Drummond's assertions, and that every reader may judge of the propriety or impropriety of my remarks, I think the most candid as well as the most just mode of procedure will be, first to state his own words, and then to make my own observations :

“When this Society was first established, Mr. Drummond observes, that no Member pledged himself further than to give the claims of phrenology a candid and a patient hearing,” &c. This is perfectly correct, for on the foundation of the Society in March 1825, the late worthy and much to be lamented President Dr. Abel, hinted to myself and some others present on the occasion that the obligation (a mere form) binding Members “to advance the interests of the Society” should be cancelled from the regulations, which was accordingly done; and it was resolved that no Member should pledge himself further, as Mr. Drummond says, than to give the claims of phrenology a candid and a patient hearing. Yet, it was most certainly not anticipated that any Member could suppose, that he was either hearing or acting candidly and patiently by publishing* to the world, crude, hasty, and premature conclusions respecting some of the most interior operations of the human mind, the phrenological exposition of which involves the idea of much patience, much perseverance, much profound thinking, various readings, and comprehensive admeasurements, and manipulations in different quarters of the globe, among divers nations and tribes.

* Note by Dr. Paterson.—It was clearly proved to the satisfaction of the Members of the Society that Mr. Drummond had no hand in the publication of his paper.

For, an isolated paper (as Mr. Drummond's must be considered when laid before the public) in as much as it does not premise the introductory and initiatory facts and reasonings, which naturally and successively lead men's minds to just and unbiassed contemplation, cannot, in my humble opinion, tend to accelerate, but must (locally at least) retard the progress of truth. After some *galimatias* about truth, Mr. Drummond concludes his first paragraph thus, "The offering I now make may be the nucleus of future discussion, and should it rouse or stimulate the talent which the Culcutta Prenological Society unquestionably possesses, it will not perhaps be considered altogether unprofitable."

The examination of any question should never be shunned in the minutest degree, but on the contrary every argument of opposition should be allowed its plenary weight and importance: and I "accordingly admit that the offering is most excellent as a nucleus for future discussion at Meetings of the Society." Moreover, I do think that Mr. Drummond pays a very handsome compliment to the Society, for which I have no doubt the Members will have the politeness to make him every suitable acknowledgement, and I trust that the *talent* which he allows the Prenological Society unquestionably to possess, will not be deemed as any proof of their weakness in having embraced a system of mental philosophy concerning which Mr. Drummond (not very consistently I trow) in the finale of his Oration considers as involving the entire "abandonment both of reason and memory!"

Mr. Drummond, however, proceeds—"until the promulgation of phrenology, mind had been uniformly contem-

plated as one homogeneous existence. In the course of my reading, &c.”

Admitting that Metaphysicians regarded the mind as an unit or homogeneous existence, still we find them obliged to call into their aid *heterogeneous states* or *modes*. Aristotle had his passive intellect, his active intellect, his speculative and practical intellects, sensibility, appetite, and voluntry motion. Bacon had his reasonable and sensitive souls, his understanding, his reasoning faculty, imagination, memory and volition. Hobbes admitted two principal faculties—to know and to move. Locke, and with him, Reid, and Stewart all agree in sensation and reflection with a few modifications. Bonnet recognizes understanding, volition, liberty, sentiment, idea, activity. Condillac admits seven faculties, sensation, attention, comparison, judgment, reflection, imagination, reasoning, and all these faculties he considers merely as *sensations transformed*. Kant admits 25 pure conceptions, as he terms them, viz., space and time, unity, plurality, totality, affirmation, negation, imitation, inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, society, possibility and impossibility, existence and non-existence, necessity and contingency, identity, diversity, concord, contradiction, interior idea, exterior idea, matter, form, self, God and the universe.

Now all these philosophers deduced their respective doctrines from reflection on self-consciousness, and I ask with what propriety can unity or homogeneity be conferred on such sublime speculations and splendid superstructures? Was it not a dream which could be demonstrated, in our sage metaphysicians retiring into the solitude of

their own closets, reflecting for days, or weeks, or months, on their own self-consciousness, and then coming forth from their study declaring to the world that they had discovered the arcana of mental science? Is it not self-evident that they could only impart a few imperfect sketches of *their own minds*, not of mind in general, not an universal outline of the average capacities and qualities of mind as existing throughout the peopled regions of the earth. Phrenology broke this dream, as Mr. Drummond very accurately observes.

Mr. D. continues, "When the Reformers, as they are termed, of the Christian Religion, first called in question the indivisibility of the Roman Catholic Church, which opinion had been until then the undisturbed belief of ages, they commenced, as naturally they should, by exposing the fallacy of the established creed."

The British Phrenologists, like the Religious Reformers of old, called in question the substantiality of every mental system from the days of the Stagyrite to those of Stewart. It was the glaring fallacy of the established mode of accounting for mental operations that first roused the talent of British Phrenologists.

"Let it not however be inferred," the paper proceeds, "that the wisdom of our ancestors is any idol of my veneration," &c. and in another part "Gentlemen, little as I respect the opinions of our forefathers, en masse, I would separate the diamond from the dross," &c.

Although it is true that Dr. Gall broke the delusion and dream of Metaphysics, and published his new system as one that was at once distinct, comprehensive and complete, thus supplying the deficiencies of the ancient sages

by a more satisfactory as well as by a more substantial and edifying analysis of mental principles, powers and operations, yet, Dr. Gall himself never denied that these boasted models of unity and indivisibility, with all their imperfections had, occasionally, tho' the instances were thinly scattered, some striking excellences.

“ Inter quæ verbum emicuit si forte decorum,
Si versus paulo concinnior, unus et alter;
Injuste totum ducit venitque poema.”

The enlightened Author of Phrenology, after some thirty years of rational study, felt himself in possession of the Master-key to the rich Cabinet of the mental Constitution with all its stores.—In his early youth, however, we see that Gall fortunately took the right road to the acquisition of truth; this consideration, coupled with the profound researches into the anatomy and organization of the Brain, of which he has exhibited abundant proofs in his magnificent publications in folio, have been unquestionably instrumental in supplying him with this key. Gall thoroughly unravelled the sophistical pretences on which the old systems affected to justify themselves. It is true he found the bigotry of old men, attached to antiquated systems, almost invincible; and, no wonder, for we may see every day of our lives examples of persons who regard the adoption of new sentiments as so much absolute loss on the side of the dead stock of their old intellectual possessions.

“ Yet, after all,” continues the address, “ it is not probable that man, by his utmost efforts will ever arrive at any thing like certainty regarding the operations of his own mind. The intellect, that can know so much of the universe, when turned into the Contemplation of itself,

recoils back in sorrow and disappointment"—then follows a quotation from Pope, elucidating the preceding prose.

This is a capital portrait of old—

Metaphysics in despair!

This is drawn to the life.

A metaphysician shut up in his closet, with the intellect turned into the contemplation of itself, (or as I have said before, reflecting on his own self-consciousness,) were he to remain in his retirement and cogitate for a century, could never arrive at any thing like certainty regarding the operations of mind in general; or regarding the nature and quality of the human mind as a standard. No—his faculties *must* recoil back in sorrow and disappointment—indeed he will most assuredly

“Drop into himself, and be a fool.”

The Phrenologists on the other hand do *not drop into themselves*, but push their inquiries into the natural history of man as he exists, differently modified as to body and mind, in every corner of this habitable globe.

“Not man the sullen savage in his den

But man called forth to fellowship with men.”

Hear the eloquent Dr. Gall “depuis le polype jusqu’ a l’homme Phrenologie nous demontre, de fragment en fragment, les causes materielles du perfectionnement graduel de leur intelligence, dont, en sens inverse, en descendant de l’homme jusqu’ au polype et en retranchant piece a piece elle opere la diminution et la degradation; les propositions nombreuses de cette doctrine tout en detruisant a droite et a gauche les erreurs les plus accreditees et se soutiennent et se consolident mutuellement; elle est eminentement feconde en application aux affaires humaines, a l’education, aux arts et aux sciences, a l’etude de l’histoire, a la medecine, a la philosophie a la morale, a la

legislation criminelle; elle ouvre au naturaliste observateur un "champ immense de meditation."

The three next paragraphs of Mr. Drummond's paper contain only the general affirmations of phrenology, such as the brain being an aggregate of organs; and that these organs are manifested by the bones &c.

I, therefore, pass on to the two next in sequence, where it is written, "These Professors of the Science maintain, that the brain consists of a certain number of distinct and separate portions, which they term the organs of an equal number of faculties; and that each of them, like the keys of a piano forte, produces, when played upon, its own peculiar note; by means of which they assure us the harmony, or whatever else it may be,) of thinking, is beautifully performed. But, Gentlemen, they have left us sadly in the dark regarding the most essential properties of this important instrument; and I rather think some of you will be surprised when I declare, that, after devoting the most elaborate attention to the subject, I have been totally unable to discover from all they have said, what one might naturally expect should have been unfolded at the commencement, viz.: whether two, or more organs can, or cannot, be excited simultaneously; whether *one* alone must have the preponderance for the moment, or whether *more* than one can act, either in opposition or in conjunction, at the same instant, producing, thereby, one specific and undivided result."

"Phrenologists, I admit, say enough concerning the combination of faculties; nay, by such instrumentality, they expound, with the utmost nicety the *why* and the *wherefore* of all the most delicate shades, and, heretofore,

most inscrutable contradictions in the human character ; extending their manipulations, not only to the dead as well as the living, but to many who never lived but in the Poet's imagination!" " Yet have they never deigned to explain what they really mean by this " combination of faculties," which is, nevertheless, trumpeted forth as the fruitful source of such astonishing illustrations."

The first question, then, the solution of which Mr. Drummond requires, is: Whether two or more organs can, or cannot be excited simultaneously? I beg leave to offer him the following information on this point, hoping that it will prove satisfactory, and annihilate his propensity to scepticism. It is the opinion of Dr. Gall and the most distinguished of our Phrenologists in England, (an opinion too which I have more than once stated in the Society's Apartments in Hare-street) that two or three or more organs can, and frequently do, manifest themselves *synchronously*. (I prefer the Greek word to the Latin synonyme, simultaneously) As the Heart and Lungs may be said to act synchronously, when the times of the pulsations of the one and of the respirations of the other are in correspondence; so, do our cerebral organs act synchronously. I will illustrate my meaning by a familiar example: suppose a person, whose organ of Colour is moderately developed, whose organs of Tune and Veneration are more than moderately developed, to be in St. Paul's Cathedral admiring the historical pieces that adorn the interior of the dome, and while he is thus engaged, suppose the hundredth Psalm comes with its heavenly notes swellings on his ear—it is probable Colour will become quiescent, and that then Veneration and Tune will act

synchronously: i. e. Tune will perceive and remember all the special and singular graces of the Holy Anthem, its *adagios*, *andantes*, *fortes*, *affettuosos*, and the melting cadences and concords that come within the proper sphere of its own activity, while a sphere of Adoration for the Deity, will encompass and invest every, the minutest musical idea.

The next question required to be solved is, "Whether one organ alone must have the preponderance for the moment."

This happens occasionally likewise, especially in the cerebral organization of Partial Genius; when one organ is exceedingly large and all the rest moderately developed. In this case one single organ will have the preponderance, not only for the moment, but for many moments, and moreover, it will press the action of congenial organs into its service. I shall illustrate this by an example. When there is an exceedingly large organ of constructiveness, and the other organs only moderately developed, this propensity will preponderate in the intellectual character. Pierre de Laar, at the age of 5 years, was continually occupied in designing and carving whatever he saw. His memory could recall, with the most astonishing fidelity, a long time afterwards, the form and construction of the objects he had only seen once. At the age of 10 years, he constructed a marble head which was the admiration of connoisseurs. His is the species of configuration among which you find people's *kobbies*, of their ruling or preponderating delight.

The third question is, "Whether one or more can act in opposition?"—Now, there is no such thing as opposition

among the organs of the brain. I have asserted that there may be individual excitation of a single organ, and that there may be *synchronous* action of one or more organs. I maintain, likewise, that there may be successive action, and also alternation of action, either with contiguous or remote organs.

That there is no created principle of opposition among the organs is proved, from the consideration that the organ of Destructiveness is not a bad propensity, when it acts in equilibrium with the organs of Reflection and Morality. That organ *may appear* opposed to Benevolence, but philosophically considered it is not so—from their combination, a *tertium-quid* effect is produced. In mental operations there are no neutralizations as in chemical operations, or in mechanical operations, so that Mr. Drummond's analogies of Acid and Alkali, and the momenta of brute force, do not apply at all; neither do Mr. Drummond's similies, such as "sailors bracing the yard, and pugilists in the ring," tend to illustrate the action and reaction of organs. They are all very vulgar—and smell too strongly of *tar* and *Pierce Egan*; besides, witticisms may do very well in some cases; but they do not apply to subjects of a stern philosophical nature.

Mr. Drummond proceeds, "If they affirm that one organ can be excited at a time, I shall ask of them, whether this individual excitation can, by its own sovereign energy, unsubjected to any amendment or veto whatever, produce a positive act of the will?"

To this question, which is a very important one, I beg leave to reply, that every organ wills, wishes, or desires to be gratified, and this by its own created, inherent or

sovereign energy: for example, **Combativeness** wills, wishes, or desires to resist; **Amativeness** wills, wishes, or desires to love; **Adhesiveness** wills, wishes, or desires to contract friendships,—all by their own sovereign energies; **Comparison** wills, wishes, or desires to make analogies; and **Causality** wills, wishes, or desires to trace effects to their causes; **Benevolence** wills, wishes, or desires happiness to the neighbour; **Veneration** wills, wishes, or desires conjunction with the Deity; **Conscientiousness** wills, wishes, or desires equity—all by their own inherent sovereign energies. Here we have 3 kinds of Volition perfectly distinct; the Volition of the Animal propensities, the Volition of the Rational faculties, and the Volition of the Moral sentiments; and the Animal is subordinate to the Rational, and the Rational to the Moral. Now I trust that Mr. Drummond will see, that what we generally mean by Free will, is compounded of the will of our reflecting faculties and moral sentiments.

To his question, therefore, I shall give this direct and explicit answer, viz. that any one organ may be excited at a time, and by this individual excitation, can produce a positive act of its own inherent will, wish or desire; and will exclusively retain the remembrance of this will, wish, or desire; but the nature of this, will depend upon the particular region in which this organ resides. This certainly is as clear as noon day. I have no need to inform Mr. Drummond, I suppose, that Free will, or Moral liberty, is an efflux from the reflecting faculties and moral sentiments. Mr. Drummond remarks, that “There is nothing so evident to the human mind as its own identity; which, although not demonstrable by any process of reasoning, must

nevertheless be assumed as a truth, anterior to the commencement of any other induction ; and I challenge (he exclaims) every phrenologist on the globe, to reconcile the possibility of his own personal identity, or in other words the consciousness he possesses of being at all times *himself*, to the hypothesis which declares he is an assemblage of 35 existences, each independently possessing the faculties of perception, volition, and memory." Personal identity, means, I suspect, the sameness of a rational being. Does the consciousness of our own existence in youth, manhood and old age, or consciousness of our existence in two joint successive moments, constitute the same individual action ?

It is strange that Mr. Drummond should have found perplexities in accounting for identity on phrenological principles ; for tho' the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the same, owing to the different organs, yet they are consciousnesses of integral combinations of the *same self*. And so any Phrenologist may easily reconcile his own identity, by the successive consciousnesses of his own organs, to the hypothesis (as Mr. Drummond terms it) of his being an assemblage of 35 essentially distinct powers and affections. The pronoun I is just as applicable and personal to three or four organs at the time of their action, as it is to the whole 35, if they happened to be all in action.

Mr. Drummond proceeds, "If a certain number of organs are conjoined in one individual impulse, why not the whole *bundle* of them?" And why not ? It is not an impossible occurrence, though, in this degenerate age, a very rare one ; for the simultaneous action of the whole organs

implies such a harmonious equilibrium as seldom or never falls to the lot of any individual now-a-days. The admirable Chrichton comes nearest this equilibrium of any person I have read of in history; and his portraits and busts are wonderfully expressive of this equilibrium—of the universal genius! But it does not follow, although the whole, 35 organs are capable of synchronous action, that the mind would be “as much an unit as in the days of Aristotle, for in the days of this Peripatetic, only *general* powers were known, from reflection on self-consciousness; no specific faculties were dreamt of, much less discovered, by a comprehensive comparison of cerebral organizations.

Mr. Drummond, lastly, says “Should the prenologists adopt a middle course, and say, the various organs sometimes act one way, sometimes another, this resort will not avail them much.” He then supposes himself under a “raging fit of jealousy, with the trusty steel grasped in his hand, and the object of his wrath entirely in his power;” and then asks—“how happens it, that, that when so situated, I am restrained from striking the deadly blow?” He adds “It will not be nearly enough for me to be told that the organ of Caution should intermeddle in the affairs of a neutral, and not even contiguous, territory, but all at once swallow up the whole force of the fiercely armed despot of Destructiveness.” I never measured nor properly manipulated Mr. Drummond’s head—therefore, I cannot say, what his endowments of reason and morality are; but if Caution is not well developed, Veneration and Benevolence may; or his Secretiveness or Self-esteem, may be well developed. Now it is possible that though Caution might be organically defective, Veneration, Benevolence, Secre-

tiveness or Self-esteem, might combine, or be mixed with Destructiveness, and by a *succenturiate* power, produce a *sextum quid*, which would prevent the effusion of blood. If Mr. Drummond should find his Destructive inclination irresistible, he may, if he chooses still to gratify its murderous desires, imitate the barber of Frankfort, who, on his sweetheart being betrothed to another, took the trusty steel in his hand, and shoved it into his own stomach!

He then says, "I must have it explained to me, how it comes to pass, that the excitation of any organ whatever can have the smallest influence, even on its nearest companion?" and in another place, "Every spring and pulley must be described." Unfortunately, in the brain, there is neither spring nor pulley—all communication from one organ to another is by the medium of fibres, *febrillæ*, and *febrillulæ*, all the white substance of the brain is fibrous. In the convolutions, the white substance is coagulated in fibres, which run perpendicularly from the basis upwards. In other parts of the brain, we perceive horizontal fibres, and circular fibres; in some parts again, we have crossed and interwoven and diverging fibres. We have the anterior, middle, posterior, and great, commissures—and there are transverse bands in the *corpora olivaria* and *crura cerebri*. All these fibres serve for the connection of organs. "La connoissance de l'homme suppose la connoissance des elemens dont il est composé comme la connoissance du mechanism ed'une horologe suppose celles des roues, des leviers, du ressort, des poids, du balanciers, de son mouvement."

If Mr. Drummond wishes to become acquainted with the springs and pullies, by which the cerebral organs,

whether contiguous or remote, are reciprocally affected, I recommend him to have recourse to the Scalpel, and dissect as many brains as he can; for, in my humble opinion, it is only by being able to trace the cerebral fibres from one organ to another, that we can attain to a precise knowledge of their mysterious sympathies; and, in such a laudable undertaking, I, for one, wish him every possible success.

The rest of Mr. Drummond's address is puerile and erratic. I, therefore, must conclude this paper, by remarking, that there is this wide difference between false science and true science; neither the extent nor trophies of the former can preserve it from decay—such is the science of Metaphysics. On the other hand, true Science, though undistinguished by its pretensions, is, nevertheless, always preserved from dissolution, by the vigour and activity of that principle of vital fact and certitude, with which it is connected. Phrenology, therefore, being a true science, a science founded on the immutable and eternal relations of created things, will be always in the spring of its youth; consequently, ever blooming, and ever exhaling, the sweet odour of that philosophic virtue which quickens it, to the delight of its cultivators, and the recreation of all who approach within the sphere of its fragrance and vitality!

MURRAY PATERSON, M. D.

*Fort William,
No. 15, Royal Barracks,
30th August, 1827.*

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Besides the foregoing, which was published in the *Calcutta John Bull* newspaper, three other replies have been laid before the Society, by *Mr. A.* *Mr. B.* and an *Anonymous Phrenologist*; from each of which I have quoted, *seriatim*, every item that has been offered which bears on my position, and examined it accordingly—including, at the same time, all that appears to me relevant and essential in Dr. Paterson's letter.*

This is not the plan, however, which, under other circumstances, I should have adopted; it would have cost me much less trouble to have combated the system of Phrenology, generally; but when I commenced these strictures, it was with no anticipation of ultimately shaping them into a book; and as I have neither leisure nor inclination to re-write the whole, this little production must even venture forth "with all its imperfections on its head."

Before, however, I proceed to consider these four papers, I request particular attention to the following *recapitulation* of my objections to Phrenology, which, are substantially those propounded in my paper of the 28th July 1827, and to which, in the course of my review, I shall frequently refer, placing one of them on the front of each division of the question, that it may be the more easily ascertained how far any, or all of these difficulties have been either met or obviated.

* The Reader will lose nothing by my not being enabled to present all these papers in full; as I have, literally, extracted from them every word they contain of reply or argument. It will be admitted that the far greater portion of Dr. Paterson's letter is neither of these, but is composed either of fulsome declamation on the glories of Phrenology,—or gratuitous abuse of "Old Metaphysics."

RECAPITULATION OF OBJECTIONS.

First. If each organ possesses, exclusively and independently, perception, volition, memory, &c. it must follow, that they are all distinct and independent existences; and that unity of consciousness, which is, in other words, a man's being *himself*, is utterly impossible.

Secondly. If a plurality of organs act, at the same moment, *in opposition*, (that is, the one counteracting the other,) it must follow, that they neutralize each other in the ratio of their respective forces.

Thirdly. If a plurality of organs act, at the same moment, *in conjunction*, (that is, in producing one individual impulse,) why not the whole of them, which would amount to all the unity of mind that has ever been contended for?

Fourthly. If the various organs do operate upon, and influence, each other, this, like every thing else, must be done by some particular means. How, then, is it managed? What connects and guides their jarring counsels? What so opportunely informs "*Cautiousness*" that a foe is in the field, and as instantly directs him to oppose "*Destructiveness*?" What is the medium of communication whereby the excitation of any organ whatever can have the smallest influence, even on its *nearest* companion?

And *Fifthly.* I have said, that the very essence of Phrenology involves the abandonment both of reason and memory, (the one of which directs and judges, the other retains and restores, all the ideas and operations of the mind,) by affirming, that these, as well as all other attributes of the glorious and divine intellect of man, are the result of thirty-five ungoverned, unconnected instincts.

EXAMINATION

OF

*Mr. A.'s Mr. B.'s Dr. Paterson's and A Phrenologist's
Replies.*

The greater portion of Mr. A.'s paper is quite irrelevant to the subject under discussion; and many of its assertions are directly opposed to the doctrine which it purports to defend. I, certainly, did not expect to hear a man calling himself a Phrenologist, and, at the same time, in possession of his sober senses, flatly denying that mind is a *heterogeneous* existence; and that, so far from its business being conducted by separate and distinct parts, whose individual positions are so manifested on the external cranium, that, with, patient examination, it may be determined what manner of man he was whose brain inhabited any particular skull,—that so far from this being the orthodox doctrine, “*Mr. Drummond,*” in having ascribed to the new science such a monstrous creed, proves, that he “*is either wholly uninstructed in the principles of Phrenology, or he has, for his own purposes, wilfully misrepresented or mis-stated the principles which he affects to combat!*”

When Mr. A. so stoutly denies that the mind is heterogeneous, does he, then, affirm with me, that it is one indivisible existence,—“*that its various faculties are only different states or modes in which the same principle acts?*” Unquestionably he affirms this, if there be any meaning in words; but, strange to say, with equal pertinacity, he affirms the direct contrary! It is evident that the worthy

member is totally *unaware* of the conclusions to which his own assertions lead, and that he has paid no attention to the just acceptation of the terms he has so unsparingly used; and he appears altogether unconscious that his paper, throughout, advocates several leading positions which are entirely incompatible with, and mutually subversive of, each other. To prove this, however, it only requires that this Essay be fairly dissected;—the affirmations on the one side separated from, and contrasted with, those on the other—I shall, therefore, endeavour to exhibit

MR. A.

versus

HIMSELF

“All sensation is directed to, or concentrated in, some one point, which point, I submit, is the habitation of the mind, or of the divinity which stirs within us.”

“The functions act with the mind, and act wherever mind pervades; and I thence infer that Reason (as a function of the mind) is exercised in *every* Faculty.”

The contradiction here is so manifest as to require no remark. If “all sensation be directed to, or concentrated in, some one point,” it is impossible that it can “*pervade*” beyond that point.

“Mind may, therefore, be considered as a MONAD EXISTENCE essential to animal life, and necessarily involving in its functions the principles of Thought. All action is consequent upon motives affecting the mind, when under the influence of excitement of the external senses, but no division of the mind takes place.”

“Gentlemen, I am impressed with a thorough conviction, that the mind does conduct its operations by the instrumentality of cerebral organs or parts, in each of which essentially run all the functions of the indivisible principle; this is necessary, because without it, the faculties and organs would be incapable of operation.”

Here, on the one side, Mind is declared to be "A MONAD EXISTENCE," "and that no division takes place;" while on the other, it is asserted that it conducts its operations by the instrumentality of parts; and that each part contains a *portion* of the indivisible principle! The worthy member seems ignorant that a *monad* is that which is incapable of divisibility; and that an *indivisible* principle cannot have parts. A *distributable monad* is a solecism in language.

"Mr. Drummond's charge, that Phrenology affirms that mind is a heterogeneous existence, and that its aggregate is not concerned in, nor at all necessary to, any process of its operation, is not supported. We do not affirm, that mind is a heterogeneous existence."

"If the mind acted homogeneously, or not in parts, an impression communicated to the sensorium; would immediately arouse every faculty. But we are conscious it is not so."

The one of these declares that mind is not a *heterogeneous* existence, and the other, that it does not *act* homogeneously. It is true that homogeneous *action* is a misapplication of language, as the words, heterogeneous and homogeneous imply *qualities* only. The worthy member, therefore, must have conceived them to be synonymous with divisibility and indivisibility, for he says, "if the mind acted homogeneously, or not in parts," &c. If this be not his meaning, he asserts that the mind is not *heterogeneous*, and yet is not *homogeneous*, which would amount to another solecism. For if the mind *acts* in parts, it must also *exist* in parts: It is a maxim in philosophy "that nothing can act where it is not," and the worthy member must confute this, or admit that he confutes himself.

“Even *Conscientiousness*, that most important susceptibility as regards moral condition, if we investigate it fairly and philosophically, we shall find to be an operation produced by Education, and dependent on, and referring to, the modes and conditions of Society.”

“It is a fundamental principle in Phrenology that man is the slave of circumstance.”

“The functions are built up through external experiences.”

“If the mind acted *en masse*, the excitant of a single susceptibility would necessarily call forth all its energies; and the acquirements of every individual would of necessity be in the proportion of his education or experience. Do we find it so in nature? are acquirements equal to the quantum of experience, or are they not rather in many cases greatly disproportioned?”

“Every faculty as Hope, &c. is essentially an *original capacity of the mind*.”

We are now told that “*Conscientiousness*,” that most important faculty of the Phrenologists, is entirely produced by Education, and the conditions of Society; that “man is the slave of circumstance;” and that all “the functions are built up through external experiences”; while, *per contra*, it is boldly asserted, and endeavoured to be proved by illustration, that the acquirements of individuals are *not* equal to the quantum of experience, but are, “in many cases greatly disproportioned”; and, further, that every faculty (*Conscientiousness* of course included) is an *original capacity* of the mind!—It would be useless to do more than exhibit this; and as I have been pretty successful, I think, in showing how ably the worthy member can oppose *himself*, I trust I shall be equally so, in portraying

MR. A.

versus

PHRENOLOGY.

“All sensation is directed to, or concentrated in,

“The doctrine of a single origin, and of a central

some one point, which point, I submit, is the habitation of the mind, or of "the divinity which stirs within us."

Mr. A.

"Mind may, therefore, be considered as a MONAD EXISTENCE essential to animal life, and necessarily involving in its function the principles of Thought. All action is consequent upon motives affecting the mind."

Mr. A.

"If a nerve be cut, the part below it, and immediately connected with that nerve, loses its power of action, and ceases to administer to the *Sensorium*."

Mr. A.

point for all the nerves, is *neither true nor possible*, and this can be verified by examination."

Sphurzheim (page 7.)

"The opinion that all consciousness resides in the brain was formerly supported by the assertion that all nerves are continuations of the brain, and that they have a central point in it. But this proof can no longer be admitted, because we have demonstrated that neither the nerves of the external senses, nor the spinal marrow, are prolongations of the cerebral mass, nor are the nervous fibres concentrated in one spot; but that every nervous system has its own origin."

Sphurzheim (page 29.)

If the worthy member had read and reflected a little, he would have learned that a "*sensorium*," or "*central point*" in the brain, is now quite unfashionable, and has never been used as an argument, even by the antagonists of Phrenology. A Phrenologist speaking of such an existence is something beyond ridiculous!

"Mr. Drummond's charge, that Phrenology affirms that mind is a heterogeneous existence, and that its aggregate is not concerned in, or at all necessary to, any process of its operations, is not supported. We do not af-

"It would be impossible to have a conception of particular dreams or ideas and sensations, if the brain were one single organ, and if every faculty were not attached to a particular and independent organ."

Sphurzheim (page 217.)

firm, that mind is a heterogeneous existence."

Mr. A.

"Every faculty, when in action, from whatever cause, produces the kind of feeling, or forms the kind of ideas, already explained as resulting from its natural constitution."

Combe (page 370.)

The worthy member, in denying that mind is a *heterogeneous* existence, as well as in believing in a *sensorium*, or *central point*, was evidently unaware that he was thus directly opposing the vital positions of Phrenology! *Spurzheim* and *Combe* assert that the mind is divided into a number of faculties, and that every faculty has a *particular and independent organ*. Now, as all these facultics are declared to be *dissimilar*, each performing a different, and, generally, an opposite duty, they are *heterogeneous*, for the word has no other meaning. Will Mr. A. assert, that the organs of "*Benevolence*" and "*Destructiveness*," of "*Amativeness*" and "*Self Esteem*," are *homogeneous*? I should think not,—that is, if he previously consult a Dictionary.

"Mr. Durmmond affirms, that Phrenologists maintain "that not only is the business of mind conducted by separate and independent portions of the Brain, (to each of which has been assigned a local habitation and a name,) but that their individual positions are so unquestionably manifested on the external cranium, that it requires only patient examination, with some

"Gall investigated particular organs according to the principal actions of men, and he named the organs according to these actions."

Spurzheim (page 279.)

"He (Dr. Gall) pointed out the organs as they were called by him, of propagation, of murder, of theft, of mechanical arts, of music, of mathematics, and of metaphysics, by determining the organs according to

share of experience, to enable one to determine what manner of man he was, whose brain inhabited any particular skull which may have survived the corroding influence of centuries." Mr. Durmond is either wholly uninstructed in the principles of phrenology, or he has, for his own purposes wilfully misrepresented, or mis-stated the principles he affects to combat."

Mr. A.

"To say what manner of man he was, or is, whose cranium exhibits particular developments, is a presumption to which the true Phrenologist, would never aspire."

Mr. A.

This point, which involves the very existence of Phrenology, I leave the worthy member to settle with his superiors. I would recommend him, however, to peruse the 1st Number of the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, page 151, where he will find a minute analysis of the character of Robert Bruce, deduced from an examination of that Hero's skull, which had been exhumated, after quietly reposing in the grave for the trifling period of *Five Hundred Years!**

If "to say what maner of man he was, or is, whose cranium exhibits particular developments, is a presumption to which the true Phrenologist would never aspire,"

energetic actions; and he discovered the organs of philoprogeny, circumspection, and religion, by determining the action, according to the protuberances."

Spurzheim (page 281.)

"I never saw a fool by pride without a great development of the organ of self love."

Spurzheim (page 287.)

"Nature admits of no exceptions; and a single instance of decidedly vigorous manifestations with a small organ, disease being absent, would overturn all previous observations."

Combe (page 47.)

* See Note [A.]

what is it, pray, that he *does* "aspire to say?" and why are all these casts and skulls so carefully arranged upon our table?

"Even *Conscientiousness*, that most important susceptibility, as regards moral condition, if we investigate it fairly and philosophically, we shall find to be an operation produced by Education, and dependent, on and referring to, the modes and conditions of Society."

Mr. A.

"It is a fundamental principle in Phrenology that man is the slave of circumstance."

Mr. A.

The functions are built up through external experience."

Mr. A.

"The same circumstances are often presented to many millions, and perhaps only one individual alone makes use of them."

Spurzheim (page 63.)

"Every individual acts and conducts itself differently against external impressions and circumstances, and always according to its *internal* faculties."*

Spurzheim (page 64.)

Netheir in animals nor in man, does education produce any faculty whatever.

Spurzheim (page 68.)

These assertions of the worthy member are perhaps more astounding than any I have hitherto noticed. So far from admitting that the human character, in any degree, depends upon *internal* organization, he positively declares that "*Conscientiousness*," and all the other functions, are *produced by education, and built up through external experience!* The worthy member, after reading the counter assertions of Dr. Spurzheim, which I have quoted for his edification, will, perhaps, be so obliging as to inform us where he acquired his knowledge of the "fundamental principle in Phrenology," he so emphatically lays down,

* See Note [C.]

viz: "*that man is the slave of circumstance;*" or, indeed, where he rests the shadow of authority for any one of his paradoxes.

I have now to review the small portion of Mr. A.'s paper which particularly relates to mine. To my *first* objection, viz: "*If each organ possesses, exclusively and independently, perception, volition, memory, &c. it must follow, that they are all distinct and independent existences; and that unity of consciousness, which is, in other words, a man's being himself, is utterly impossible,*"—the worthy member replies.

"It would be absurd to say that every action is directed by a separate mind. A Tree distributed into branches is no less a tree—a whole number, or unit, divided into parts, is still essentially a whole number; thus when we see the animated body divided into various members, the individuality of that body is not affected by its distribution into parts, and its identity is preserved with reference to the whole. In like manner, although the mind may be developed in a thousand faculties, yet as the faculties are parts, the unity is completely maintained. Parts partake of the properties of the whole of which they are parts;—so if the faculties be parts of the mind, they naturally possess the same functions."

Now, this is a neat enough syllogism, and the conclusion would be just, were it not that, unfortunately, the premises are false! "A tree distributed into branches," or "a whole number divided into parts," can have no possible analogy to a being possessed of thinking and consciousness. The application of these truisms, therefore,

to the nature of a sentient and intelligent existence, is manifestly fallacious: for, if "parts partake of the properties of the whole of which they are parts," every hair on a man's body, being a part of him, must possess, not only, all the properties of intellect, but those of seeing, digesting, and a thousand others; and every time he shaves himself, he is guilty of suicide! Parts do *not* partake of the properties of the whole of which they are parts. The ears no more secrete bile, than the great toe cogitates upon the wisdom of its Creator: nearly one half of the human body may be divided and destroyed, without the *thinking principle* being at all affected.

The worthy member has not drawn a particular inference from the "whole number divided into parts," but, in his conclusion, has blended it with the "tree distributed into branches;" I shall, however, separate them:—

"A whole number, "(says Mr. A.)" or unit, divided into "parts, is still essentially a whole number."

If the worthy member simply means that a whole number, say fifty, is fifty, his assertion amounts to nothing; but, as I rather think, he imagines a whole number to be *something else* than its component parts, I conceive that it behoves me, in a friendly way, to set him right. The aggregate of fifty, distinct from its component units, is an absolute non-entity,—an abstraction totally inconceivable! The Geometrical axiom that "The whole is *equal* to all its parts," is as directly expressed by saying that the whole is all its parts. Twelve is *equal* to a dozen, and twelve is a dozen; the words only differ, the meaning is the same. If the worthy member were owing me the "*whole number*" of fifty rupees, and paid me in fifty "*divided parts*,"—that

is in fifty sterling *siccas*, (taking at the same time a stamp receipt for the same,) he would look rather amazed, I suspect, should I afterwards inform him that, as I had received only the "*parts*," he must now pay me the "*whole*!"

I shall next investigate what Dr. Paterson has said in reply to this objection, viz:

"To this question, which is a very important one, I beg leave to reply, that every organ wills, wishes, or desires to be gratified, and this by its own created, inherent or sovereign energy: for example, Combativeness wills, wishes, or desires to resist; Amativeness wills, wishes, or desires to love; Adhesiveness wills, wishes, or desires to contract friendships, all by their own sovereign energies; Comparison wills, wishes, or desires to make analogies, and Causality wills, wishes, or desires to trace effects to their causes; Benevolence wills, wishes, or desires happiness to the neighbour; Veneration wills, wishes, or desires conjunction with the Deity; Conscientiousness wills, wishes, or desires equity; all by their own inherent sovereign energies. Here we have 3 kinds of Volition perfectly distinct, the Volition of the Animal propensities, the Volition of the Rational faculties, and the Volition of the Moral sentiments; and the Animal is subordinate to the Rational, and the Rational to the Moral. Now, I trust that Mr. Drummond will see, that what we generally mean by Free will, is compounded of the will of our reflecting faculties and moral sentiments."

"To his question, therefore I shall give this direct and explicit answer, viz. that any one organ may be excited at a time, and by this individual excitation, can produce a positive act of its own inherent will, wish or desire,

" and will exclusively retain the remembrance of this will,
 " wish, or desire; but the nature of this, will depend upon
 " the particular region in which this organ resides. This
 " certainly is as clear as noon day. I have no need to
 " inform Mr. Drummond, I suppose, that Free will or
 " Moral liberty is an efflux from the reflecting faculties
 " and moral sentiments. Mr. Drummond remarks " There
 " is nothing so evident to the human mind as its own iden-
 " tity, which, although not demonstrable by any process of
 " reasoning, must, nevertheless, be assumed as a truth,
 " anterior to the commencement of any other induction;
 " and I challenge every phrenologist on the globe to recon-
 " cile the possibility of his own personal identity, or, in
 " other words, the consciousness he possessess of being at
 " all times *himself*, to the hypothesis, which declares he
 " is an assemblage of 35 existences, each independently
 " possessing the faculties of preception, volition and me-
 " mory." Personal identity, means, I suspect, the same-
 " ness of a rational being. Does the consciousness of our
 " own existence in youth, manhood, and old age, or con-
 " sciousness of our existence in two joint successive
 " moments, constitute the same individual action?"*

* This strange jumble of words, which the worthy Doctor has conceived
 it necessary to pour, I shall neither attempt to unravel nor analyze. His
 " three kinds of volition," and the assertion that " free will, or moral liberty,
 is compounded of, and is an efflux from, the will of our reflecting faculties
 and moral sentiments," are to me utterly incomprehensible! And what, pray,
 are we to make of his quere:—" Does the consciousness of our own exist-
 tence in youth, manhood and old age, or consciousness of our existence in
 two joint successive moments, constitute the same individual *action*?—Con-
 sciousness constituting an " ACTION"—" ma conscience," but this is indeed
 NEW philosophy!

“ It is strange that Mr. Drummod should have found “ perplexities in accounting for identity on phrenological “ principles; for tho’ the successive consciousnesses which “ we have of our own existence are not the same, owing to “ the different organs, yet they are consciousnesses of in- “ tegral combinations of the *same self*.” “ And so any “ Phrenologist may easily reconcile his own identity, by “ the successive consciousnesses of his own organs, to the “ hypothesis (as Mr. Drummond terms it) of his being an “ assemblage of 35 essentially distinct powers and affec- “ tions. The pronoun I is just as applicable and personal “ to three or four organs at the time of their action, as it is “ to the whole 35, if they happened to be all in action.”

Although Dr. Paterson might certainly have clothed what he had to say, in a somewhat lighter drapery of words, he has, nevertheless, the full merit of coming boldly forward. In the most unqualified terms, he declares, that each of the 35 organs is a separate and distinct wishing, willing, remembering, and, therefore, *responsible*, being. But, ah! “ what a falling off is there,” when he attempts to explain how it comes to pass, that 35 distinct and independent minds, become,—what man, beyond all other species of certainty, feels himself to be,—one entire and undivided identity!

There is no essential difference between the arguments of Dr. Paterson and Mr. A. Both are based on the fallacy I have just destroyed. Instead of perceiving that the whole, *is* all its parts, and *nothing* but all its parts, they have taken it for granted, that the whole and all its parts, are actually available as distinct existences! But are these Gentlemen really serious in assuming that thirty-

five consciousnesses are only one consciousness, and *vice versa*, because 35 units are 35? And, pray, what is this magical "*same self*," which Dr. Paterson says the thirty-five organs are integral combinations of?—unquestionably nothing more than the sum of thirty-five! To exhibit more forcibly, however, this absurdity, I will tell the worthy Doctor, that every individual composing it, is an "integral combination" of the "*same self*" REGIMENT. If, therefore, a combination of conscious identities into a whole, or "*same self*" (as he calls it) constitutes only *one* mental identity, a *Regiment* is a thinking and a conscious being! The worthy Doctor's position is plainly this. Because 35 is the aggregate of its units, which is, in other words, because 35 is 35—an equal number of conscious beings are only one conscious being—ergo, any thirty-five men or women whatever, or all the men, women, and children, on the Globe, are only *one* conscious and responsible being!!!

Mr. A. not contented with his previous illustrations, proceeds to give another, which, no doubt, he imagines to be still more convincing, viz:

"It is evident that a Pianoforte operating by parts, retains its characteristic unity and identity—the corporeal substance being divided into limbs, each performing different functions, is nevertheless but one person—in like manner, the identity of the mind is completely preserved, notwithstanding that its operations are conducted by means of separate instruments."

I am quite willing to concede to the worthy member, that a pianoforte is *identically an instrument*, and that each of its keys is *identically a key*; and, further, that

all the parts of the "corporeal substance is, nevertheless, only one person;" I shall also admit, if he pleases, that all the inhabitants of the British Empire are only one NATION; but his conclusion, that "in like manner, the identity of the *mind* is completely preserved, notwithstanding that its operations are conducted by means of separate instruments," I cannot so easily subscribe to. If, however, when it is asserted that the *mind* "conducts its operations by means of separate instruments," it were explicitly declared, that these are neither the *mind* itself, nor possess any portion or attribute of *mind*, my objection would be of a very different nature: for these "*instruments*," (could any use be found for such machinery,) would be thus assimilated to the external senses and the muscles of voluntary motion, which simply minister to perception, and obey the will. But such is *not* Phrenology, neither can it be Mr. A.'s view of it; for he declares, that "Reason, as a function of the *mind*, is exercised in *every faculty*"—*unequivocally affirming*, that there are *thirty-five* Reasoning faculties! Now, all I contend for, is the truth of the axiom, "*that a thing cannot be, and not be, at the same time*"—that the human *mind* cannot be *one* and also *thirty-five* independent, conscious existences. The worthy member's illustration, therefore, is nothing else than his previous assumption, conveyed in different words: for, a "pianoforte" or a "corporeal substance" is no more analogous to a conscious and intelligent being, than is a "tree" or a "whole number," whose pretended analogy has already been sufficiently exposed. Every particle of matter may be said to possess its own peculiar identity, which is only adopting another word to express its *existence*;

but a percipient being only, is *conscious* of that identity: and it is this *consciousness* that constitutes the wide distinction, and destroys every parallel, between mental and corporeal identity. Yet this distinction, wide as it is, Mr. A. has never reflected on; otherwise he never could have imagined that, although *brute* matter may be separated *ad-infinitum*, each portion being still an identical existence, identity of *mind* was equally distributable,—as easily cut up into shreds and patches. When the worthy member uses the expression “*identity of the mind*,” he is evidently ignorant of its legitimate import. He has uniformly confounded this conception with that of *simple existence*, while nothing is more opposite. The pen I write with has its own identity, that is to say—it is a pen: but my pen does not *know* this; whereas, the mind I think by, not only *is* a mind, but *knows* that it is such; and it knows more: it is not only conscious of its *present* existence, but it is also conscious that *that* which *now* thinks and feels, is *that* which has *hitherto* thought and felt. Hence we have the notion expressed by the pronoun I, the positive force of which, although intuitively *felt* by an idiot, is not easily *explained* by a philosopher. Unless, therefore, he is prepared to maintain, that a “*pianoforte*,” or a “*corporeal substance*,” divided into parts, is *conscious* that it exists as a *whole*, and, at the same time, *not* as a whole but as a *part*; and that each part, also, is conscious that it is both a *part* and a *whole*, (while it would be insanity to assert that they possess consciousness at all,)—unless the worthy member, I say, is prepared to maintain, as truth, this mass of impossibility.—he has maintained nothing; and my objection rests as it was—unanswered, as it is unanswerable!

Although last, not least, Mr. B. has attempted a reply to this formidable objection; and has also called in the aid of a musical instrument. Behold the following very ingenious display:—

“ We are asked, “ says Mr. B.” whether one organ can “ produce a positive act of the will? and, whether the “ *remembrance* of this is exclusively retained by the “ particular organ so excited?”—Both questions I should “ answer in the affirmative. Most certainly one organ “ *can* produce an act of the will; but it does not, there- “ fore, follow that an act of the will must be the result of “ excitement in *only* one organ.—But, even allowing that “ such were the case, that an act of the will was always “ produced by the energies of a single organ, and that there “ were thirty-five organs, I must deny that this would inter- “ fere with mental identity; or that, of necessity, we must “ discard Mr. Drummond’s favorite little pronoun I from “ the vocabulary:—for, although the thirty-five organs are “ so many identities, and, as contended for by Mr. Drum- “ mond, are most royally entitled to the plural *we*, yet they “ are so only as *organs*,—as *integral* organs, of which the “ aggregate is required to exist and be available, in order “ to form the one grand identity, mind.—To use the analogy “ of a musical instrument as suggested by Mr. Drummond,* “ I should say that in the almost infinite variety of sounds, “ to which a flute is the medium of affording utterance, “ each note has its own identity, occupying a particular “ space, possessing peculiar powers, and, to an accustomed “ ear, easily distinguishable from every other vibration of “ which the same reed is capable.—Numerous, however,

* Dr. Spurzheim, I believe, has the honor of suggesting this “analogy.”

“ as are these tones, they contribute but to one entity as regards the instrument; and, I may add, that the conception of each separate note is, notwithstanding, so blended with that of the entire instrument, as to occasion its being universally acknowledged, that it is as essentially the *flute* which we sound, when but *one* of its notes is produced, as it would be, were we able to call forth *all* its powers at once into expression: and it is thus with the brain, where, if all its other powers be quiescent, the excitement of but one organ is sufficient to create an action of the mind, of which, at the same time, the power inherent in that organ forms but one of many component parts.”

After having already said so much on this subject, I might, perhaps, dismiss the question. To one who has studied the difficult science of mind, and who has laboriously reflected on what is philosophically implied by the expression, *mental identity*, further discussion would be “ flat and unprofitable.” But there are few who have reflected on this subject at all; and fewer still who have reflected sufficiently, to divest themselves of that (apparently original) curse entailed upon mankind, viz.—*the despotism of words!*—a despotism, it might easily be proved, which has inflicted more evil upon humanity than all the tyranny of Priests and Conquerors: because, unless for the existence of the former, that of the latter, could neither be attempted nor endured.

When the worthy member says, that the aggregate of thirty-five mental identities “ *is required to exist and be available, in order to form the one grand identity, mind,*” I cordially agree with him, that, to render his argument

any thing else than nonsense, this is positively *required*. But it is not altogether logical, to assume the existence of an impossibility, merely because a false position requires it: nor should the worthy member have expected, that I would be quite so condescending as to permit him to take for granted the "head and front" of all he pretends to prove.

I have already exhibited the untenableness,—I had almost said, the childishness,—of conceiving that an aggregate number is an existence distinct from its component parts; or that, although the *human body* is divisible, it should be assumed that *mind* is so. When a man is deprived of toes, fingers, or even legs and arms, is a fragment of the *thinking principle* carried away in each of them? or is the *ego of consciousness* at all affected by the corporeal mutilation? If the more vital portions be seriously injured, mental identity is annihilated; or continues to exist, as revelation informs us, independent of its "mortal coil;" but still as much undivided,—still as much *itself*, as when fettered within its earthy tenement. The worthy member's elucidation, therefore, that the thirty five mental identities are "*so only as organs*," is but a show of words,—a distinction without a difference! The sense of vision may be called an organ of the mind; but, invest this organ with a *separate consciousness*, and it is instantly a *separate mind*: and I again challenge all the Phrenologists on the Globe, to show, how a *separate mind*, although inhabiting the same *encephalon*, is not as much a distinct, responsible being, as any two men or women that ever existed.

Mr. B.'s simile of the *flute*, is essentially Mr. A.'s of the

piano-forte: for although these gentlemen perform on different instruments, they only favor us with the “*same self*” tune; and one, moreover, which is utterly discordant with the harmony of truth. All my objections to Mr. A.’s are equally applicable to Mr. B.’s *finale*. I freely concede, however, to the latter, as I did to the former, that a flute is an instrument, and that its different tones, are different tones; and, when Mr. B.’s position is stripped of all its ornaments, I cannot discover that he has asserted more. A flute is an inert and unconscious thing, and equally so are all the sounds in the world; and, as I have already proved the fallacy of assuming any analogy between *brute* and *sentient* existence, I might here close the discussion. But Mr. B.’s conclusion is *mathematically* absurd! A flute is no more concerned with the sounds that may be produced from it, than are the bones of a skull with the glorious conceptions they encase. There is no *one* of its notes which is *all* its notes, neither is it possible that *all* its notes can be any *one* of them. What, then, becomes of his “*grand identity*, in order to form which, the aggregate was required to exist and be available?” It is a fantasy of his imagination, which has neither an archetype in the earth beneath, nor in the heavens above!

My Second Objection is—“*If a plurality of organs act, at the same moment, in opposition, (that is the one counteracting the other,) it must follow, that they neutralize each other in the ratio of their respective forces:*” And to this, Mr. B. Dr. Paterson, and an anonymous “*Phrenologist*” have replied—thus:

Mr. B. “We are asked, whether one faculty may not

“be liable to neutralize another:—probably it may;—I have not however given this subject due consideration, but form my opinion upon an illustration afforded by Mr. Drummond, wherein he raises a dagger under the excitement of jealousy, puts it down again upon mature deliberation, and remains in precisely the same position in which he was, before either his jealousy or reasoning faculty” was called into action.”

DR. PATERSON. “The next question is whether one or more can act in opposition.—Now there is no such thing as opposition among the organs of the brain. I have asserted that there may be individual excitation of a single organ, and that there may be *synchronous* action of one or more organs. I maintain, likewise, that there may be successive action, and also alternation of action, either with contiguous or remote organs.”

“That there is no created principle of opposition among the organs, is proved from the consideration that the organ of Destructiveness is not a bad propensity, when it acts in equilibrium with the organs of Reflection and Morality. That organ *may appear* opposed to benevolence, but philosophically considered it is not so—from their combination, a *tertium-quad* effect is produced. In mental operations there are no neutralizations as in chemical operations, or in mechanical operations, so that Mr. Drummond’s analogies of Acid and Alkali, and the momenta of brute force, do not apply at all: neither do Mr. Drummond’s similies, such as “sailors bracing the yard, and pugilists in the ring,” tend to illustrate the action and re-action of organs. They are all very vulgar —and they smell too strongly of *tar* and *Pierce Egan*;

“besides, witticisms may do very well in some cases, but they do not apply to subjects of a stern philosophical nature.”

A PHRENOLOGIST. “With respect to the argument of organs neutralizing each other, *like an acid and an alkali*, I must quote from Mr. Combe. He observes, “that a person who had a large endowment of the faculty of perceiving distinctions, would discriminate in a moment, the *difference* between two chemical substances, placed in a state of mechanical mixture, and two organs subsisting separately, and having distinct functions; and he would see that the analogy would have no force whatsoever.”

To begin with Mr. B. so far from his opposing my position, he not only accords with it, but furnishes an apt illustration in its support.* As, however, he “has not given the subject due consideration,” let us enquire what others have to say to it, whose pretensions to decide are either not so humble, or not so candid.

* “When the action of one organ” says Mr. B. “would equally incline to either of two objects, there will not be any choice, until some suggestion from the excitement of another organ, at once gives, and accounts for the *preponderance*: supposing all the organs to be excited in the same equal degrees, which is imagining an extreme case, there will again be an absence of choice, and the result will be referable, as is not unfrequently the case, entirely to accident.”

I am certainly obliged to the worthy member for thus assisting me: but I cannot understand what he means by saying, that when there is “an absence of choice, the result will be referable, as is not unfrequently the case, entirely to accident,” He must be informed that, in philosophical language, there is no such word as *accident*. There can be no effect without a cause; it is not possible, therefore, that, throughout the boundless universe, there can be any one occurrence more accidental than another.

According to Dr. Paterson, "there is no such thing as opposition among the organs of the brain!" Destructiveness and Benevolence, therefore, never disturb each other; and yet he says they act simultaneously, or in his more learned language, *synchronously*. Now, this doctrine is, to me, passing strange; and almost inclines me to think, that Dr. Paterson has reflected as little on the subject as Mr. B. If the organs are always "like sailors bracing the yard," conjoined in an individual impulse;" and never, "like pugilists in the ring, doing their utmost to knock their adversaries down," why does not the worthy Doctor explicitly say so? why does he blink the question, and content himself by saying, that my "similies are all very vulgar, and smell too strongly of *tar* and *Pierce Egan*?" The truth is, he finds, to his cost, that they smell too strongly of *sound induction*. If the organs of Destructiveness and Benevolence perform distinct and opposite functions, and act at the same instant towards producing a particular volition, they *must* counteract each other;—it is not possible to conceive the contrary; and if they be, in their nature, one and the same,—so are Phrenology and Nonsense! What could possibly be the purpose of such complexity? Of what use, even to Phrenologists, would be a variety of organs, unless each performed a particular, and, in many cases, a directly opposite duty? I wish I had leisure to show off Dr. Paterson *versus* Phrenology!

The worthy Gentleman, however, admits, that the organs of Destructiveness and Benevolence "*may appear* to be opposed to each other," but that, "philosophically considered it is not so;" because, he continues, "from their

combination, a *tertium quid* effect is produced!" Good Doctor, had you said a *tobacco quid*, it would have been just as much to the purpose! for what is your "*tertium quid*" but a neutralization? This result, produced from their combination, is neither *Destructiveness* nor *Benevolence*; neither is the product obtained from the mixture of an "*acid and an alkali*" the one or the other of these bodies. You have admitted, and you would have gained nothing by denying it,—you have admitted, in spite of yourself, that the organs *do* counteract each other. Their "*producing from their combination a tertium quid effect*" is an argument as conclusive against your own assertion, as the ingenuity of man could offer. My objection is insuperable. If two adverse organs, possessed of equal energy, act at the same instant, their action is useless, because mutually destructive; and should their individual powers be unequal, their product must be exactly the amount of that inequality;—a mode of operation, when attributed to the economy of the human mind, so contrary to the glorious simplicity manifested in every work of God,—so directly opposed to all the evidence of experience and common sense, that it would be insulting the meanest understanding to do more than point to it.

The defence which *A Phrenologist* has quoted from Mr. Combe, would be unworthy of notice, had any other than a great *apostle* delivered it. It is asserted that the result of two organs, acting at the same instant, in opposition, must be similar to that received from the combination of an acid and an alkali; and whether this be produced from "*mechanical mixture*" or otherwise, the principle is untouched. Two equal weights, suspended

to either end of a balance, preserve it *in equilibrio*; and two men of equal strength pulling against each other, can effect nothing: so, two organs, equally balancing their influence, by *whatever process they operate*, must yield the same consequences. Mr. Combe's reply to this objection is utterly unworthy of him. It requires no "large endowment of *the faculty for perceiving differences*" to discover that two adverse organs, acting simultaneously, do not mix together like two *fluids*, but it would require a considerable endowment of the *organ of Credulity** to believe, that they can so act without resisting and modifying each other. Mr. Combe says, the organs are "calculated for acting on *different occasions*." Does he mean that they cannot, and never do, act, at the same moment? If this were his meaning, I should admit his reasoning: but he dares not insinuate such doctrine; it would give the death blow to his splendid theory of "*the Combinations*,"—in fact, it would annihilate phrenology.

My Third Objection is—"If a plurality of organs act, at the same moment, in conjunction, (that is in producing one individual impulse,) why not the whole of them, which would amount to all the unity of mind that has ever been contended for?" And to this, the following answers have been received:

MR. B. "The next question that suggests itself is, "whether, if two or more faculties can be excited at one moment, the whole may not be so simultaneously aroused? And, taking for granted that they may, Mr. Drum-

* See NOTE [D.]

“mond triumphs over the downfall of Phrenology, which, by thus allowing that the whole brain may act at once, must concede also, that in this case, it would act as one indivisible organ of mind, by which we should merely be recurring to the told principles of metaphysicians.”

“In answer to Mr. Drummond’s question, I confess myself to be ignorant of any *positive* reason that should prevent such *occasional* excitement of all the faculties of the mind; but I should suppose their action to be balanced in this respect, in a manner, some what analogous to that, by which the excitement of our *physical* energies is regulated: and of these we seldom or never find that *all* the organs, the nerves, the muscles, veins, heart, liver, lungs, stomach, legs, arms, trunk, &c. &c. are simultaneously aroused; while we are nevertheless aware, that *many* of these are constantly performing their several functions at the same moment, and that the excitement of a greater or a smaller number of them, frequently depends entirely upon accident. I should, indeed, imagine, that a general excitement of *all* the organs of our physical powers, might create an agitation too great for nature to sustain; and that a similar shock would follow similar excitement of the brain, instead of causing the mind to resolve into such unity of purpose, as attends the action of the supposed indivisible and homogeneous organ, of heterogeneous and opposite powers.”

“In venturing this opinion, I have not considered the brain as excited towards any particular object; but I will now endeavour to explain why I think it even less probable, that such general excitement should occur,

“when directed towards any one object. In the first
 “place, however, allow me to state, that as the utmost
 “stretch of Mr. Drummond’s argument merely shows the
 “consequences of adopting, without even tending to dis-
 “prove, the first great principle wherein Phrenology dif-
 “fers from other systems of the Philosophy of mind,—I
 “conceive it to be only placing myself on an equal footing
 “with himself, to *assume*, unsupported by argument, what
 “Mr. Drummond as unceremoniously rejects:—*viz.* that
 “the different parts of the brain *are* organs of separate
 “powers of the mind. The acknowledged opposite na-
 “tures of many of these powers, and the consequent
 “opposite tendency of their action, is *one* argument
 “against the *probability* of their entire co-operation:—It
 “must necessarily render some of them unfit for excite-
 “ment in that direction, to which others are well suited;
 “and as, in the economy of nature, we do not observe
 “that *physical* powers are diverted from their proper
 “directions, towards objects for which their functions are
 “not adapted, I do not see any reason why the same rule
 “by which these are guided, should not also direct the
 “energies of our *mental* faculties. But even allowing,
 “once more, the possibility of such co-operation of *all*
 “our powers, and that this shall be for the especial pro-
 “duction of an undivided result, it does not, therefore,
 “follow, as Mr. Drummond seems to argue, that, because
 “all the brain acts, there is a total amalgamation of its
 “parts: I should rather say, that (supposing the whole to
 “be composed of parts,) each part, acting in its separate
 “vocation, pursues its own course to the attainment of
 “the one object in view.”

DR. PATERSON. "Mr. Drummond proceeds," "If a certain number of organs are conjoined in one individual impulse, why not the whole *bundle* of them?" And "why not? It is not an impossible occurrence, though, in this degenerate age, a very rare one; for the simultaneous action of the whole organs implies such a harmonious equilibrium, as seldom or never falls to the lot of any individual now-a-days. The admirable Crichton comes nearest this equilibrium of any person I have read of in history; and his portraits and busts are wonderfully expressive of this equilibrium—of the universal genius! But it does not follow, although the whole of the organs are capable of synchronous action, that the mind would be "as much an unit as in the days of Aristotle, for in the days of this Peripatetic only general powers were known from reflection on self-consciousness; no specific faculties were dreamt of, much less discovered, by a comprehensive comparison of cerebral organizations."*

So far as these can be considered *replies*, I am quite content to let my argument rest on its own basis. I cannot forbear, however, from remarking, that, declaring as both these Gentlemen boldly do, that the whole or any number of organs are capable of simultaneous, or "*synchronous*" action, involves an assertion of greater importance than, I suspect, they are aware of,—viz, that the human mind is capable of being employed in many different occupations at the same absolute moment! I am not a little surprised that Dr. Paterson and Mr. B. should have been blind to the consequences of such a

* See Note [E.]

doctrine: it is true, had they said otherwise, they ceased to be phrenologists; but why sacrifice truth and common sense, even at the shrine of Phrenology?

It has been verbally affirmed in this society, that there are certain acts performed by the body, without any interference or knowledge of the mind. And a worthy member, in illustration of this, stated that our Gracious Majesty, during his evening parties, while dealing cards, (which it appears he condescends to do with his own royal hands,) beats excellent time to the music in the orchestra. Another illustration was offered from a *Fiddler's* fingers, (what a juxtaposition!) finding their exact way to the cat-gut, while his thoughts were employed in very different concerns.

But if the muscles of the body be at any time exerted independently of the will, it must follow that *something else*, is the cause of this. I am aware of its having been asserted, that there is an *automatic* power in the human body, which sometimes operates on the muscles of *voluntary motion*, over which the mind has neither check nor control; but what this *is*, or *how* it operates, has never been explained. *Instinct* it cannot be; for such action is uniformly the result of progressive improvement: nor can any one, who is not satisfied with a *word* instead of a *thing*, give the least credit to its existence. To enter, fully into the subject, however, would far exceed the limits of my present design; but Professor Dugald Stewart has examined it so ably, and his reasoning appears to me so lucid and conclusive, that I trust I shall be permitted to give a few extracts.

“ When we read a book, (especially in a language which “ is not perfectly familiar to us,) we must perceive suc-

“cessively every different letter, and must afterwards
 “combine these letters into syllables and words, before
 “we comprehend the meaning of a sentence. This pro-
 “cess, however, passes through the mind, without leaving
 “any trace in the memory.”—

“The wonderful effect of practice in the formation of
 “habits, has been often, and justly taken notice of, as one
 “of the most curious circumstances in the human consti-
 “tution. A mechanical operation, for example, which
 “we at first performed with the utmost difficulty, comes in
 “time, to be so familiar to us, that we are able to perform
 “it without the smallest danger of mistake; even while
 “the attention appears to be completely engaged with
 “other subjects. The truth seems to be, that in conse-
 “quence of the association of ideas, the different steps of
 “the process present themselves *successively* to the
 “thoughts, without any recollection on our part, and with
 “a degree of rapidity proportioned to the length of our
 “experience; so as to save us entirely the trouble of hesi-
 “tation and reflexion, by giving us every moment a
 “precise and steady notion of the effect to be produced.”—

“Thus, in the case of a performer on the harpsichord,
 “I apprehend, that there is an act of the will preceding
 “every motion of every finger, although he may not be
 “able to recollect these volitions afterwards; and al-
 “though he may, during the time of his performance, be
 “employed in carrying on a separate train of thought.
 “For, it must be remarked, that the most rapid performer
 “can, when he pleases, play so slowly, as to be able to
 “attend to, and to recollect every separate act of his will
 “in the various movements of his fingers; and he can

“gradually accelerate the rate of his execution, till he is
 “unable to recollect these acts. Now, in this instance,
 “one of two suppositions must be made; the one is, that
 “the operations in the two cases are carried on pre-
 “cisely in the same manner, and differ only in the degree
 “of rapidity; and that when this rapidity exceeds a cer-
 “tain rate, the acts of the will are too momentary to leave
 “any impression on the memory—The other is, that when
 “the rapidity exceeds a certain rate, the operation is
 “taken entirely out of our hands; and is carried on by
 “some unknown power, of the nature of which we are as
 “ignorant, as of the cause of the circulation of the blood,
 “or of the motion of the intestines. The last supposition
 “seems to me to be somewhat similar to that of a man
 “who should maintain, that although a body projected
 “with a moderate velocity, is seen to pass through all the
 “intermediate spaces in moving from one place to another,
 “yet we are not entitled to conclude, that this happens
 “when the body moves so quickly as to become invisible
 “to the eye. The former supposition is supported by the
 “analogy of many other facts in our constitution. Of
 “some of these, I have already taken notice; and it
 “would be easy to add to the number.—An expert ac-
 “countant, for example, can sum up, almost with a sin-
 “gle glance of his eye, a long column of figures. He can
 “tell the sum with unerring certainty; while, at the same
 “time, he is unable to recollect any one of the figures of
 “which that sum is composed: and yet nobody doubts,
 “that each of these figures has passed through his mind,
 “or supposes, that when the rapidity of the process be-
 “comes so great that he is unable to recollect the various

“steps of it, he obtains the result by a sort of *inspiration*.”—

“When two persons are speaking to us at once, we can attend to either of them at pleasure, without being much disturbed by the other. If we attempt to listen to both, we can understand neither. The fact seems to be, that when we attend constantly to one of the speakers, the words spoken by the other make no impression on the memory, in consequence of our not attending to them; and affect us as little as if they had not been uttered. This power, however, of the mind to attend to either speaker at pleasure, supposes that it is, at one and the same time, conscious of the sensations which both produce.”—

“There is indeed a great variety of cases, in which the mind *apparently* exerts different acts of attention at once; but from the instances which have already been mentioned, of the astonishing rapidity of thought, it is obvious, that all this may be explained, without supposing these acts to be *co-existent*; and I may even venture to add, it may all be explained in a satisfactory manner, without ascribing to our intellectual operations, a greater degree of rapidity than, that with which we know from the fact, that they are sometimes carried on. The effect of practice in increasing this capacity of apparently attending to different things at once, renders this explanation of the phenomenon in question, more probable than any other.” *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Vol. 1st Chapter 2d.*

I am inclined to think that, after the foregoing has been carefully perused, it will be conceded to me, that the

illustrations drawn from the King and the Fiddler are by no means demonstrative. If, then, it be even *doubtful*, that the most habitual movement of the muscles cannot take place without a particular intervention of the will, shall we listen to those who assert, that the human mind can be actively engaged in thirty-five important and opposite duties at the same absolute moment? Will Dr. Paterson affirm, that even the "*Admirable Crichton*" could parry his adversary's sword in deadly combat, compose an acrostic on his mistress's name, and solve a mathematical problem, at the same instant of time? And yet this is nothing to what the Doctor asserts may happen: for "it is not an impossible occurrence," he says, for the whole thirty-five organs to be at work together! If this doctrine be true, it evidently follows, that a man may kneel before his God in fervent piety—plot the murder of his father, and the ravishment of his mother—concert plans for the relief of suffering humanity—and cogitate how to rob and betray his benefactor—follow the most abstruse inductions of mathematics and metaphysics—and execute the most complex and difficult piece of music—all at the same instant! Further, he must be, at one and the same time, happy and miserable—a hero and a coward—drowned in love, and steeped in hatred! He must not only be perceiving, judging, willing, remembering &c. all at once; but thirty-five distinct perceptions, judgments, wills, and memories, must be all, *higgledy piggedy*, jumbled together; and thirty-five *different* wills must all operate "*synchronously!*" He must, therefore, walk and sit, eat and fast, curse and forgive, fight and run away—and the Lord knows what—all at once! And what

is more surprising still, while all this worse than Babel confusion is going on within the poor victim's skull, he, "good easy man," so far from being distracted by the dreadful turmoil, is perfectly ignorant of such proceedings: and, unless he be furnished with a strait jacket himself, instantly consigns to Bedlam every assessor of such extravagance and absurdity!!!

To my fourth objection, viz—*"If the various organs do operate upon, and influence, each other, this, like every thing else, must be done by some particular means. How, then, is it managed? What connects and guides their jarring counsels? What so opportunely informs "Cautiousness" that a foe is in the field, and as instantly directs him to oppose "Destructiveness?" What is the medium of communication whereby the excitation of any organ whatever can have the smallest influence, even on its nearest companion?"*—The replies are as follows.

A PHRENOLOGIST. "Again, with reference to what Mr. Drummond says of "Destructiveness" about to commit Murder, and "Cautiousness" coming in opportunely to say nay; asking by what method or medium it appears, I have to reply, that it is through the "*medium of the intellect*, which perceives the probable consequences connected with the commission of the act, and that "Cautiousness" by its natural constitution, on such consequences being presented to it, gives the feeling of *fear* and unnerves the uplifted arm."

DR. PATERSON. "Mr. Drummond, lastly, says "should the Phrenologists adopt a middle course, and say, the various organs sometimes act one way, sometimes ano-

"ther, this resort will not avail them much." He then
 "supposes himself under a "raging fit of jealousy, with
 "the trusty steel grasped in his hand, and the object of
 "his wrath entirely in his power;" and then asks, "how
 "happens it, that that when so situated, I am restrained
 "from striking the deadly blow." "He adds, it will not
 "be nearly enough for me to be told, that the organ of
 "Caution should intermeddle in the affairs of a neutral,
 "and not even contiguous territory, but, all at once,
 "swallow up the whole force of the fiercely armed Despot
 "of Destructiveness." I never measured, nor properly
 "manipulated Mr. Drummond's head—therefore, I can-
 "not say what his endowments of reason and morality
 "are; but if Caution is not well developed, Veneration
 "and Benevolence may; or his Secretiveness or Self-
 "esteem may be well developed. Now, it is possible
 "that though Caution might be organically defective,
 "Veneration, Benevolence, Secretiveness or Self-esteem
 "might combine or be mixed with Destructiveness,
 "and by a *succenturiate power, produce a sextum quid*;
 "which would prevent the effusion of blood. If Mr.
 "Drummond should find his Destructive inclination irre-
 "sistible, he may, if he chooses still to gratify its murder-
 "ous desires, imitate the Barber of Frankfort, who, on
 "his sweetheart being betrothed to another, took the trusty
 "steel in his hand, and shoved it into his own stomach!"

"He then says, "I must have it explained to me, how
 "it comes to pass, that the excitation of any organ what-
 "ever can have the smallest influence, even on its nearest
 "companion?" and in another place, "Every spring and
 "pully must be described." Unfortunately, in the brain

"there is neither spring nor pully—all communication
 "from one organ to another is by the medium of fibres,
 "febrillæ, and febrillulæ; all the white substance of the
 "brain is fibrous. In the convolutions, the white substance
 "is coagulated in fibres which run perpendicularly from the
 "basis upwards. In other parts of the brain, we perceive
 "horizontal fibres, and circular fibres; in some parts again,
 "we have crossed and interwoven and diverging fibres."
 "We have the anterior, middle, posterior, and great, com-
 "missures—and there are transverse bands in the corpora
 "olivaria and crura cerebri." "All these fibres serve for
 "the connection of organs." *La connoissance de l'homme*
 "suppose la connoissance des elemens dont il est com-
 "posé, comme la connoissance du mecanisme d'une
 "horologe suppose celles des roues, des liviers, du res-
 "sort, des poids, des balanciers, de son mouvement."
 "If Mr. Drummond, wishes to become acquainted with
 "the springs and pulleys by which the cerebral organs,
 "whether contiguous or remote, are reciprocally affected,
 "I recommend him to have recourse to the Scalpel, and
 "dissect as many brains as he can; for, in my humble
 "opinion, it is only by being able to trace the cerebral
 "fibres from one organ to another, that we can attain
 "to a precise knowledge of their mysterious sympathies;
 "and, in such a laudable undertaking, I, for one, wish
 "him every possible success."

To commence with "*A Phrenologist*"—I require to be
 informed, by what means and by what medium, the 35
 organs are reciprocally influenced and connected; and he
 responds—"it is through the medium of the *Intellect!*"
 and, in another part of his paper, he says, "I conceive

that the *Will* is the decision of the intellect on the motives presented to it." Were this said "*Phrenologist*" better acquainted with me, he would scarcely expect to satisfy me with a *word*—The *intellect* forsooth!—and pray where is *its* organ situated? Really, our anonymous friend must be jesting with us! The term intellect implies all the faculties of the understanding; he is, therefore, quite correct in saying, that "the will is its decision on the motives presented to it," but this doctrine, so far from according with the "*new science*," has been the creed of all who have reflected on the subject since the beginning of the world!

I am aware that there are many who, conceiving themselves to be Phrenologists, imagine that the mind and the 35 faculties are entirely distinct existences; and a friend of mine, a member of this Society, conceived he had completely settled the point, by saying, that the faculties are not the *mind itself*, but *faculties of the mind*; which is exactly the exploded sophism of the whole number and its parts. Had Phrenologists given supreme dominion to *one* particular organ, and concentrated therein the powers and energies of all the rest, like rays into a focus, the hypothesis might have been listened to: so far, however, is this from being the case, that its founders, in the true spirit of ultra liberalism, have not only given it a constitution purely republican, but have left the 35 independent states without even a *President* to conduct the general government! Phrenology acknowledges the existence of no mental principle or power whatever, beyond what is manifested in the 35 organs. The word "*intellect*," therefore, introduced by "*A Phrenologist*," as being

the medium of communication between the organs, must imply either a *faculty* of the mind, or the mind *itself*. If a faculty, it is one hitherto unknown to Phrenologists; and if the mind itself, it must follow, that *mind* is an unconscious channel for conveying information between thirty-five conscious and intelligent portions of *matter* !*

Turn I now to *Dr. Paterson*. But although I have given his long reply without curtailment, I have no intention of commenting on all the learned verbiage he has introduced. It is the Doctor's own fault if he has not "properly manipulated my head," although I cannot conceive how this could have assisted him much in his present difficulty. As for "a *surcenturiate* power producing a *sextum quid*," my imagination cannot soar to such sublimity; but when he advises me, in imitation of the Barber of Frankfort, "to shove the trusty steel into my own stomach," I can easily appreciate his meaning. Before, however, I take his kind advice, he must patiently wait until I have given a few more vital thrusts to the God of his idolatry—that monstrous Humbug Phrenology.

The worthy Doctor had not to inform me, that there are neither springs nor pulleys in the brain. But I insist, that if there be a communication between the pretended organs, it must be managed *some way*. Does he mean that the fibres, convolutions, &c. he speaks of, are not organs, nor portions of organs? Perhaps they are what "A Phrenologist" calls the "*intellect*!"

* If "A Phrenologist," by a perversion of language, when he writes *intellect*, means the *reflecting faculties*, his position will subsequently be proved to be equally untenable and ridiculous.

Nor do I agree with him that, "in attaining to a precise knowledge of these mysterious sympathies," the "*scalpel*" could be of much service to me. The dissections I have witnessed have far from corroborated the assertions of Phrenology. The very first appearance, when the skull is removed, viz. the *convolutions*,—ramified, as they are, in all directions,—a continuation of the same substance apparently extending over a great portion of the brain,—decidedly militates against the whole hypothesis. But the confutation of Phrenology, by anatomical illustration, is in much better hands, than mine.*

To my *Fifth* and last objection viz—"The very essence of Phrenology involves the abandonment both of reason and memory, (the one of which directs and judges, the other retains and restores, all the ideas and operations of the mind,) by affirming that these, as well as all other attributes of the glorious and divine intellect of man, are the result of thirty-five uncontrolled, unconnected instincts."

Mr. B. replies—"As I had not an opportunity of hearing the discussion that took place at the meeting in July, regarding the Reasoning faculty," I shall touch but lightly upon this subject. Let me, however, remind Mr. Drummond, that, *intellectually*, our organs of Comparison and Causality, excited to the contemplation of analogies, and the sequences as cause and effect, in respect to the Phenomena of which Individuality gives us the power of observation and recollection, may be considered as reasoning faculties,—it being assumed as a postulate, that several powers may co-operate in the production of one

* See NOTE [F.]

“ effect, and that the memory and excitement of one, may
“ be made available to the purposes of the other.”

In the first place, I have to assure the worthy member, that his absence during the verbal discussion regarding the “ *Reasoning faculty*,” was no important loss to him; for these are not subjects at all adapted to the confusion of stormy debate. I will here, however, take the opportunity of remarking, that when I declared, in my first paper, that Phrenology rejects the existence of the *Reasoning faculty*, and that unless this were added to the former 35, (“ making thereby even dozens of them,”) the new science was unworthy of notice, I certainly never dreamt that it could be imagined I was in sober earnest. There is in language a figure of speech, ycleped *irony*; but, it appears, I am either a bad rhetorician, or that my audience were not, at the time, under the excitement of the peculiar organ for apprehending such things. Reason *cannot* be one of the phrenological faculties. Each of these, it is declared, performs its own specific duty, and without the possibility of extending its influence beyond its own locality; while *Reason* sits in judgment on *every* feeling, wish, or desire; and weighs, in the balance, *every* motive presented to the intellect. No additional *instinct*, with an organ limited to its own locality, could perform the important duties of this *all pervading* function. Had I seriously proposed such an addition, I should have been, deservedly, a subject for merriment.

Mr. B. does not directly affirm, that the organs of Comparison and Causality *are* the Reasoning faculty. He says, with the assistance of Individuality, they “ *may be considered as reasoning faculties*,” (he does not say how

many of them,) "it being assumed as a *postulate*, that several powers may co-operate in the production of one effect, and that the memory and excitement of the one, may be made *available* to the purposes of the other."

I should like to know where the organ of "*Begging the question*" is situated—for, if there be one iota of truth in phrenology, Mr. B. must have a grand developement there! I have written to very little purpose, unless I have shown, that one memory *cannot* "be made available to the purposes of another;" but, on the contrary, that two memories must inevitably constitute two distinct responsible beings; and it would certainly be very unnecessary to go over the ground again. The "*postulate*" he assumes, which involves the whole he is required to prove, I shall, therefore, dismiss, by simply referring the worthy member to where I have already proved it to be an impossibility.

MR. COMBE, (in his system of Phrenology, page 339,) says, the "reflecting faculties minister to the direction and gratification of all the other powers, and constitute what we call Reason or Reflection;" and (page 344) quoting Dr. Spurzheim, "The faculty of Individuality makes "us acquainted with objects and facts; the faculty of "Comparison points out their identity, analogy or difference; and Causality desires to know the causes of all "events; consequently, those three faculties together "forming systems, drawing conclusions, indications, or "corollaries, and pointing out principles and laws, constitute the true philosophical understanding."* Mr. Combe

* If the Reflecting faculties constitute Reason, why does the Doctor summon to their aid the faculty of "*Individuality*," which belongs to a quite different order?

“ adds, in a note, “ It appears that it is *Wit* which points “ out *differences*.”

These lights of Phrenology certainly here affirm, that the “ *Reflecting faculties*” perform the important function of *Reasoning*. But let us consider, *first*, how, from their own showing, this is possible; and, *secondly*, how far it is consistent with their express declarations and their general doctrine.

Dr. Spurzheim allows two *Reflecting faculties*, viz. “ *Comparison*” and “ *Causality*.” Mr. Combe doubles the number, by adding “ *Wit*” and “ *Imitation*,” admitting, at the same time, that the existence of only *one* of the four viz—*Causality* “ *is established*.” The *Reasoning faculty*, we intuitively know, takes cognizance of *every* motive presented to the intellect; while the *Reflecting faculties* of Phrenologists are, like all the rest, *blind instincts*; and can only perform their own particular duties. Read but their definitions of these faculties, and it will be evident that it is impossible they can pervade the *whole* mind. Combe says, that *Comparison*, when large, enables the speaker or writer to illustrate his argument by similies; “ it *compares* a light seen afar in a dark night, to a good deed shining in a naughty world; or it compares the Kingdom of Heaven to a grain of mustard seed;” *Causality*, “ perceives the dependencies of phenomena;” “ the function of *Wit* is to distinguish differences;” and *Imitation* “ is indispensable to the portrait painter;” yet, he adds, “ *it is possessed by the lower animals*.” I say, it is impossible that any faculty acting entirely by a local organ, can extend its influence beyond that organ; for “ a thing cannot act where it is not.” A faculty which, according

to Mr. Combe, "ministered to the direction and gratification of all the other powers," could have no individual locality. *Its* organ would be the *whole* brain; the *whole* brain, therefore, would be *one* organ; and this is the very postulate which Phrenology denies!*

Spurzheim and Combe directly contradict themselves when they say, that the Reflecting faculties constitute Reason. The definitions they give of these faculties render this, I again say, impossible; and to these definitions I refer. They not only never pretend that the Reflecting faculties regulate and balance all the rest, but they unequivocally declare, that the knowledge of *right and wrong* belongs to a very different kind of organ, and is situated in a very different quarter. Behold what Mr. Combe says of the faculty of "*Conscientiousness*," which is classed as a mere "*feeling*:"

"This faculty is of the very highest importance as "*a regulator of all the others*. If Combativeness be too active, Conscientiousness prescribes a limit to its indulgence; it permits defence, but no malicious aggression: "if Acquisitiveness urge too keenly, it reminds us of the "*rights of others*: if Benevolence tend towards profusion, "*this faculty issues the admonition—be just before you be generous*: if Ideality aspire to its high delights, "*when duty requires laborious exertions in a humble sphere*, Conscientiousness supplies the curb, and bids "*the soaring spirit stoop its wing*."

This extract, I should think, were enough to prove the gross inconsistency of these pretended philosophers. *Conscientiousness*, which is not a *Reflecting* faculty, is

* See NORR [G.]

here invested with attributes by far the most important of any. Dr. Gall, however, should not be included as a venter of this absurdity, for he *totally denies the existence of such a faculty!* In fact, the doctrine of any particular power predominating over, and directing, all the others, is entirely repugnant to their general plan,—utterly subversive of their whole hypothesis! But listen to what the great Spurzheim says.

In the 14th lecture of a course, delivered by him in London, and published in "*The Lancet*" of August 20th, 1825, he most positively asserts, (in entire accordance with Dr. Paterson,) that *every faculty possesses, inherently, Will, Memory, Imaginative and Judgment.* Regarding the latter, the following are his words.

"There is no fundamental power of judgment, but it is the attribute of the powers I have already spoken of. What we call a philosophical judgment in the reflective powers, what is that? The judgment of each power is *confined to itself*, as colour, melody, configuration, &c.; but as we have spoken of certain reflective powers which act differently from others, we perceive these powers sometimes to be active, and when they are active, then the result is that which is called a philosophical judgment: but it is not of itself a fundamental power, it is merely the perfect state of action of the individual powers."

It would be difficult, perhaps, to find, in the same space, less coherence, or connection of ideas, than this extract affords. When the Doctor says, that so often as the Reflective powers are active, "the result is that which is called a *philosophical judgment*," does he mean, pray, that

there are *two* kinds of judgment, entirely different in their natures, and produced by essentially different means? for, until he has explained, somewhat more intelligibly, this mysterious process, which he calls “a philosophical judgment in the reflective powers,” I must still propound to him *his own* question viz—“*what is that?*” It is sufficient for me, however, that he directly affirms, that “*there is no fundamental power of judgment,*” but that, “*the judgment of each power, as colour, melody, configuration, &c*” (none of which are reflecting faculties,) “*is confined to itself*”—and I leave it to any Phrenologist who pleases, to reconcile this, to the possibility of the reflecting powers producing either “a philosophical Judgment,” or the Reasoning faculty. What sort of reasoning, forsooth, could result—even from the united efforts of *Causality, Comparison, Wit, and Imitation*, which, at the highest enumeration, constitute the whole *reflecting* department, without the aid of the sovereign faculty of CONSCIENTIOUSNESS—that faculty which, Spurzheim and Combe maintain, exclusively and independently discriminates, right from wrong—good from evil—truth from falsehood?

Mr. B. concludes his paper by starting some objections to my definition of the *Reasoning Faculty*; but he adds, in a note, “Since the above was written, I have had reason to believe, that my question regarding *motive* was urged, under a misapprehension of the sense in which Mr. Drummond used that word.” Still, however, the worthy member determines to *pose* me. “I am content,” he says, “to yield M. D. quiet possession of *motive* as the “excitant of will, but would ask another question regarding the reasoning faculty. Are all acts of the brute

“creation involuntary? They must be so, if, as Mr. Drummond maintains, the reasoning faculty,—the “Divinity which stirs only within us,” be essential to volition.”*

In answer to this, I refer the worthy member to my “*Reply to the President's observations*,” and to the foregoing extracts from the respected *Professor Stewart*. It is impossible to draw any definite line of demarcation between *Reason* and *Instinct*. These, like many others, are mere words, substituted as a mantle to cover human ignorance. Mr. B. assumes, that the “brute creation” do not *reason*; and that, therefore, all their acts are *involuntary*; but before, he proceeded to draw any such inference, he should have proved that they are neither guided by motives, nor modified by experience. And, this I rather think, is what he or any other, to the end of time, will find it somewhat difficult to prove.

To this objection, DR. PATERSON, condescends only to say, that it “*is puerile and erratic!*” He seems, for once, to have discovered that there is wisdom in silence. Our anonymous “PHRENOLOGIST,” however, has not taken it so lightly. *His* paper may, indeed, be considered as exclusively directed to this particular objection. Let us, then, examine, what, in the shape of argument, he has brought to bear on the subject.

He commences, in a style of considerable arrogance, by demanding “what Mr. Drummond *means* by the term

* I have never asserted that “the Divinity stirs *only within us*.”—A celebrated Doctor of the Sorbonne once said, to a little boy “I will give thee an apple, my dear fellow, if thou wilt tell me where God is?”—“But I will give thee *two apples*,” replied the boy, “if thou wilt tell me where God *is not?*”

Reasoning Faculty?" and it is certainly not a little fortunate for me that I can so easily answer him, and in his own identical words too! I conceive, he says, "that the *Will* is the decision of the *Intellect* on the motives presented to it,—and if only one organ be acting, which it may be, the *intellect*, having no motives to choose amongst, must follow its dictates. But if, as is generally, if not always, the case, a number of organs be in activity at the same moment, the *intellect* chooses between all motives presented to it,—sitting, as it were, in judgment upon the motives to action,—the decision on which is followed by an act of the *Will*."

Now, if the worthy Gentleman will but substitute *my* term "*Reasoning Faculty*" for his word "*Intellect*," he has exactly, the grand desideratum—the No. 36—which I contend is absolutely necessary to render Phrenology worthy of a moment's rational notice! I care very little what name may be given to any thing, provided that it definitely express the idea intended; but I cannot compliment "*A Phrenologist*" on the energy of his perceptive powers. I have heard of a Butcher, running in all directions in quest of his knife, which was the while, safely fixed between his teeth! and so it is with our "*Phrenologist*." He cannot, for the soul of him, discover what the *Reasoning Faculty* is, although he is, at the same instant, describing it in the plainest language. *That* which "chooses between all the motives presented to it,—sitting, as it were, in judgment upon the motives to action,—the decision on which is followed by an act of the *Will*," is not only what I *mean* by the term *Reasoning Faculty*, but is almost, *verbatim*, my own recorded definition.

The worthy Gentleman proceeds to affirm, that the "*Reflecting Faculties*" constitute Reason, which he re-baptizes Intellect; and, in support of this, he quotes largely from Mr. Combe. I have already, I conceive, demolished this position; but the destruction will be still more complete, when I come to investigate the theory of an *Organ of Consciousness*: and I am almost convinced that, not only "*A Phrenologist*," but even *Mr. Combe*, should they ever meet these arguments, will no longer deceive themselves into the belief of such palpable absurdity.

"A PHRENOLOGIST" next assures us, that "Mr. Combe gives long and elaborate dissertations on each of these classes (of faculties) and also simple and highly satisfactory explanations of their Metaphysical powers;" and that "he shews Perception, Conception, and Memory, to be merely *different degrees of activity* of all the INTELLECTUAL *Faculties*; and not *Faculties* themselves." I do not know what "*A Phrenologist*" may conceive to be "*highly satisfactory explanations*."—An illiterate Hindoo is perfectly satisfied that a black stone is the eternal Deity! and he neither wishes nor requires explanation;*—but I have attentively perused Mr. Combe's Chapter "*On the modes of Activity of the Intellectual Faculties*," and have no hesitation in pronouncing it to be an incoherent rhapsody—every way unworthy of serious refutation! "Perception, Conception, Imagination, Memory, and Judgment," he asserts, are merely different degrees of activity of the *same* organs! an assertion which, at once, annihilates his hypothesis. What, in the name of common sense, could be the use of *thirty-five* different organs, when a

* See NOTE [H.]

mere difference of *activity* is altogether sufficient to produce such astonishing results? On the same data, might not *one* organ, differently excited, far more simply and satisfactorily, account for the entire phenomena of mind? Are we to be persuaded that 35 organs are necessary to perform that which we are assured any one of them may do, equally well, by a simple difference of modification? And what boots it, whatever may be the size of an organ, when a mere increase of its *activity*, not only changes the measure of its *power*, but essentially metamorphoses its *nature and constitution*?*

After "*A Phrenologist*" had so boldly laid it down, that the "*Reflecting Faculties*," (of which Spurzhiem says there are *two*, and Combe *four*,) exclusively perform all the functions of *Reason, Memory, &c.* it is not a little amusing to find that, in his next paragraph, he not only demolishes this, but, unmercifully, tears up the whole ground-work of Phrenology! His words are these:—

"Mr. Drummond, in the commencement of his "*Address*," after making a few preliminary remarks, observes, "that until the promulgation of Phrenology, Mind had been uniformly considered as one homogeneous substance, and its powers and energies merely the different states or modes of the one indivisible Mind.' *In this we all agree*; but, when he adds, 'that Phrenology broke the dream,' &c. 'proclaiming that this indivisibility, this datum, upon which the sages of the Earth had rested their sublimest speculations and most abstruse inductions, was utterly false and absurd,' I am obliged decidedly to oppose the assertion, and believe that nothing

* See Notes [J.]

"but an unacquaintance with the system which, I beg to remark, is inexcusable in a Member of a Society instituted for its cultivation, could have allowed him to say any thing of the kind."

I do not, however, mean to insinuate, that our "*Phrenologist*," while under such powerful excitement of his "*Organ of Destructiveness*," contemplated the ruin he has accomplished. On the contrary, I am satisfied that, so far from being conscious of uttering a gross absurdity, he chuckled himself over the wisdom of his consistency! Although he had declared, that certain organs exclusively perform particular functions in the mental economy,—functions that all the others are quite incapable of performing,—he does not seem to be at all aware, that this explicitly proclaims the mind's *heterogeneity*. He courageously insists that each of the thirty-five "*faculties*" has a particular *piece* of brain, whereby it performs its particular, and, in most cases, directly opposite, duty; and yet, no way abashed, he says—"WE ARE ALL AGREED, that mind is one homogeneous substance, and that its powers and energies are merely the different states or modes of the one indivisible mind!"

For a more complete exposition of this bare-faced delirium, I refer to my "*Examination of Mr. A.'s Reply*;" where I have shown, that denying the mind's homogeneity, and asserting that its powers and energies are *not* different states of the same indivisible substance, is virtually all that constitutes Phrenology—and which being dissolved,

"The rest is nought but leather and prunella."

But to do "*A Phrenologist*" justice, I admit that, while guilty of such egregious obliquity, he is not acting without

a precedent; although I must, at the same time, inform him, that the tergiversation of one man can never excuse the ignorance of another. "A Phrenologist" has offered nothing of *his own* in support of this anomalous position, but has entirely sheltered himself under the protecting wing of *Mr. Combe*; whence he pours forth long, and, in his opinion, unanswerable quotations. I shall, therefore, abandon our *anonymous* friend, and follow up the greater game which he has started, previously exhibiting all that the *Edinburgh Phrenologist* has advanced on the subject.

MR. COMBE. "As Phrenological observation establishes
 " the existence of a plurality of mental faculties, each
 " connected with a particular part of the brain, the ques-
 " tion occurs, is the mind simple, or an aggregate of se-
 " parate powers? It is extremely difficult to give a satis-
 " factory answer to this inquiry. Looking at the facts
 " presented to us by observation, the most obvious infe-
 " rence seems to be, that the mind consists of an aggregate
 " of powers, and that *one* of them supplies the feeling of
 " personal Identity, or the *I* of Consciousness, to which,
 " as their substance, all the other feelings and capacities
 " bear reference. This view is strongly supported by
 " some of the phenomena of insanity; for patients are
 " sometimes insane in the feeling of personal identity,
 " and in no other faculty of the mind. Such individuals
 " lose all consciousness for their past and proper perso-
 " nality, and imagine themselves different persons altoge-
 " ther; while, with the exception of this erroneous im-
 " pression, they feel and think correctly. Under the head

" of Memory, in a subsequent part of this work, an ab-
 " stract will be found of a case of divided personality;
 " occurring through disease, reported by Dr. DYCE of
 " Aberdeen to Dr. HENRY DEWAR, and by him published
 " in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.
 " A similar case is stated in " The Medical Repository,"
 " communicated by Dr. MITCHELL to the Reverend Dr.
 " NOTT, date January 1816. 'When I was employed,'
 " says he, 'early in December 1815, with several other
 " gentlemen, in doing the duty of a visitor to the United
 " States Military Academy at West Point, a very extra-
 " ordinary case of Double Consciousness, in a woman,
 " was related to me by one of the professors. Major
 " Ellicott, who so worthily occupies the mathematical
 " chair in that seminary, vouched for the correctness of
 " the following narrative, the subject of which is related
 " to him by blood, and an inhabitant of one of the western
 " counties of Pennsylvania:—Miss R——— possessed,
 " naturally, a very good constitution, and arrived at adult
 " age without having it impaired by disease. She pos-
 " sessed an excellent capacity, and enjoyed fair opportu-
 " nities to acquire knowledge. Besides the domestic
 " arts and social attainments, she had improved her mind
 " by reading and conversation, and was well versed in
 " penmanship. Her memory was capacious, and stored
 " with a copious stock of ideas. Unexpectedly, and
 " without any forewarning, she fell into a profound
 " sleep, which continued several hours beyond the ordi-
 " nary term. On waking, she was discovered to have
 " lost every trait of acquired knowledge. Her memory
 " was *tabula rasa*,—*all vestiges, both of words and things;*

“ were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for
 “ her to learn every thing again. She even acquired, by
 “ new efforts, the arts of spelling, reading, writing, and
 “ calculating, and gradually became acquainted with the
 “ persons and objects around, *like a being for the first time*
 “ *brought into the world.* In these exercises she made
 “ considerable proficiency. But, after a few months, ano-
 “ ther fit of somnolency invaded her. On rousing from it,
 “ she found herself restored to the state she was in before
 “ the first paroxysm; but was wholly ignorant of every
 “ event and occurrence that had befallen her afterwards.
 “ The former condition of her existence, she now calls the
 “ Old State, and the latter the New State; and she is as
 “ *unconscious of her double character as two distinct per-*
 “ *sons are of their respective natures.* For example, in her
 “ old state, she possesses all her original knowledge; in
 “ her new state only what she acquired since. If a gen-
 “ tleman or lady be introduced to her in the old state, and
 “ *vice versa,* (and so of all other matters,) to know them
 “ satisfactorily she must learn them in both states. In
 “ the old state, she possesses fine powers of penmanship,
 “ while in the new, she writes a poor awkward hand, hav-
 “ ing not had time or means to become expert. During
 “ four years and upwards, she has undergone periodical
 “ transitions from one of these states to the other. The
 “ alterations are always consequent upon a long and sound
 “ sleep. Both the lady and her family are now capable
 “ of conducting the affair without embarrassment. By
 “ simply knowing whether she is in the old or new state,
 “ they regulate the intercourse, and govern themselves ac-
 “ cordingly. A history of her curious case is drawing up

“by the Reverend TIMOTHY ALDIN of Meadville.’ Such cases as the foregoing, have led some persons to the inference, that the feeling of personal identity is a primitive mental affection, connected with a particular organ, and hence liable separately to disease; and because we have ascertained that each of the other primitive feelings and intellectual powers is also manifested by a separate organ, the mind has appeared to them to consist of an aggregate of powers acting together. This view corresponds with the apprehension of mankind in general, for popular language is framed on the principle of the *I of Consciousness being distinct from the other mental affections*. We speak of *evil thoughts* intruding themselves into *our* mind; and of *our* having *strong desires* which *we* forbear to indulge. In such expressions, the *our* and *we* seem to mean the principle of personal identity; and the evil thoughts and desires appear to be regarded as affections of that principle, originating from sources distinct from it, and different from one another.”—

“The more general opinion of philosophers is, *that the mind is a simple and indivisible substance, and that the several faculties are merely different states of it*. This view is espoused by my excellent friend the Reverend DAVID WELSH, who successfully shews, that it is consistent with the phrenological doctrine of a plurality of organs. ‘The leading doctrine,’ says he, ‘of Phrenology is, that different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind.’ The truth of this position can obviously be ascertained only by observation. But, taking it for granted that it is true, it may be asked, how it can be reconciled with the great

“principle to which so frequent reference has been made,
 “that the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind are
 “not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself
 “existing in different states?”—

“It is not necessary, in studying Phrenology, to decide
 “which of these views is the correct interpretation of
 “nature, because the effects of the organs on the mind is
 “the same, whichever of them be adopted. Holding the
 “mind to consist of an aggregate of powers,—then each
 “acts by means of a particular organ, and is manifested
 “with a degree of energy in proportion to its size. View-
 “ing it as a simple substance, capable of existing in a
 “variety of states, it enters into each state by means of
 “a separate organ: when the organs are spontaneously
 “active, they induce their relative states; without their
 “influence these cannot take place: when they are large,
 “the states are excited vigorously; when they are small,
 “they exist feebly. *The reader may therefore adopt
 “whichever theory appears to himself preferable.* In the
 “following pages the faculties will be treated of as dis-
 “tinct mental powers, connected with separate organs,
 “because this view enables me to bring out the doctrine
 “more simply and luminously, than by considering them
 “as merely particular states of the general power—the
 “Mind; and this language, moreover, is correct even on
 “the latter hypothesis, because, according to this view,
 “when the organ of Causality, for example, is largely
 “possessed, the individual is capable of reasoning logi-
 “cally and acutely; of which mental acts he is incapable,
 “when it is greatly deficient. The word *faculty* or *power*
 “therefore, is used to express the quality which is pos-

“assessed in the one, and not in the other case, and which, being active, is legitimately designated, and universally recognised, by either of these terms.” *System of Phrenology* (Pages 51 to 56.)

Mr. Combe commences by saying, that from “the facts presented to us by observation, the most obvious inference seems to be, that the mind consists of an aggregate of powers, and that one of them supplies the feeling of personal identity, or the *I* of consciousness, to which, as their substance, all other feelings and capacities bear reference.” He further asserts, “that this view is strongly supported by some of the phenomena of insanity;” and then quotes an elaborate statement of a particular case, to prove that such a separate faculty must exist.

A re-perusal of my first paper will show, that my several arguments against Phrenology, are only divisions of one insuperable objection, viz. the impossibility of its accounting for *personal identity*, or, in other words, *single consciousness*. I had before me an array of 35 distinct and separate faculties, each operating by an *organ*, consisting of a particular portion of the cerebrum or cerebellum; but, amid the multitude of heterogeneous instincts, I could discover neither bond of union nor council of control;—“no power” (to use the words of our anonymous “*Phrenologist*”) “which collected and combined all the sensations, feelings, and ideas, that can be compassed from No. 1 to No. 35”—in short, I saw no possibility, on the principles of this pretended science, whereby a human being could be himself! I therefore rejected Phrenology.

I now find, however, that this decision was rash and premature. I had founded my reasoning on the belief that,

“to that which is already the whole, nothing can be added” —altogether forgetting, that such superannuated axioms, although *criteria* in science and philosophy, are quite inapplicable to Phrenology; for, we are now assured, that besides *all* the faculties, there is still *another*, which “supplies the feeling of personal identity, or the *I* of consciousness, to which, as their substance, all the other feelings and capacities bear reference,”—a faculty, whose influence and importance, at once, reduces the remainder to absolute nothingness!

On their map of the cranium, however, we search in vain, for any speck of this important territory. They have carefully named, and precisely laid down the boundaries, of the acknowledged 35 Principalities, many of which, it might easily be proved, deserve no such distinction: but of this Paramount power, this Imperial dominion,—to which all the other petty states are declared to be mere subjects and tributaries,—no vestige is to be found! In their catalogue of mental energies, its name has never appeared; in their whimsical divisions of the cranium, its site is utterly rejected; and in the verbose definitions of their fancied faculties, there is not discoverable the most distant allusion to its nature or existence! My worthy friends may now, if they please, laugh at me for asserting the necessity of a 36th faculty, when they find that the great leaders of phrenology are so distressed for the want of an additional power, which, like Aaron’s Serpent, swallows up all the rest.

But the absurdity of these Phrenologists does not merely consist in refusing to recognize a faculty which, nevertheless, they declare *must* exist. They are not contented

with asserting, that there is an organ which is the "*substance*" of all the others, and then leaving us to hunt after it, wherever we please; their whole reasoning, if reasoning it can be called, uniformly involves, and frequently declares, the positive non-existence of any such power. To quote from their writings, however, all that might be adduced in support of this, would be to copy almost the whole they have written; but as specimens, I propose the following.—

"It would be impossible to have a conception of particular dreams, or ideas and sensations, if the brain were one single organ, and if every faculty were not attached to a *particular and independent organ.*" (*Spurzheim, Page 217.*)

"Now, in every position and in every motion of the body other muscles are active. In the same way it is conceivable, that every kind of *sensation* or *idea* is attached to a *particular organ.*" (*Spurzheim, Page 230.*)

"When an impression is made upon the hand, it is not the organs of touch which form the conception of the object making the impression: but the nerves of feeling in the hand receive the impression, *and a faculty of the mind perceives the object.*" (*Combe, Page 260.*)

"Dr. Spurzheim states, that the *Upper Individuality* recognises the activity of every other faculty, whether external or internal; and acts, in its turn, upon all of them." No doubt, if Cautiousness be affected, and violent fright ensue, at the sight of a certain object, it is Individuality which *observes* it; and if, at a distance of time afterwards, it become the topic of conversation, Individuality *recollects* not only the appearance of the

"object, but also the mental fact that fear was then felt at beholding it." (Combe, Page 292.)

"Every faculty, when in action, from whatever cause, produces the *kind* of feeling, or forms the *kind* of ideas; already explained, as resulting from its natural constitution." (Combe, Page 370.)

"The laws of the *Knowing* and *Reflecting* faculties are different: These faculties *form Ideas, and perceive Relations*; they are subject to the will, or rather constitute will themselves; and they minister to the gratification of the other faculties which *only feel*."*

"The faculties, also, may be active from internal excitement of the organs, and then the kinds of ideas which they are fitted to form are presented involuntarily to the mind. The musician feels the notes *flowing on him uncalled for*. A man in whom Number is powerful and active, *calculates by a natural impulse*. He in whom Form is vigorous, *conceives figures by internal inspiration*. He in whom Causality is powerful and active, *Reasons while he thinks without an effort*. He in whom Wit is energetic, feels witty conceptions *flowing into his mind spontaneously, and even at times and places when he would wish them not to appear*."† (Combe Page 376.)

* Mr. Combe accords to each of the Reflecting faculties all the attributes and powers of mind; and says, that the others only "*feel*." It will, however, be shown subsequently, that feeling and consciousness are synonymous terms; and that every separate feeling thing, is a separate and distinct identity.—But what he means by saying, that the Reflecting faculties "are subject to the Will, or rather constitute Will themselves," my organ of imagination can by no effort arrive at!

† I have frequently stated that all the faculties of Phrenologists are merely *blind instincts*; and I am surely justified in this after what Mr. Combe here asserts. The knowing faculties, he says, act by "a natural impulse"—"*involuntarily, and spontaneously*."—Causality, the chief of the Reflecting corps

“ Each faculty performs the act of conception in its own sphere.” (Combe, Page 379.)

“ Each organ will enable the mind to recall the impressions which it served at first to receive. Thus, the organ of Tune will recall notes formerly heard, and give the memory of music. Form will recall figures formerly observed, and give the memory of persons, of pictures, or of crystals, and produce a talent for becoming learned in matters connected with such objects. Individuality will give the memory for facts, and render a person skilled in history, both natural and civil. A person in which Causality is powerful, will possess a natural memory for metaphysics. Hence there may be as many kinds of memory as there are Knowing and Reflecting Organs.” (Combe, Page 393.)

Here every faculty is, unequivocally, invested with the attributes of *sensation, conception, &c.* while the greater portion of them have also *judgment and memory*; which is directly awarding to each a consciousness exclusively *its own*; thereby rendering a particular faculty for that purpose not only useless, but impossible. It is evident, however, that Mr. Combe has been led into this palpable contradiction by his ignorance of the true nature of that abstruse principle which is expressed by the word

“reasons without an effort,” of course, also involuntarily and spontaneously; and as for Wit, another of the same elevated grade, it not only powers its conceptions “spontaneously” but even “at times, and places when he (its proprietor) would wish them not to appear!” If these be not descriptions of *instincts*, it is high time, in my opinion, that such a term were expunged from human language.

It would be very obliging in Mr. Combe if he would inform us, what kind of Being the *He, or proprietor* of these spontaneous, involuntary, and impermanent faculties really is?—Where he resides, and what is the tenure of his proprietorship? I shall certainly not part with him without making some further enquiry into the nature of this mysterious, incomprehensible existence.

Consciousness. It is not otherwise conceivable—after Spurzheim had laid it down, that “every kind of sensation or idea is attached to a particular organ,” and he had himself declared, that “there may be as many kinds of memory as there are Knowing and Reflecting organs,”—how he could, nevertheless, still imagine, that there can be *one* faculty only endowed with *Consciousness*.

These speculators seem to encounter no difficulty in believing, that certain faculties of the mind may conceive, feel, remember, &c. and yet, at the same time be entirely ignorant of such proceedings; while it remains for *another* faculty which does *not* conceive, feel, or remember, to *know*, or be *conscious of*, these and all other modes of mental existence! A little reflection, however, would have taught them the gross fallacy of this assumption. “Sensation” (says an eloquent philosopher) “is not the object of consciousness different from itself, but a particular sensation is the consciousness of the moment; as a particular hope, or fear, or grief, or resentment, or simple remembrance, may be the actual consciousness of the next moment.”—“To suppose the mind to exist in two different states, in the same moment, is a manifest absurdity. To the whole series of states of the mind, then, whatever the individual momentary successive states may be, I give the name of our consciousness—using that term, not to express any new state additional to the whole series, (for to that, which is already the whole, nothing can be added, and the mind, as I have already said, cannot be conceived to exist at once in two different states,) but merely as a short mode of expressing the wide variety of our feelings; in the

“ same manner, as I use any other generic word, for expressing briefly the individual varieties comprehended under it. There are not sensations, thoughts, passions, and also consciousness, any more than there is quadruped or animal, as a separate being, to be added to the wolves, tigers, elephants, and other living creatures, which I include under those terms.”—I am conscious of a certain feeling, really means, no more than this—I feel in a certain manner, or, in other words, my mind exists in that state which constitutes a certain feeling; —the mere existence of that feeling, and not any additional and distinguishable feeling that is to be termed consciousness, being all which is essential to the state of my mind, at the particular moment of sensation; for a pleasure, or pain, of which we are not conscious, is a pleasure, or pain, that, in reference to us, at least, has no existence.” *Brown’s Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human mind.*—(Vol. 1st.—Pages 226 & 227.)

To feel, and to be conscious of that feeling, then, are one and the same: as a feeling of which we are not *conscious*, would be exactly a feeling which is not *felt*! Mr. Combe has said, and said truly, that “when an impression is made upon the hand, it is not the organs of touch which form the conception of the object making the impression;” but, when he goes on to say that, “the nerves of feeling in the hand receive the impression, and a *faculty of the mind* perceives the object,” I would ask him how he *knows* this, and how it can be possible, unless the particular faculty is *conscious* of the perception? He has already said, that one gifted power is alone sentient of what is passing amid all the rest. How, then, can any other faculty perceive the

object making the impression, any more than "the nerves of feeling in the hand," which form no conceptions whatever? The doctrine of a plurality of mental faculties, and one of them alone endowed with consciousness, is a baseless chimera of deluded fancy. The very essence and distinguishing attribute of Mind is consciousness; a faculty of the mind, therefore, without this attribute, is an impossible conception—a gross contradiction in terms!

The doctrine of a separate organ of consciousness is, moreover, as little reconcilable to phrenology as to common sense and philosophy. What I have remarked, regarding *Reason*, is equally applicable to *Consciousness*.^{*} No additional *instinct*, with an organ limited to its own locality, (which all the organs are declared to be,) could perform the duties of this all-pervading function.—Nor is it possible that any faculty, acting by a local organ, could extend its influence beyond that organ: for "a thing cannot act where it is not." The organ of such a comprehensive faculty would be the *whole* brain; the whole brain, therefore, would be *one* organ, and the faculty of consciousness, the *whole* mind—a conclusion which, at one blow, annihilates all the apparatus and assumptions of Phrenology.†

* When I asserted that Phrenology denies the existence of Reason and Memory, (and I might have added, of Will, Imagination &c.) it was purely on the ground, that it rejected Consciousness—which is, indeed, but another term to express the same thing: for what is Reasoning, Remembering, &c. but the *consciousness* of such acts?

† It is scarcely comprehensible how all this did not suggest itself to Mr. Combe, and, thereby, save him from sending forth to the world such unaccountable imaginings. He seems to be fully aware, that if the said "Organ of consciousness" be out of tune, and its play suspended, the operation of all

What then, it may be asked, are we to say to the case, so gravely attested, of the Lady in Pennsylvania, who lost her old consciousness and acquired a new one, each of which, periodically and in rotation, took possession of her earthly tabernacle, with as much facility as she changed her night-gown! and who "was as unconscious of her *double character* as two distinct persons are of their respective natures?" We are told that, on waking from a profound sleep, the woman's "memory was *tabula rasa*,—all vestiges both of words and things were obliterated and gone. It was found necessary for her to learn every thing again. She even acquired, by new efforts, the arts of spelling; reading, writing, and calculation, and gradually became acquainted with the persons around, like a being for the first time brought into the world." But is it not rather singular, that this Pennsylvanian prodigy should have com-

the others immediately ceases: for he clearly admits, that when Miss R's old consciousness left her, every other faculty fled along with it, and that, of course, had not another faculty of consciousness been in waiting, and ready to leap into her, all the rest were forever annihilated! Might it not have occurred to Mr. Combe, that the existence of such a power as this, was little in accordance with his doctrine, that "each faculty performs the act of conception in its own sphere"—that "each organ will enable the mind to recall the impressions which it served at first to receive"—that "there are as many kinds of memory as there are knowing and reflecting organs," &c. &c.—Why did it not occur to him that this faculty, (which he musters in the rank and file of the private thirty-five,) was, *bona fide*, and exclusively, the American Lady herself—and, but for which, she was no more Miss R.—than she was the Queen of Sheba, or Alexander the Great? The smallest reflection might have convinced the worthy Gentleman, that consciousness is but another name for the soul, mind or intellect; and that it effectually comprehends—nay is—all that can be conceived to exist, either of feeling or thinking.

menced her education by learning *to spell?* for as “*all vestiges, both of words and things, were obliterated and gone,*” the far more difficult art of *articulation* had first to be overcome, besides the acquisition of *a language, as dead to her as Hebrew or Chinese.* And previous to this important step, how much must she have experimented upon the senses of touch and vision, before acquiring any notion whatever of shape, distance, or magnitude? What a helpless and unfortunate object must not this great infant have been;—incapable of locomotion;—incapable of feeding, cleaning, or covering, herself—or of expressing any natural want but by cries and emotions; and how long must not this imbecility have continued before the first beam of rationality dawned upon her mind! Yet, are we accurately informed, that the space of time, from the period when her memory was “*a tabula rasa,*” until she had, “*by new efforts, made considerable proficiency in the arts of spelling, reading, writing and calculating*”—from the hour when she was “*like a being for the first time brought into the world,*” until we find her Mistress of these varied and useful accomplishments—was, *mirabile dictu,* only “**A FEW MONTHS!!!**”

Although it is asserted that a *Reverend Divine* drew up this “*curious case,*” and that a *Professor of Mathematics* vouched for its correctness, we must pity the credulity that can indulge in such extravagance. The day, it may be hoped, is gone, when the authority of learned names could dupe and enslave mankind: and the well-attested miracles of Southcote and Hohenlohe, are too fresh in our remembrance, to admit the validity of any human testimony, when opposed to our experience of the known and

established laws of nature;—which, rightly understood, is preferring the assertion of a fallible and erring creature, to the immutable and eternal voice of God! But even admitting that this strange American tale were true, I cannot discover how it could assist Phrenologists in establishing the existence of a separate *organ of consciousness*—but quite the contrary. For if *any* conclusion can be drawn from such premises, it must certainly be, that the woman in question, had *two* such organs. It then follows, that granting them all they require, they prove too much, and, therefore, nothing.

The last portion of the hypothesis remaining to be examined, is that which Mr. Combe gives us as the “view” of his “excellent friend, THE REVEREND DAVID WELSH”—viz. “*that the mind is a simple and indivisible substance, and that the several faculties are merely different states of it.*”

That *The Reverend David Welsh*, or any other sober minded person, should take this “view” of the subject, is nothing at all remarkable; for such has not only been the *view*, but the *conviction*, of almost every one who has reasoned on the subject, from the first dawn of philosophy until the grand discovery of Dr. Gall. But, that Mr. Combe should be cajoled into the belief that this view of his Reverend friend, “is consistent with the Phrenological doctrine of a plurality of organs,” is something beyond remarkable! Nor is our surprise lessened, when he gravely asserts that, whether the mind be *single*, or consists of 35 *heterogeneous parts*, is a question,—so far as Phrenology is concerned,—of no importance whatever; and that “*the reader may, therefore, adopt whichever theory appears to himself preferable!*”

It would be difficult, I should think, while perusing this, to keep one's *Organs of Risibility* under due control! Mr. Combe has written a large and elaborate volume, to illustrate and defend a new system of the human mind, which Gall had discovered, and Spurzheim amplified: viz. that the brain is not a *single* organ, but an aggregate of *thirty-five*, which are the working tools of an equal number of mental faculties, each of them performing its own particular duty, and most of them arrayed in deadly opposition;—one propensity devoutly adoring God, another, as sincerely worshipping Mammon;—this, inciting to torture and destroy, that, to succour and save! and that the joint operation of this heterogeneous assemblage,

“Good counteracting ill, and gladness wo,”

constitutes all the feelings and all the operations of the human mind. Further, it is declared, that each of these faculties is, independently and exclusively, a sentient being, and that there is no other faculty of sensation; while certain classes of them “form ideas and perceive relations,”* having distinct and separate memories for their own individual purposes.—there being “as many kinds of memory as there are Knowing and Reflecting Organs.”† Dr. Spurzheim directly affirms, that “the Judgment of each power is confined to itself,” and that “there is no fundamental power of judgment.”‡ And Dr. Murray Paterson, the apostle to the Eastern Gentiles, positively affirms, that “every organ wills, or wishes, or desires to be gratified,

* Combe's System of Phrenology page, 376.

† Combe's System of Phrenology page, 393.

‡ Spurzheim's 14th Lecture—The Lancet 20th Aug. 1825.

and this by its own created, inherent, or sovereign energy ;” and that any one of them, by its “individual excitation, exclusively retains the remembrance of this will, wish, or desire.”*—Yet in defiance of these, and a thousand other such asseverations and attempted proofs of the mind’s heterogeneity, Mr. Combe escapes, at once, as he imagines, from all the consequences of his difficulties and absurdities, by unblushingly avowing, that “whether the mind is a simple and indivisible substance, and the several faculties are merely different states of it,” or “consists of an aggregate of powers, each acting by means of a particular organ—that whether the one or the other “of these views is the correct interpretation of nature”—“in studying phrenology, it is not at all necessary to decide ; and that “*the Reader may, therefore, adopt whichever theory appears to himself preferable!*”

I have, perhaps, followed Mr. Combe far enough—but I will chase him further, and prove, satisfactorily, that the mind’s divisibility or indivisibility, which he affects to treat as a point of no consequence to his hypothesis, involves the *whole* question of the truth or falsehood of Phrenology. And, although I have previously urged this argument, its vital importance demands a more complete and particular analysis.

What *Metaphysicians* mean by “*Faculties of the mind,*” are the different capabilities and susceptibilities which it is known to possess ; and which, they believe, to be merely different states of the same indivisible substance. Thus, the mind and its faculties cannot be different existences, as the faculty of Reasoning, for instance,

* Dr. Paterson’s Reply to my paper—Calcutta John Bull 10th Sept. 1827.

is but the mind existing in a certain state, which we have been taught to designate by that particular appellation.

What *Phrenologists* mean by "*Faculties of the mind,*" they have never directly explained, nor, in my firm conviction, have they ever inquired into. Hence the source of all the tergiversation and contradiction, with which their speculations so fruitfully abound; and from this arises the particular absurdity of Mr. Combe's declaring, at one time, that each of them with its corporeal organ, is an independently sentient being, and at another, that the human mind is one simple and indivisible unit.*

To obtain, therefore, a clear explanation, I now demand of Mr. Combe, to say explicitly, what he wishes to be understood by the often reiterated expression—"Facul-

* In proof of this ignorance and tergiversation, I beg leave to quote, a second time, the following paragraph from Combe's "*System of Phrenology:*"

"The faculties, also, may be active from internal excitement of the organs, and then the kinds of ideas which they are fitted to form are presented involuntarily to the mind. The musician feels the notes flowing on him uncalled for. A man in whom number is powerful and active, calculates by a natural impulse. He in whom form is vigorous, conceives figures by internal inspiration. He in whom causality is powerful and active, reasons while he thinks, without an effort. He in whom wit is energetic, feels witty conceptions flowing into his mind spontaneously, and even at times and places when he would wish them not to appear." (Page 376.)

The positive amount of all this is, that ideas, or conceptions are not formed by the mind, but by the organs; whence, they flow into the mind, (cut and dry, like particles of ground flour into a miller's receiver!)—that all the phenomena, which has hitherto been believed to be exhibited by *the mind*, are spontaneous and involuntary impulses of *the organs*—and that *He*, in whom these ideas or conceptions take up their abode, merely feels them flowing into his mind, which at certain times and seasons, they do, altogether in spite of him.

Did Mr. Combe really mean to assert the existence of such a trinity? He talks, it is true, of "*figures* being conceived by *internal inspiration,*" but he has omitted to inform us by what kind of "*inspiration*" we are to conceive this strange figure of a man, his mind, and his conceptions, being totally distinct from one another! Mr. Combe pretends to feel great reverence for the opinions of Dr. Thomas Brown; but if he will but read, and reflect on, one single page of that philosopher's definition of mental identity, I am inclined to think, he will have the modesty to blush deeply for what he has uttered.

ties of the mind?" Whether their aggregate constitutes the mind,—the *whole* mind, thereby, rendering the mind and the aggregate of the faculties equivalent and synonymous terms?—Or, whether, besides the aggregate of the faculties, there is *also* the mind, each a separate and distinct existence?

Dr. Paterson, Mr. A. and Mr. B. felt no difficulty in believing *both* these propositions to be true; nor any hesitation in asserting that the mind, at the same time, is the aggregate of the faculties, and that it is not! Blest in their credulity, they imagined that a whole number, and its parts, were totally distinct and available existences; and that the human mind, therefore, although consisting purely of the aggregate of the faculties, was, nevertheless, *as an aggregate*, something entirely different from them! But, this has been so effectually dissected and exposed, that the Edinburgh Phrenologist, should ever these pages have the good fortune to meet his eye, is not very likely to resort to such a subterfuge.

Should Mr. Combe adopt the first proposition, viz. that *the mind and the aggregate of the faculties are synonymous terms*, I will agree with him so far, that this is consistent with Phrenology, and with all he has written, save and except where he renounces every article of his faith to back "the view of his excellent friend, The Reverend David Welsh." In the first page of Mr. Combe's "INTRODUCTION" the following sentence stands conspicuous: "The human mind as it exists in this world, cannot, *by itself*, become an object of philosophical investigation. "Placed in a material world, it cannot act, nor be acted "upon, but through the medium of an organic apparatus."

Now, as it is declared that each faculty operates by its particular organ, and that there are no more organs than faculties, the aggregate of the faculties must constitute, or, more properly *be*, the mind. For, if the mind "cannot act, nor be acted upon, but through the medium of an organic apparatus," there can be no mind, nor quality of mind, that is not attached, and belonging, to some particular organ. If, therefore, there be only 35 organs, there can be only 35 faculties, and beyond this, the existence of mind, or quality of mind, is utterly impossible.

Should Mr. Combe, on the contrary, adopt the second proposition, viz.—that besides the aggregate of the faculties, there is *also* the mind, each a separate and distinct existence, he surrenders to destruction every principle of his beloved Phrenology, and may sing a requiem over its grave! If the mind, or any quality of mind, exists unattached to a particular organ, what, let me ask him, would be the use or object of such existence? He has declared that it could "neither act, nor be acted upon," which is, in the plainest language, proclaiming its nonentity: for, a thing that "cannot act, nor be acted upon," is utterly impossible to be either conceived or imagined.

Having now ascertained the positive meaning which Phrenologists are compelled to attach to the expression, "*Faculties of the mind*," viz.—that their aggregate *is* the mind, *all* the mind, and *nothing* but the mind, I have next to consider, whether, on Phrenological principles, the mind can be a simple and indivisible substance, and the powers, thoughts, and feelings, thereof, merely the mind itself existing in different states.

Phrenology declares that each faculty is endowed with a constitution intrinsically *its own*, and that no two of the thirty-five are capable of performing the same definite function; some, only feeling and perceiving, others, reflecting and remembering; some, more or less congenial, others, partially or diametrically opposed; and, moreover, that each of them may operate *singly*, which individual operation, without the aid or assistance of any thing besides, can produce sensation, volition, and memory. It is for Mr. Combe to reconcile this multitude of heterogeneous and independent powers to the view of "his excellent friend,"—for I cannot assist him. So far from the mind being "a simple and indivisible substance," I find that it is not only divided, but sub-divided! and that each subdivision is a separate, identical being, altogether distinct in its nature and constitution, and quite incapable of performing any other than its own allotted function; and that many of them are so opposite and incompatible,—so sternly arrayed in immutable hostility, that joint co-operation is impossible. And as for "the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind, being merely different states of it," I find, that all which philosophers imply by a different state of the mind, (which is any momentary thought, feeling, or emotion, supplying a new link to the chain of consciousness,) may be effectually produced, and yet the mind be entirely ignorant of the matter—that so far from a thought, feeling, or emotion, being a state of *the mind*, it is only the state of *an organ*—an affection, purely, of the thirty-fifth fractional division of a substance, declared to be *simple and indivisible!!*

Having now closed accounts with Mr. Combe, I might

do the same with *Phrenology*; but I cannot forego the opportunity of exchanging a few words with that great authority in the "New science," *The Reverend David Welsh*, regarding his "view" of the subject,—the heresy he would engraft upon so frail a stem. The Reverend Gentleman, we are informed, is the Biographer and Critic of the late Dr. Brown, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, and ought to be, at least in some degree, equal to the undertaking. I have not, however, in this distant land, been able to procure his work, and am, therefore, obliged to confine my remarks entirely to the following extracts, copied from Combe's "*System of Phrenology*."

MR. WELSH. "The leading doctrine, of Phrenology is, "that different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind. The truth "of this position can obviously be ascertained only by "observation. But taking it for granted that it is true, it "may be asked, how it can be reconciled with the great "principle to which so frequent reference has been made, "that the powers, thoughts, and feelings of the mind are "not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself "existing in different states?"

"It requires but little reflection to be satisfied that the "introduction of cerebral organs does not in any degree "affect Dr. BROWN'S leading principle. The cerebral "organs are not the mind—nor is any state of these organs the mind. The mind, we believe, to be a simple and "indivisible substance. And the only difference that the "doctrines of phrenology introduce in regard to Dr.

“BROWN’S principle is, that, instead of the feelings and thoughts being merely the relations of the simple substance *mind*, to its own former states or to external objects, they are the relations of the simple substance *mind* to certain portions of the encephalon.”

“In looking upon any object—as snow—we have the notion of a certain colour. Now, the notion is not in the snow but in the mind. That is, the notion of colour is the mind existing in a certain relation to an external object. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is an intervening step between the snow and the mind. There is an affection of the optic nerve. The notion of colour, then, is the mind existing in a certain relation to the optic nerve. It will be conceded, that this does not alter the question as to the simplicity of the mind. And if this is conceded, it is abundantly obvious, that another step in the process might be conceived, without taking away from the simplicity of the immaterial part, and that, instead of an affection of the optic nerve being the immediate antecedent of the notion of colour, it might be a particular portion of the encephalon. As the notion of colour, upon this supposition, is a relation of the mind to the organ of colour, it follows, that, if that organ were changed in any respect, the state of the mind would also be changed. Thus, if it were larger, or of a finer structure, or more active, the perception of colour would be more delicate, or quick, or pleasing. The same remarks might be extended to all the organs. Where the organ of Casuality is large, as in the case of Dr. BROWN himself, then there will be a tendency to reason; which tendency is a state of the mind in relation to a material or-

“gan, which state would have been different had the organ been different.”

“A multitude of organs may all be affecting the mind at the same instant, and in that case a variety of feelings will be experienced. But still the mind is simple, and it is only its relations to these different organs that are complex.”

“When we say, then, that when we have any power, as for example, of reasoning, we are not to suppose that the power is different from the mind. There is a material organ which is separate from the mind, but the perception of relation is a state wholly mental. One state of the organ may give the perception of relation, another the desire to perceive or discover it; but the perception and desire are both attributes, not of matter but of mind.—The effect of the organ being large or small, active or inactive, in different individuals, or upon the same individual at different times, is the subject to which I allude in the chapter on Cause and Effect, as that which Dr. BROWN had not considered.”

“It has occurred to me,” continues Mr. WELSH, “that another difficulty of a metaphysical nature may suggest itself in regard to the principles of Phrenology. It may be asked, What is the soul when deprived of the cerebral organs? But the system of Dr. BROWN affords us no more light upon this point, than the system of Dr. GALL. Indeed, a passage which I have quoted from his Lectures shews, that he considered that those who engaged in such inquiries were ignorant of the limits of our faculties. It is only experience that can teach us in what state the soul exists when sepa-

“rated from the body.” *Combe's System of Phrenology*,
(Page 54 to 57.)

Mr. Welsh agrees with Dr. Brown and with metaphysicians in general, that “the mind is a simple and indivisible substance,” and that “its powers, thoughts, and feelings, are not different from the mind, but merely the mind itself existing in different states.” He disagrees, however, from Dr. Brown and from Philosophy, by affirming that, instead of the mind receiving impressions *directly* from the nerves of sensation, “there is *another*, step in the process”—that instead of an external object “as *snow*,” affecting the optic nerve, and the optic nerve again affecting the mind, the utmost influence of this nerve, or of any other, can only affect “a particular portion of the encephalon,” viz. one of the 35 *organs*, which alone have the honour of being admitted into the presence chamber. I find, however, that The Reverend Gentleman does not pretend to *prove* this, but merely says, that such “another step in the process *might be conceived*.” Now, I freely admit, that not only *one* such other step “might be conceived,” but ten thousand: although, at the same time, just as easily “might it be conceived,” that nothing of the kind ever existed; and the more especially so, as he has not attempted to insinuate the most distant use or advantage derivable to the mind, or to any thing else, from the additional machinery. Mr. Welsh must be aware that it is an established law in philosophising, that more shall not be assumed as a *cause* than is sufficient for the existing *effect*. As, therefore, he has not shewn that the intercourse between external objects and the mind, would be, in any degree better ma-

naged by the intervention of "*particular portions of the encephalon*" than has hitherto been the case without them, we must reject their existence as a useless and unnecessary complication.

I frankly concede that there is *one* "intervening step" or, more properly, that there is *a medium of communication*, between external objects and the mind. Experiment demonstrates this. If a nerve be divided, or even compressed, so that its continuity with the brain is destroyed, the sensations derived from that particular nerve immediately cease. Hence, it is evident, that all sensation is exclusively in the mind; and that, unless for these media of communication, it could receive no impression whatever, nor (at least in connection with its mortal coil) possess any knowledge either of external nature, or of its own existence. But although we concede this, which is so fully demonstrated that the contrary cannot be conceived, does Mr. Welsh expect we must, therefore, concede that there is "another step in the process" which, nevertheless, he neither establishes to be true in fact, nor necessary in theory?

But granting that, between the nerves of sensation and the mind, the intervention of particular portions of the brain was absolutely indispensable, it still remains to be explained, why such is necessary for conducting these numerous operations which the mind *itself* performs. Admitting that there is a particular portion of the brain to which the optic nerve conveys the notion of colour, whence the necessity to the "Indivisible substance," of such apparatus for the purpose of *remembering, comparing, or imagining* by? These are not impressions, journeying to

the mind from *without*, and can, therefore, make no "step in the process!"—Although it is evident, that the mind can neither see, hear, smell, &c. without the intervention of the organs of sense, does it necessarily follow, that it must have a separate *piece of brain* for the purpose of hoping, fearing, loving, &c. Is there no difference between sensation and reflection—between the states of the mind derived from the presence of external objects, and those derived from its own previous states? Has the Biographer and critic of Dr. Thomas Brown entirely overlooked a distinction, so often, and so strongly inculcated by that eminent Philosopher?—who, after classifying the whole phenomena of the mind into external and internal affections, (the immediate antecedents of the former, being "foreign to the mind," and those of the latter, "belonging to the mind itself,") introduces the following passage, which Mr. Welsh may reconcile to his new view of phrenology in the best manner he can.—

"Our intellectual states of mind, and our emotions, have for their objects things really existing without; but the external affections of our senses, though the most permanent, and usually the most vivid, and therefore the best remembered, of all the sources of our internal feelings, are far from being necessary, in every instance, to the production of these. There is a constant, or almost constant, succession of internal affections of mind, of thoughts and emotions, following thoughts and emotions, which, even though we were to be rendered incapable of a single new sensation,—if our animal life could in these circumstances be long protracted,—would still preserve to us also that intellectual and moral existence, which

“ is the only life that is worthy of the name. The know-
 “ ledge which we acquire from without, lives in us within;
 “ and, in such a case as that which I have now imagined,
 “ our memory would be to us in some measure every sense
 “ which we had lost, creating to us again that very world
 “ which had vanished before us. If we could compare and
 “ love or hate only things actually present, we should be
 “ far from the maturity and perfection of an infant’s mind,
 “ and should scarcely be advanced to the rank of idiocy.”
Brown’s Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human mind—
 (Vol. 1st Page 353.)

Mr. Welsh continues—“ As the notion of colour, upon
 “ this supposition, is a relation of the mind to the organ
 “ of colour, it follows, that, if that organ were changed in
 “ any respect, the state of the mind would also be
 “ changed. Thus, if it were larger, or of a finer struc-
 “ ture, or more active, the perception of colour would be
 “ more delicate, or quick, or pleasing. The same remarks
 “ might be extended to all the organs. Where the organ
 “ of Causality is large, as in the case of Dr. Brown him-
 “ self, then there will be a tendency to reason; which
 “ tendency is a state of the mind in relation to a material
 “ organ, which state would have been different had the
 “ organ been different.”

It is here strictly asserted, that every state of the mind
 depends entirely upon the size, structure, or activity, of
 the organs—that “if the organ were changed in any res-
 pect, the state of the mind would also be changed.” I
 admit that this is strictly *Phrenological*, although the
 direct inference must be, that, in every process of mental
 operation, the organs are the *causes*, and the states of the

mind the *effects*. The mind cannot modify the organs—it can neither make them “larger”—“of a finer structure”—nor “more active”—but must, submissively, be any thing which the physical conformation of the organs induces. What a strange creation of fancy does this Phrenological mind turn out to be! “Change the organ in any respect, and the state of the mind also is changed”—even so—and, change the key of a *musical instrument* in any respect, and the state of the *sound* also is changed. How apt an illustration of Phrenology, after all, is afforded by a Pianoforte—how beautifully do its keys correspond with the 35 organs, and how exactly parallel is the mind of that *machine* with the *human mind* of Phrenologists. How equally are both the passive results of their mere corporeal structure—how absolutely, except when played upon, inexplicable, inconceivable, nonentities!*

Mr. Welsh may, until dooms-day if he pleases, continue to make use of the word mind; but after having stripped it of every kind of efficacy—reduced all its faculties, both external and internal, into the mere passive results of every accident and modification of thirty-five portions of matter—he annihilates it—or only leaves behind such an unintelligible and imperfect notion, as the wildest sceptic, or the most convinced materialist, will scarcely think it worth his while to contend against. †

The Reverend Gentleman, (having no doubt the fear of the General Assembly before his eyes,) defends his doctrine from the charge of materialism, thus.—“It may

* See NOTE. [K.]

† See NOTE. [L.]

"be asked, what is the soul when deprived of the cerebral organs? But the system of Dr. Brown affords us no more light upon this point, than the system of Dr. Gall." I submit, however, that there is, in this respect, a wide difference between the two systems. According to Dr. Brown, the soul when deprived of its organs, is only deprived of five inlets to *new* knowledge, viz. the five organs of the respective senses; and that, although it could acquire no original information but through these particular channels, it may, nevertheless, after they are all shut up, continue to operate upon its already treasured ideas, forming new combinations and conclusions, throughout all eternity: whereas, according to Phrenology, the soul, when deprived of its thirty-five organs, as it "can neither act nor be acted upon without them," is entirely annihilated!

It is amusing to remark the strange discrepancies, into which the writers in defence of Phrenology seem as it were naturally to fall; and Mr. Welsh is certainly no exception. First, he asserts, that "the cerebral organs are not the mind,—nor is any state of these organs the mind"—but afterwards he exclaims—"What is the soul when deprived of the cerebral organs?" He does not indeed answer to his own question, but, which is the same thing, he admits that it cannot be answered; and that, therefore, the soul without its organs is NOTHING! It is not to be supposed, however, that the Reverend Gentleman was aware of this inconsistency. Most probably, like many others, he was afraid to exert his reason on such a subject. But if he admits, (and he certainly does so, if there be any meaning in language,) that every particular

state of the organs produces a particular state of the mind, and that no state or manifestation of mind whatever can exist otherwise—if he seriously admits this, and nevertheless declares, that he can conceive any notion or idea, either of mind or quality of mind, separable from, and independent of, the organs,—he must possess a faculty unknown to other mortals, bestowed upon him by heaven for this express and particular purpose!

Mr. Welsh's whole attempt is to reconcile two things mutually incompatible and abhorrent, viz. Philosophy and Phrenology. He endeavours to convince others, as he appears to have done himself, that the mind is, at the same time, simple and not simple! but all he has to offer in explanation of this singular position, is the following play upon words:

“A multitude of organs may all be affecting the mind at the same instant, and in that case a variety of feelings will be experienced. But still the mind is simple, and it is only its relations to these different organs that are complex.”

The first sentence of this paragraph declares, in the most unequivocal terms, that the mind may be employed in a multitude of avocations at the same absolute moment! But, having previously, (page 76,) exposed and exemplified the extravagance of such a doctrine, I shall not return to it. In the second sentence, The Reverend Gentleman insists that, although the mind may be employed in a multitude of avocations at the same instant, it “is still *simple*,” and that “it is only its relations to the different organs that are complex.” The mind he says, is simple, but the organs are complex.

Now, as it is declared that the mind "cannot act nor be acted upon but by the organs," and that without them its existence could by no possible means become manifest, it indubitably follows, that all its manifestations are complex—*ergo*, the mind is complex: for to suppose a thing to be simple which, nevertheless, cannot exist but in a state of complexity, would be an absurdity somewhat too monstrous—even for a *Phrenologist*. *

I shall now conclude my examination of Phrenology, which has already extended much beyond the limits originally intended. My principal aim has been to show, that this system is utterly incompatible with the fundamental stratum of all human truth, viz. the mind's inherent conviction of its own identity. In my first paper, I challenged "every Phrenologist on the Globe, to reconcile the possibility of his own personal identity, or, in other words, the consciousness he possesses of being at all times *himself*, to the hypothesis which declares he is an assemblage of thirty-five existences, each independently possessing the faculties of perception, volition, and memory." That challenge has not, indeed, been honoured by the notice of "every Phrenologist on the Globe," but *three* doughty champions, Dr. Paterson, Mr. A. and Mr. B. have appeared in the arena, and defended this article of their faith, with as much ingenuity and skill, as it is likely will ever again be exercised in so bad a cause. There is no ground for imagining, that either Germany or Scotland will ever conjure up a single better argument

* See NOTE. [M.]

than these Gentlemen have already adduced; and yet the sum of all their exertions amounts but to a sophism! which being now exposed in its native nothingness, they are, I am well convinced, heartily ashamed of. Phrenology declares that, with a few exceptions, each organ possesses exclusively and independently, perception, volition, and memory, and I declare that, from these premises it must inevitably follow, that mental identity is impossible; and as this conclusion cannot be true, it necessarily follows, that Phrenology is false! There are other points, however, in which this new hypothesis is equally inconsistent with reason and experience; some of which I have not adverted to. But if I have succeeded in demonstrating, that its leading assumption is diametrically opposed to the first and firmest conviction of our nature, further effort may in mercy be spared;—Phrenology having fallen, “like Lucifer,—never to rise again!!”

It is, I confess, rather singular that an objection so fatal to Phrenology should not have arrested the very first steps of its progress: for so far as my reading extends, no argument derived from *mental identity* has hitherto been raised against it. The venerable Dugald Stewart, it is true, has mentioned the system scornfully, but I am not aware that he or any other, (the wit of the Edinburgh Review not excepted,) has subjected its pretensions to this fiery ordeal. Dr. Thomas Brown, a celebrated man, and an inhabitant too of that intellectual city, where, strange to say, this German folly seems to have found its most congenial locality, has well said, “We pay truth a very easy homage, when we content our-

“selves with despising her adversaries. The duty which “we owe to her is of a more manly kind. It is to gird “ourselves for the battle,—to fit us for overcoming “those adversaries, whenever they shall dare to present “themselves in array.”—I have to learn, however, that he ever “girded himself,” or aimed a single blow at the many-headed monster, Phrenology: and I cannot otherwise account for this supineness, than that those qualified to fight and conquer, have hitherto, not only “*despised*” their adversaries, but also *pitied* them.

It is the common cant of Phrenologists to ridicule and revile Metaphysics; and some of them, in the simplicity of their hearts, actually imagine, that *their* miserable jumble of contradictions altogether supersedes and demolishes this sublime science. But! these pseudo philosophers are evidently ignorant that, when translated into English, the terms Metaphysics and Phrenology are purely synonymous, both simply implying—“*the doctrine of the mind,*” which is in fact the title of Dr. Spurzheim’s last work. The system of Gall and Spurzheim is, avowedly, a new system of Metaphysics, its truth or falsehood, consequently, a consideration strictly Metaphysical. Some of its averments may indeed, be either illustrated by, or opposed to, Physiology and Anatomy, but it is only by investigating whether “the Phenomena of the Human *Mind* can be accounted for on Phrenological principles,” that it can be brought before a tribunal, at once competent and absolute. And it is this which I have presumed to do—with what success, however, it is not for me to determine. But if I have made out my case to the satisfaction of a few candid *judges*, my ut-

most anticipations will be amply gratified: for no more expect "the Leopard to change its spots or the Ethiopian his hue," than that a single confirmed Phrenologist, or any bigot whatever, will be induced to sacrifice one iota of his faith at the simple shrine of Reason.

We are constantly referred by the Apostles of Phrenology to the daily increasing number of its disciples, the learned names enrolled among its votaries, and the rapid progress it is making in different parts of the world; and these facts are triumphantly blazoned forth as irresistible evidence of its truth and importance. But one who thinks for himself, and who has "gazed on man, his manners, and his ways," will consider it but a poor test indeed of a doctrine, whether it be espoused by units or by millions. Were human instruction what it ought to be, a man's credulity would, perhaps, be pretty nearly in the ratio of his ignorance. But such is not the case, and never will be so, until it is practically acknowledged, that to extract prejudice and error—to cast off and *un-learn*, are of far more importance to the mind's true developement, than all the *acquisitions* with which it is generally loaded. *Joanna Southcote* had no scarcity of disciples, and some of them were persons of talent and education. The *Jumpers* or the *Ranters*, at the present hour, (to say nothing of the amiable *Quakers*,) far outnumber the *Phrenologists*; and if the *Gall-and-Spurzheimites* boast of supporting a periodical journal, so also may the *New-Jerusalemites*! Men of the greatest learning and of the most unblemished integrity have, in all ages, been found entertaining some fashionable superstition: of such, among the ancient philosophers and poets, many examples might be adduced.

And in times nearer our own, when *Astrology* was the order of the day, not a few of the greatest ornaments, both of religion and philosophy, have been zealous believers in this imaginary science; of those among our own countrymen, I shall only particularize that wonderful prodigy in all kinds of knowledge, the immortal Roger Bacon, and the greatest poet of a more recent age, the illustrious John Dryden. *Animal Magnetism* (another German discovery) was introduced into France within the memory of the present generation; by which the most astonishing results were exhibited, the most miraculous cures performed, and One Hundred Thousand Pounds sterling realized by one of the subordinate professors;—while all Europe resounded the tidings of the wonderful and glorious science, which was “to make as great a revolution in Philosophy as it had already done in Medicine.”

But Judicial Astrology and Animal Magnetism are now no more. Their light has set in darkness, and the gentle hand of time is kindly pressing them into eternal forgetfulness. And so must it be with *Phrenology*. It may dazzle like a meteor, and like a meteor, it may spread; but, like a meteor, it will also be extinguished and lost—leaving only, to the moralist, another illustration of—how easily and how often mankind may be deceived!

NOTES.

NOTE [A.] *Pages 4 and 50.*

I have been disappointed in not being able, as I expected, to procure a paper containing a minute analysis of the skull of King Robert Bruce, whose skeleton was disinterred at Dunfermline, A. D. 1818, in presence of the Barons of Exchequer. The Edinburgh Phrenological Journal, (No. 1, Page 151,) alluding to this document, which was drawn up by a Mr. W. Scott, insists, as usual, that the character of the man exactly coincides with his cerebral developement. But, in point of fact, we know very little of the minutiae of Bruce's character. After his countrymen, rendered desperate by insult and oppression, had been roused to determined resistance, he abandoned the ranks of his country's foes, and joined issue for the crown of Scotland. It is true he obtained an important victory, and rescued his country from a foreign yoke; but, in times when few could read or write, and when the slaughter of human beings was almost the only study and the only virtue, it would be in vain to look for any data whereon to rest either the merits or demerits of any person.

NOTE [B.] *Page 6.*

Phrenologists constantly assure us, that theirs is a science purely derived from observation—based on facts, and utterly obnoxious to speculation. It is not a little amusing, therefore, to find them keeping one another in countenance, by searching for proofs of the truth and excellence of their doctrine, among the fleeting visions of imagination and romance! A considerable portion of the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal is filled with

correct admeasurements of, and profound reflections on, skulls which never existed! The poetical creations of Shakspeare Scott, &c. are ransacked and subjected to the nicest test of newly invented callipers; and we are confidently assured, that such scrutiny of the *bumps* of these "airy nothings," affords the most incontrovertible proofs of the beauty and the *solidity* of Phrenology. As a specimen of their mode of *induction*, take the following manipulation of Iago's upper-works, from No. 2, page 288.

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Amativeness, large. | 17. Conscientiousness, small. |
| 2. Philoprogenitiveness, moderate. | 18. Firmness, large. |
| 3. Concentrativeness, full. | 19. Individuality, large. |
| 4. Adhesiveness, small. | 20. Form, moderate. |
| 5. Combativeness, full. | 21. Size, |
| 6. Destructiveness, very large. | 22. Weight, |
| 7. Constructiveness, moderate. | 23. Colour, |
| 8. Acquisitiveness, large. | 24. Locality. |
| 9. Secretiveness, very large. | 25. Order, |
| 10. Self-esteem, large. | 26. Time, |
| 11. Love of Approbation, moderate. | 27. Number, |
| 12. Cautiousness, very large. | 28. Tune, |
| 13. Benevolence, small. | 29. Language, large. |
| 14. Veneration, large. | 30. Comparison, large. |
| 15. Hope, moderate. | 31. Causality, very large. |
| 16. Ideality, moderate. | 32. Wit, full. |

This certificate of character, we are told, was without any name affixed, shown to several Phrenologists; one of whom descanted largely on the horrible delineation, and was almost terrified out of his wits that such a monster should be loose upon the world! He declares, however, that "he can hardly imagine a case, where a firm belief in the truths of phrenology would be productive of more beneficial consequences than in the present;" and among a great many other things, he is absolutely certain, that a man with such a head, would never "give two guineas for a copy of the *Lady of the Lake*," but that he would, nevertheless, be quite in admiration of "the national air of God save the King and Rule Britannia"!—Such is the trifling, by which men, otherwise of no mean literary attainments, contrive to entangle and delude both themselves and others.

NOTE [C.] Page 51.

The foundation of all Phrenology is, that the constitution of the human mind is radically different in different individuals. Unless, therefore, this basis be secure, the whole superstructure crumbles into nothing! Phrenologists, being easily satisfied on this point themselves, have uniformly assumed it as an undeniable postulate. There may be those, however, not quite so easily satisfied; and who may be even so unreasonable as to think, that these gentlemen should have established by something like proof, the validity of this primary position, before attempting to proceed a single step further; and, that in not having done so, they have gratuitously begged the whole question.

Among many other high authorities which might be adduced, I shall only bring forward DUGALD STEWART, who so far from admitting this as a postulate, declares, "that the capacities of the human mind have been in all ages the same; and that the diversity of phenomena exhibited by our species, *is the result merely of the different circumstances in which men are placed*, has been long received as an incontrovertible logical maxim; or rather, such is the influence of early instruction, that we are apt to regard it as one of the most obvious suggestions of common sense."^{*}

I do not however, agree with Mr. Stewart, that this is quite so obvious to mere "common sense," if taken in its widest and most unqualified meaning. Very few important truths are obvious to mere common sense. The great Creator of the universe has indeed provided, that, in the conservation of his existence and the perpetuation of his species, man should no more be left to the influence of capricious reasoning, than the rest of the animal and vegetable tribes, which equally adorn the beautiful landscape of nature; but the sublime truths which elevate, and

^{*}Encyclopædia Britannica, Dissertation 1st, page 53.

the splendid imaginings which delight him, are almost exclusively the results of long and laborious speculation. Experience and reflection, however, prove that, in many of his most important relations, he is merely clay in the hands of the potter; and it has never been questioned, that his religious belief, his habits and pursuits, his modes of thinking and acting, are, in the far greater proportion, indelibly determined by the locality and period of his birth and education. Still there are many who cheerfully admit all this, but who, nevertheless, believe and assert, that there is an essential and original difference between the minds of persons, born at the same period, in the same country, and even of the same parents—nay, that every son and daughter of Eve is provided at its birth, or previously, with the elements of as distinctive a character and disposition, as with the distinguishing lineaments of form and feature. The advocates of this doctrine demand, whether, under any change of circumstances, Milton could have written “The Principia,” or Newton composed “Paradise Lost”? But should this question be replied to in the affirmative, on whom rests the *onus probandi*? It would not, I admit, be easy to maintain, that these great men could, at mature age, have so exactly exchanged their respective knowledge and pursuits, but to prove that this might not have *originally* been the case, will be found, upon reflection, to be a matter of far greater difficulty. We know that Newton was a great philosopher, and Milton a great poet; we also know that they were differently circumstanced, as all men are; but here our facts are exhausted. What each would have been under other circumstances, becomes, therefore, an enquiry exclusively within the province of induction and analogy.

We universally find, that a greater or less diversity of circumstances uniformly produces a greater or less diversity of character and disposition; from which it may be inferred, that unless for a variety of circumstances, the variety of mental mo-

dification discoverable in our species would not exist. We find also, that uniformity in the human character is exactly in the ratio of the uniformity of circumstances. The language of a particular nation or tribe, for example, being generally uniform, the people uniformly acquire that language, or dialect, which alone they hear spoken; from which it may further be inferred, that if every circumstance were equally uniform, the same uniformity in every thought and action would necessarily follow.

But as the difference of opinion on this question, as in many others of vital importance to man, towards his forming a just estimate of his nature and his powers, is much more verbal than substantial, it may remove a great portion of the difficulty, if we can previously come to a definite understanding of what, in its present acceptation, is really meant by the word *circumstances*.

Let there be two Brothers, or Sisters, and, for the sake of more direct illustration, let us suppose them to be twins—enjoying from their birth the same locality, every object presented to their observation, and every word uttered in their presence, operating upon them both mutually;—no iota of external influence suffered to impress the one, which may not equally affect the other. In such a case as this, it might be asserted, that, being thus uniformly circumstanced, unless their minds were originally different, every feeling, thought, and action, of both, would be the same—uniform and harmonious, as the sounds of two exquisitely attuned musical instruments. But this would be the very fallacy which has so widely misled Phrenologists—that of assuming the human mind, with all its mysterious complexity, to be essentially in accordance with the simple mechanism of a musical instrument.

When the sweet Amelia touches any key of her pianoforte the same note will follow, or may be made to follow, which responded yesterday. In the interval, the whole instrument, has been silent and inert. From the instant that it ceased

to receive the impress of her pretty fingers, every tone and sympathy ceased to exist. But the human mind is not this sort of instrument. Under no interval of external excitement does it remain inert for an instant, but is for-ever active and industrious,—for-ever combining and reproducing, not only from its pre-received external impressions, but from every one of its previous combinations and reproductions! So far from this mysterious instrument being exactly the same to-day as yesterday, it cannot possibly continue in the same absolute state during two consecutive moments! “From the very instant,” (says the eloquent Brown,) “of its first existence, the mind is “constantly exhibiting phenomena more and more complex,—“sensations, thoughts, emotions, all mingling together, and “almost every feeling modifying, in some greater or less degree, “the feelings that succeed it; and as, in chemistry, it often happens, that the qualities of the separate ingredients of a compound body are not recognizable by us, in the apparently “different qualities of the compound itself,—so, in this spontaneous chemistry of the mind, the compound sentiment, that “results from the association of former feelings, has, in many “cases, on first consideration, so little resemblance to these “constituents of it, as formerly existing in their elementary “state, that it requires the most attentive recollection to separate, and evolve distinctly to others, the assemblages which “even a few years may have produced.”*

It is but for this wonderful associating principle—this “spontaneous chemistry of the mind,” (which, nevertheless, Phrenologists, in their ignorance, scarcely admit the existence of,) that man is superior to a clod of earth! It is owing also to this mysterious principle, that no two human beings, or even the same person at different points of time, can be equally affected

* Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, page 208.

by the same positive cause. Twin infants may have had the same objects presented to their observation; they may have listened only to the same precepts, and beheld only the same examples; but the same concatenation of thought will never follow. Should they both continue to direct their attention, simultaneously and exclusively, to the very same objects of sensation, which would be supposing an utter impossibility, (even if they slept, waked, cried, smiled, fed, &c. uniformly at the same moment,) the most imperceptible shade of difference in the intensity of the same perception, must produce a corresponding difference in the state of the percipient mind; and, as the present state becomes a parent link, which generates and controls every other that can possibly succeed, the turning round but for an instant, decides and determines every thought, word, and action, of a thus dependent being, should his existence be prolonged throughout eternal duration!

I do not expect, however, to be sufficiently understood in this portion of my argument, by such as have not read a little, and reflected much, on that branch of the Philosophy of mind, generally termed "*The association of ideas.*" But common observation may convince any one, that he has many feelings and recollections of the past, which, although he may not know why, are so inseparably connected and interwoven, that when any one of them is recalled, a long train accompanies; and the most superficial thinker will admit, that the name of a person or of a place, which to the ear of one is but an indifferent sound, can produce in the mind of another, the most exquisite and powerful emotions—

"O! many a shaft, at random sent,

"Finds mark the archer little meant;

"And many a word, at random spoken,

"Can sooth or wound a heart that's broken!"*

* Scott's Lord of the Isles.

The finest strain of impassioned poetry, delivered in a language which is not understood, is only so much articulated air; while a simple rustic ballad of "*auld lang syne*," overwhelms and subdues the soul—

Move but one thought of life's sweet spring,
 And memory wakes on every string;
 While many a scene of distant days,
 In quick succession, shifts and plays—
 Again arise the haunts of youth,
 Sweet bowers of innocence and truth—
 The bubbling brook, the blossomed thorn,
 Which gladdened life's unclouded morn,
 Ere disappointment's withering wind,
 Or crazing care had reached the mind—
 The voice of friendship echoes clear,
 Again is poured the filial tear—
 And love—fond love's extatic sigh
 Again transports to agony!

What, indeed, is all written or spoken language, but the offspring of such association? A combination of letters viewed by the eye, or an articulated sound impressed upon the ear, cannot of itself suggest one idea more than another. The same letters, or the same sound, which we use to express the feeling of delight, would serve equally well to convey that of despair; and examples, from different languages, might be easily produced, where words of exactly similar pronunciation, are significant of meanings directly opposite!

If it has now been made evident, that no state of the mind is exclusively induced by any present or external cause, but that every feeling and thought is powerfully modified by all which have preceded, it must be equally so, that every future state of the mind is influenced by the present; for it cannot free itself from the influence of a single antecedent thought or association, nor, consequently, be ever again absolutely in the same state as

before; and if this were otherwise, man could have no special identity; as every feeling and thought would be an independent, unconnected existence—having no more relation to one mind than to another! The minute shades of association, which qualify every susceptibility and every operation of his mind, and the minute occurrences, which entirely change the current of his ideas, and hence the whole tenor of his life, in general cases, evade the detection of the most cautious observer. But every one must be able to recollect and appreciate some incidents that have befallen him, which have completely altered the course of his pursuits, affections, and fortunes. He may recollect the kind glance of an eye, or an averted look, which has decided the important question—“to wed or not to wed;” he may recollect an accidental meeting, or a word of advice, which has determined some of his most momentous actions; and he may sometimes recollect the instant when a new thought was suggested, which, by diverting the objects of his studies and reflections, rendered him eventually a very different person. These he may recollect, because he felt their consequence at the time, and memory has since continued to renew them. He will seldom, however, be able to recall those innumerable and rapid volitions, which led him to be, at those particular moments, within the operation of those particular influences; but if it were possible for him to trace, with equal precision, the whole series of his thoughts, and the events which followed them, he would discover, that those which his memory confesses to be so important in their consequences, depended for their existence on others, which, although entirely forgotten, were equally important, because equally necessary links, in the wonderful chain of his waking or dreaming consciousness!*

* Dr. Franklin, in illustration of the propriety of attending to small matters, because they lead to great, has given an instance of the loss of a

This will become still more apparent, if we attend to the general history of mankind. It is said, that the first idea of the law of gravitation was suggested to Newton, by his observing an apple falling from a tree; and it will scarcely be doubted, that had not Milton lost his sight, and "fallen on evil days and evil tongues," we had never been delighted with "Paradise Lost;" or, that both these great men, had they been left, in early infancy, on the island of New Zealand, would have been other than

nail being the loss of an important battle! A trooper was sent with despatches for moving up some part of the army, and one nail being wanting in his horse's shoe, the others became loose, and, the shoe falling off, the horse became lame, by which both the rider and the despatches fell into the hands of the enemy.

The loss of this nail brings to my remembrance a passage in that splendid work, "Anastasius," which is so much to the purpose of my argument, that I trust I shall be excused for giving it in detail.

"On one occasion, indeed, the current of my thoughts, thus far unimportantly directed toward Stamboul, experienced a sudden stop, a total reflux. The intellectual tide, till then only flowing in one direction, at once ebb'd, and set the contrary way. It was when we came in sight of my native land, of my beloved Chio. While rapidly sailing before the wind along its verdant shores, a pang shot to my heart—an indescribable yearning seized upon my soul. At the back of that ridge of purple crags, which I could almost touch with my hand, lived my aged parents; lived, sighed—perhaps sighed no longer—my injured Helena, the first loved of my heart! Were not the rocky screen betwixt, I might actually at that instant behold their now melancholy homes, and in less than an hour I might restore the mourning tenants to their wonted serenity. I might receive and bestow the embraces of love and of duty; I might again possess the united blessings of those whom I had so cruelly abandoned; I might tell them, "Anastasius has fought, Anastasius has vanquished, Anastasius returns to you. He returns to deposit at your adored feet, and to sacrifice to your love and your pardon, the laurels he has gathered, and the praise and promises he has gained." "Now is," thought I—"but soon irretrievably to vanish—the moment in which to recover kindred, country,

a brace of naked cannibals ! The good looks of Helen brought on the ten year's war, "which laid at last old Troy in ashes." The cackling of geese saved the Roman Capitol ; and who will assert that any individual of the human species would have been in the same situation to-day—or even in existence—had the barbarians on that night obtained possession of "the eternal city?"—The difference of a single hair's breadth in the direction of a bullet, might have finished the career of Buonaparte on the

"peace of mind, and connubial happiness. If again cast away, they must be lost for ever!"

"Frantic at this thought, I hastily left the deck, and hurried to the Drogueman, to entreat that I might be put ashore, and allowed to return among my friends.

"On what trifling circumstances depends the fate of our lives ! Had I felt less anxious I should have succeeded. I should have reached my master's presence, have preferred my petition, have obtained my suit, have been reinstated in my filial privileges, and probably at this time have been the happy father of a numerous progeny of my own, with the soothing prospect of a tranquil and respected old age.

"A NAIL HEAD MADE THE DIFFERENCE !—A nail head causes me, by remote consequences, at the distance of many years, to die in a strange land, a premature and painful death. Not sufficiently clenched in the boards, this unfortunate iron, (on which may lie all my sins !) protruded most unwarrantably from the steps of the cabin. Several times already it had caught my flowing dress ; and each time condemned to decapitation, it had only been reprieved from thoughtlessness. In the eagerness of the moment, I hooked it with my shaksheer, as I ran down stairs, and, losing my lance, fell, and came with my skull against the floor of the cabin.

"Senseless from the shock, I only recovered to find myself lying on the deck, with my head in the lap of one of the Pasha's tchawooshea. The first thing upon which my eyes opened was his vest—was one of those gorgeous specimens of embroidery, which I had so greedily coveted, and had so fully determined some day to obtain : the first thing I heard was a condescending message of inquiry from the Pashaw himself ! So much glare dazzled my senses ; so great an honour overpowered my weak brain. For

field of Marengo; and the substitution of a single new idea, might have diverted him from his mad expedition into Russia. Natural Philosophers assert, that the acquisition or abstraction of the smallest particle of matter, would instantly affect the whole physical universe—so, by the wonderful process of reaction, the most insignificant thought arising in the mind of man, or the occurrence of the most trivial incident, may equally operate over the whole extent of moral nature—until the buzzing of a musquittoe decides the fate of the world!

I trust that we may now, without much difficulty, come to a true appreciation of what, in such a discussion, is the proper meaning and application of the term *circumstances*; and this, in my judgment, is almost all that is necessary towards arriving at a just conclusion on this important question. Dr. Spurzheim, in proof that the mind of man is constituted in defiance of education, &c. says, “the same circumstances are often presented to many millions, and perhaps only one individual alone makes use of them.” It is evident that the worthy Doctor means by “the same

“some time, indeed, I scarce could remember what had occupied my thoughts prior to my accident. All in my mind was confusion and darkness; and when I again began with some clearness to retrace my ideas, the contact was too immediate with one species of object near my heart, not to feel the attraction of other more distant treasures, weak in comparison. It now seemed to me a womanly act to cast away all the fruit of the perils I had past, of the reputation I had gained, and of the favour I had earned:—to exchange the fame and greatness that awaited me, for obscurity and oblivion; to prefer to the destinies of the eagle, soaring from region to region, those of the worm; content to die in the same cled in which he was born, and perhaps crushed to death before his time, by the more bold and aspiring. I knew I should be laughed at by all on board only for hinting such a whim; and, on further reflection, I felt not at all sure that my very filial duty itself did not make it incumbent upon me to seek at Constantinople that rank, which might be so powerful a protection to my parents on their little island.”

circumstances," the same *external objects*, and, with this qualification, I entirely agree with him; and he might have added, that even the same individual will not, at different times, make the same use of the same external objects; for I am sure the Doctor will admit, that the play-thing which delighted him in childhood, has no longer the power to please. Another kind of play-thing must be substituted in every progressive stage of human life; and even, at two successive moments, the same external causes will produce very different effects. A draught of water for example, which is so desirable and so precious to a man burning with thirst, is very differently estimated after his thirst is quenched; and the keenest temptation, which at one moment it would be the greatest virtue to resist, is frequently at the next moment, no temptation at all.

The same positive influence, acting upon the same positive object, must for ever produce a series of uniform effects; but although the influence continue the same, if the object be in any degree changed, the effect will be changed in that degree. Thus, any two men, to be placed in the same *circumstances*, must not be exposed merely to the same external impressions, but their minds, which are the objects of these impressions, must also be equally situated and prepared to receive them. They may both be surrounded by the same scenery, and together enveloped by the same objects of contemplation, but, while one of them, on beholding the opening of a glorious landscape, leaps and exclaims, in a fit of extacy and delight, the other is struck with nothing else than his companion's extravagance and madness!—Hence it is evident, that a difference in the *state* of two minds, constitutes an essential difference in their *circumstances*, as could possibly be produced by any change of external influence. Thus, the just and legitimate meaning of the term *circumstances*, does not consist, exclusively, in the external impressions he may be subjected to, nor in the state of his mind at the particular

moment; but is compounded of both. There are many situations in human life, which to one man, would be the summit of all his wishes, but to another, the extremity of wretchedness.

I have already said, that I agree with Dr. Spurzheim and others, who assert, that "the same external objects are often presented to many millions, and perhaps only one individual alone makes use of them." But it must now be evident, that the worthy Doctor's inference, which he seems to think so triumphant and conclusive in favour of his creed, is altogether inadmissible. He further says, that "every individual acts and conducts itself differently against external impressions and circumstances, and always according to its internal faculties." By his coupling together the terms, *external impressions* and *circumstances*, he decidedly considers them to be synonymous; and this is the germ and root of the fallacy—for I have proved, and I trust most amply, that two persons may be subjected to the very same external impressions, and be, nevertheless, in circumstances directly opposite! When the Doctor says that, every individual acts and conducts itself "always according to its *internal* faculties," he means, of course, according to the size and efficacy of the thirty-five organs. But if this were true, every individual, having always the same organs, would at all times, and on all occasions, act and conduct himself alike; whereas, nothing is less disputable, than that no two individuals can be more different from one another, than the same individual may be found differing from himself! Phrenologists are between the two horns of a dilemma. They must either cast to the winds the whole apparatus of their clumsy hypothesis, or frankly admit, that every bump, from No. 1 to 35, is constantly and everlastingly in a state of change and mutability!*
 I have never read any of Mr. Owen's writings on this subject.

* See Examination of the President's Observations, page 20.

But if that philanthropist imagines, that, by doing his utmost to create a uniform atmosphere of causes, he would, thereby, succeed in producing a positive uniformity in the feelings and thoughts of man, he is widely mistaken. Nor would such uniformity be desirable. What were the face of external nature if it presented only one unchanging expression? But, how much more desolate still, would be the condition of man, if all his species possessed only one uniform series of thoughts, opinions, and desires! Crusoe was wretched in his solitary island, but the presence of another *self* would have yielded him no more solace than did his own shadow. The wise Creator, who has so bounteously varied every portion of the boundless universe, has not excepted the mind of man from partaking of this universal excellence. But as it is proved, that all the diversity of appearances in physical nature results from modifications of only one primary substance, so, if we admit the existence of mind at all as a separate principle, we cannot a moment doubt, that the whole delightful and astonishing variety exhibited in the moral world, is equally the result of one simple element. The science of chemistry sufficiently establishes the truth of the one, and the doctrine of association, which Dr. Brown so emphatically terms "the spontaneous chemistry of the mind," perhaps, still more decidedly illustrates the other.

I have mentioned the name of Mr. Owen, because I find that the Edinburgh phrenologists have been at deadly war with him. I cannot, however, imagine that he, or any other intelligent and reflecting man has asserted, that, practically, any application of *external* circumstances could ever induce the minds of two human beings to operate in unison, like two well adjusted chronometers. But although this, which would be reducing the whole human race to one solitary identity, can never be accomplished, we have only to look around us with unprejudiced

eyes, to be convinced of the astonishing effects that may be produced by a judicious application of ways and means, in forming and establishing the human character. Those nations which are now the most enlightened on the globe, were, not many centuries ago, composed of lawless savages; and other nations, which at that era were high in the scale of civilization and refinement, are now plunged into the deepest ignorance and barbarism; and wherever we happen to be in possession of sufficient historical data, the causes of these respective revolutions can easily be traced and explained. To confine our investigation to any particular community, do we ever doubt the influence of situation and usages, as it operates on all the different classes of individuals? In this country in particular, have we not uniformly before our eyes, the most wonderful illustrations of the power of institutions—fixing and chaining the destinies of man—each *caste* moving in its own allotted circle, as contentedly and passively as a piece of machinery? Here we see our species exhibiting a regular series, from the most degraded prostration of thought, up to the highest elevation, if not of mind, at least of luxurious refinement: and all these distinctions, hereditarily and inviolably; fixed by law and sanctified by religion. But does any one of us ever suppose, that the out-cast and scarcely human *Pariah*, differs, otherwise than in the circumstances of his birth and education, from the most polished and philosophical *Bramin*?

It may be said, that it cannot be *demonstrated* that there is not an original difference between the minds of individuals; but such a position is not within the range of demonstration, nor is any one compelled to prove a negative. I am well aware how frequently it happens, that children of the same family, equally treated and taught, are nevertheless very different in their dispositions, aptitudes, and acquirements; and that, when all that

is possible has been done, the one comes to honour, and the other to dishonour; but if it has been shown that all this can be clearly accounted for, without the least necessity for supposing that there is any *original* difference between one human mind and another—I conceive I have done enough—for no *Reasoner* will attempt to assume the existence of any cause, or shadow of cause, beyond what is admitted to be *sufficient*—this being an established rule in philosophical enquiry, which if broken through, all human speculation would be chaos; and save in tracing the relations of number and quantity, (which Diderot says, “is perhaps what the oyster is doing in its shell”,) not a single ray of truth could be elicited or evolved.

But, although the assertors of the all-prevailing influence of circumstances might, with perfect safety, make their stand on this particular ground, they are not, however, under the necessity of merely defending their own position; but are quite prepared to carry fair hostilities into the very bosom of the enemy’s capital.

It is uniformly admitted, that an infant, when it comes into the world, or at least at some previous period, has neither felt sensations nor formed ideas. Now, as the mind can be conscious only of its own sensations and ideas, what can be conceived of its existence when it has nothing to be conscious of? The mind of a new born infant, (if such an incipience can be called by any name,) is “a sheet of white paper, void of all characters.” Phrenologists will not deny this—They dare not assert, that there are any such things as “innate *ideas*”, although they boldly declare that there are innate *faculties*. But what do they mean by innate faculties? Is it merely that the tender infant is formed with *capacities* for receiving impressions, and hence acquiring ideas? This is admitted by all. But they insist, that there are thirty-five distinct *predispositions* entailed upon a human fœtus, before it is conscious of its own existence!—that it has an indelible bias

for or against this or that feeling or pursuit; long before it has either felt or thought! I should like to know *when* these predispositions are communicated?—Whether at the moment of conception, during any intervening period; or at the instant of its birth? Many physical qualities are communicated from the parents to their offspring, the most conspicuous of which, perhaps, is complexion; and, although the process by which generation is accomplished is still a dubious point in the field of human knowledge, it cannot be doubted that children do participate in the corporeal qualities of both father and mother. No sequence of cause and effect is more uniformly expected, than that the different complexions of the father and the mother will be blended in their offspring—but not so their dispositions or genius. When Peter, surnamed the great, of Russia, married together all the dwarfs in his empire, it was not for the purpose of producing a regiment of grenadiers; but when Frederick of Prussia compelled the union of every tall man and woman in his kingdom, he was well aware that the fruit would furnish him with a battalion of Ajaxes! But has it ever been imagined that *Genius* can be thus bred and rendered hereditary? Or that Homer and Sappho, had they been husband and wife, would have ensured to the world the propagation of either a poet or a poetess? If genius could be propagated, not only would each of the offspring inherit the average amount possessed by the father and mother, but all the children of the same stock would possess the same definite quantity; whereas nothing is more obvious and proverbial than the great dissimilarity, in this respect, between parents and children, brothers and sisters.

Now as a man's complexion, features, stature, &c. are inherited from his parents, when it is alleged that his predispositions, genius, &c. are also born with him, although not inherited, it may very properly be demanded, *whence* he receives them?

Shall it be said, that they are qualities purely of the immaterial and immortal soul? No two men since the beginning of the world, have exhibited dispositions and genius absolutely parallel, this would, therefore, be to assert, that all the human souls which have ever existed, were formed by the Creator, intrinsically and immutably dissimilar. Such an assertion, would be rather astounding in the ear of orthodoxy—"the sinful body," "the lusts of the flesh," &c. could no longer be mentioned; nor could the soul ever be purified from these, all being inherent, and derived from *itself!* To Phrenology, such an assertion would be the final death blow; as, according to that doctrine, the nature of the soul itself is of no importance, every thing depending on the magnitude and structure of its *case-work!*

If at the moment of its birth, all the intellect an infant possesses be *capacities*, by which a mind may ultimately be attained, can it be said, that at that period, it is endowed with predispositions? Can it be said that a predisposition of the mind exists before the mind itself? And if it be yielded that predispositions commence only at the period of birth, this were an abandonment of the whole argument—a complete admission that man is the creature of circumstances—entirely depending for every attribute of his character on the fortuitous combination of his perceptions. A new born infant may indeed be said to possess faculties, in like manner as Aristotle would assert that a block of wood was a chair, because the block may be fashioned by the workman into that piece of furniture. But admitting this, it carries along with it, that before the block of wood became a chair it required fashioning, and it will not be denied, that it might just as easily have been fashioned into a table; nor that, if not wrought upon at all, it would have still continued a block of wood.

Would it not be something whimsical to assert, that a man, from his birth, was in full possession of a particular genius or

predisposition for an individual pursuit, *mathematics* for example, and who, nevertheless, should die at a good old age, without ever having had the most distant conception that such a science existed? But under the supposition of innate faculties, this must be the case with the far greater portion of the human race; otherwise it must be asserted, that no individual ever possessed such a faculty, save the very few by whom it has been manifested; and who, by a series of very remarkable co-incidences, have all come into existence in highly civilized countries.*

But is it not extremely probable, that many *new* sciences may be yet developed? Have we the presumption to "limit mind's unwearied spring," or circumscribe its energies within the circle which at present bounds them? Is every important property in nature, and every law of the universe, already laid open? May not the application of a new calculus to the investigation of a new principle, constitute, at some future period, as important a division in the empire of human knowledge, as any of those which particular individuals have hitherto exclusively excelled in? The sciences of Geology and Political Economy are but children of yesterday; and may not others be still engendering in the womb of futurity, of whose nature and importance we are at present utterly unconscious? Modern Chemistry is derived from results obtained by superstition and ignorance, while pursuing a non-entity—the philosopher's stone; and Galileo received the first hint for constructing a telescope from a spectacle maker's child, who while playfully looking

* Is it not further very remarkable, that so much greater a proportion of students with predispositions for mathematics, should be sent to Cambridge than to Oxford—it being notorious, that proficiency in this science is so much more general and conspicuous in those educated at the former university?

through different lenses, and holding them at particular distances, discovered a power of magnifying which had never before been suspected.

Let the knowledge of any new science be discovered, and it will instantly spread itself over all the educated world. The ability to understand its principles, and to carry them to further perfection, will follow as a necessary consequence. By what abuse of language, then, is that to be termed *innate* and *pre-existing* which is thus evidently created by the circumstance of an accidental discovery?

The Greeks were originally an assemblage of wandering barbarians. They rose, however, to the very pinnacle of learning and patriotism, became the instructors of the world; but the progeny of this same people have sunk again into sloth and superstition. The founder of Rome, tradition affirms, was nursed by a wolf, at any rate, the first founders were little else than wolves; yet never has the human mind been found so elevated, nor has the muse of history recorded such traits of heaven-born virtue, as were exhibited by their descendants. But look at them now!

Our forefathers of the British Islands must have been endowed with all the faculties and predispositions for science, literature, and philosophy, which we are now so proud of; but with the exception of one tribe of them, *the Picts*, who arrived at such perfection in the *fine arts*, as to be capable of besmearing or tattooing their naked bodies, the more noble faculties seem for ages to have been given them for no purpose whatever. Shall it be said, that savage nations who have continued in a state of the deepest barbarism for thousands of years, were, nevertheless, during all that dismal period, in effectual possession of particular predispositions for all the arts, refinements, and exaltations of life—that they had powerful predilections of which

they were never conscious, for habits, pursuits, and acquirements, which they either knew not the existence of, or heartily despised?

The progressive causes which have brought nations to greatness and civilization, and which have again reduced them to imbecility and ignorance, may be as clearly illustrated as those which operate on individuals. The many tribes which inhabit central Africa, appear to have experienced no change, whatever, but continue as they were found by the earliest travellers, in the same horrid state of degradation and misery. No useful predisposition or faculty has ever announced itself there! The geographical position of that unhappy continent is, perhaps, sufficient explanation. It cannot be conquered. No sea or river affords a path to its inland navigation. Its burning deserts would destroy any army; nor has even a single adventurer ever returned, who has attempted to penetrate through its wild recesses, or still wilder men! Yet has a portion of these wild and degraded beings,—to gratify the cupidity of men calling themselves christians, torn from their native domains, and, condemned, on an opposite part of the globe, to the most dreadful and galling slavery—yet has this portion of wild and degraded beings, (a consequence of the French revolution,) established an independent republic on the soil of their former bondage; and laws, learning, and liberty, begin to flourish! Hayti is yet very young, nor has any of her institutions had time to ripen into manhood; but no community, within the range of history, has ever exhibited, in the short period of thirty years, such an astonishing transition—so mighty a stride, in the glorious path of improvement.

The utmost that can be said, in reply to this accumulation of opposing facts is, that savage man would, *under more congenial circumstances*, manifest in the highest degree, his innate facul-

ties or predispositions; and, that it only requires the application of such circumstances to call them forth. The plain meaning of which is, that unless for the application of particular circumstances, such faculties or predispositions are complete non-entities. If, however, Phrenologists, as children of habit, will still cling to words which have no conceivable archetypes in nature, they are welcome to do so—Let them continue to yield the most implicit belief in the existence of innate faculties, which have no innate influence; and of predispositions, which without the operation of fortuitous circumstances, predispose to nothing!

Some writers on this subject, avoiding or rejecting the terms innate faculties and predispositions, continue, nevertheless, to maintain the existence of original and predisposing *capacities*. Without directly asserting, that there is any innate faculty, actively, predisposing the mind to one thing in preference to another, they still insist, that different minds have particular capacities, or aptitudes, for receiving particular impressions: and the various shades of intelligence exhibited by an oyster, an idiot or a madman, up to a Newton, have been gravely set forth in support of this.* I cannot, however, see the bearing of such an argument. I cannot discover that, because there is a difference between the intellects, (if such a term can be applied,) of an oyster, an idiot, a madman, and a perfectly organized human being, that this in the least degree tends to prove that there must be a similar difference between the intellectual capacities of one perfectly organized human being and another. “God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind: and God saw that it was good.”—But “God said, let us make man in *our image, after our likeness*: and let them

* Edin. Review No. 67. Life of Sir Joshua Reynolds, page 83.

“ have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of
 “ the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over
 “ every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”*

I can conceive nothing more ridiculous than this endeavour to prove, from the undoubted fact of every species of animals being endowed with a distinct measure of intelligence, that it must, therefore, follow, that individuals of the same species, and of that species too, which is the lord of all, must be created with intellectual powers so astonishingly dissimilar as those exemplified, at mature age, by a Newton and a Savage of the woods. It would not be more absurd to assert, that, notwithstanding the human species is determined by its organization to walk erect, certain individuals thereof should, nevertheless, creep and others fly! We are entirely in the dark regarding the intellectual economy of the lower animals. We are entirely ignorant, for example, how it happens, that the Bee constructs its cell on principles which untutored man has never thought of, which the greatest Mathematician contemplates with astonishment, and would in vain attempt to improve. But this we know, that there is a wide distinction between ourselves and any other species of animal—

“ *Brutes* soon their zenith reach : their little all

“ Flows in at once ; in ages they no more

“ Could know, or do, or covet, or enjoy.

“ Were *man* to live co-eval with the sun,

“ The patriarch-pupil would be learning still ;

“ Yet dying, leave his lesson half unlearn’t.”†

An idiot is a mal-conformation, and a madman either inherits his derangement from his parents, or receives it by some physical accident: neither possesses perfect organization; that of the one being defective, and that of the other injured. They are

* Genesis Chap. 1st Verses 25 and 26.

† Young's night thoughts.

exceptions, and according to the old adage, *exceptio regulum probat*. A man may be naturally mal-conformed, he may be tainted with hereditary madness, his head may have received an injury at his birth, or subsequently, or his brain may be diseased; although he may, nevertheless, live on in tolerable health, and the mental deficiency or derangement be the only symptoms which manifest the bodily state on which they depend; and the minds of many individuals may thus perhaps suffer, in a certain degree, even when neither of these causes is suspected to exist. But it is no way necessary to my position, to deny that every defect or injury of the organs of sensation or of the brain, produces a corresponding effect on the human intellect and character. These I would class among other prominent *circumstances*. I only deny, that this in the least degree tends to prove an original difference between the minds of men who are alike completely and perfectly organized.

The same writer in the Edinburgh Review, proceeds: "The impression it is true, does not exist in the sealing-wax till the seal has been applied to it: but there was the previous capacity to receive the impression: and there may be and most probably is, a greater degree of fitness in one piece of sealing-wax than in another."

If I mistake not, this simile of the sealing-wax is as old as Aristotle or Plato. It is, at any rate, an exact counterpart of the block of wood being a chair, because it may be fashioned by the workman into that piece of furniture; to which I have already replied, that before the block became a chair it required fashioning; and might just as easily have been fashioned into a table. The *reasoner* I am now dealing with says, "there may be, and most probably is, a greater degree of fitness in one piece of sealing-wax than in another," and, because this "may be, and most probably is," the case, he concludes, that one human mind has originally a fitness to receive some impressions

in preference to others ! But has this sage ever met with a piece of wax so capacitated ? Let there be two seals, equally well engraved, the one containing the word *Poetry* and the other *Mathematics*, and it will puzzle him a little, I rather think, to produce a piece of sealing-wax, which will not as easily and indifferently receive the one impression as the other. The legible inscription of either word will follow the fair application of the particular seal, with just as much certainty, as that a man born and educated in London will speak English, and that another, so located, in a certain part of Africa, will only re-echo the *cluck cluck* of the Hotentotts ! It is puerile in the extreme to fancy any distinction between original predisposing faculties and the same kind of capacities. They are but different words for expressing the same thing, or more properly the same *nothing*. I look upon it as folly to compare the human mind to any thing else which we are acquainted with in nature. But were I to descend to quibbling and sophistry, I should say to this reviewer, "I thank the Jew for teaching me that word,"—for nothing could better suit my purpose in so proving that man is the creature of circumstances—and that his mind is absolutely passive, than this very simile of the sealing-wax.

A popular and very entertaining writer, Mr. D'Israeli, lauds to the skies those arguments of the Edinburgh Reviewer ; but he goes himself much farther. Indeed, from his lavish praise of a work which he mentions, entitled "*An inherent difference in the organs or faculties to receive impressions of any kind,*" it would appear that he is almost, if not altogether, a Phrenologist ! This Gentleman, however, is a greater Wit than a Philosopher—much more at home in declamation and anecdote than in the more humble occupation of patient reasoning. "There is something "ludicrous," he says, "in the result of a theory of genius which "would place Hobbes and Erasmus, those timid and learned "recluses, to open a campaign, with the military invention and

“intrepidity of a Marlborough, or conclude that the romantic bard of the ‘Fairy Queen,’ amidst the quickly-shifting scenes of his visionary reveries, could have deduced, by slow and patient watchings of the mind, the system and demonstrations of Newton.”* D’Israeli is here combating a shadow! No theory of genius has ever asserted what he attributes. When he speaks of Hobbes, Erasmus, Marlborough, Spencer, and Newton, he certainly does not intend to convey the notion of what these individuals were when they first inhaled the breath of existence, and had neither felt nor thought. He can only mean, that neither of these great men could have exchanged his respective habits, acquirements, and modes of thinking, after they had been determined by circumstances and matured by time; and this, I believe, no “theory,” has ever called in question. I have already shown, that twin infants must commence the process which ultimately renders them different characters, with the very first impression they receive; and I believe that the human character is, to a certain extent, decided or at least influenced, before any period which the utmost effort of recollection can retrace. Consider the influence of *first* impressions and ideas—reflect that they are the parents which generate and control every other that can possibly succeed, and their omnipotence, if I may use the expression, will be immediately apparent. On this subject, I am tempted to quote largely from the unfortunate and unhappy Rousseau,—a man who studied the progress of the infant mind, with a degree of intensity and minuteness, which must strike even the most philosophical *mother* with astonishment and reverence. But I will only refer to this wonderful production,† which, to do the subject justice, should be studied entirely. I cannot, however, forbear from introducing

* *Essays on the Literary Character, page 36.*

† *Emilius, or a Treatise on Education.*

the sentiments of Dr. Thomas Brown, on this subject, adorned as they are in all the charms of poetical imagery.

“ We may wish, indeed, to be able to distinguish our present
 “ feelings from those which the same objects originally excited ;
 “ but since no memory can go back to the period at which we
 “ did not perceive longitudinal distance, as it were, immediately
 “ by the eye, as little, may we suppose, can any memory go back
 “ to the period when other sensations, less interesting than those
 “ of vision, were first excited. Could we trace the series of
 “ feelings, in a single mind,—as variously modified, in the
 “ progress from infancy to maturity,—we should know more of
 “ the intellectual and moral nature of man than is probably ever
 “ to be revealed to his inquiry,—when, in ages, as remote from
 “ that in which we live, and perhaps as much more enlightened,
 “ as our own age may be said to be, in relation to the period of
 “ original darkness and barbarism, he is still to be searching
 “ into his own nature with the same avidity as now. He must
 “ indeed be a very dull observer, who has not felt, on looking
 “ at an infant, some desire to know the little processes of thought
 “ that are going on in his curious and active mind ; and who, in
 “ reflecting on the value, as an attainment in science, which the
 “ sagest philosopher would set on the consciousness of those
 “ acquisitions which infancy has already made, is not struck
 “ with that nearness, in which, in some points, extreme know-
 “ ledge and extreme ignorance may almost be said to meet.
 “ What metaphysician is there, however subtle and profound in
 “ his analytical inquiries, and however successful in the analyses
 “ which he has made, who would not give all his past discovery,
 “ and all his hopes of future discovery, for the certainty of
 “ knowing with exactness what every infant feels ? The full
 “ instruction, which such a view of our progressive feelings,
 “ from their very origin, in the first sensations of life, would
 “ afford, nature, in her wisdom, however, has not communi-

" cated to us, more than she has communicated to us the nature
 " of that state of being which awaits the soul after it has finish-
 " ed its career of mortality. Our existence seems, in our con-
 " ception of it, never to have had a beginning. As far back as
 " we can remember any event, there is always a period that ap-
 " pears to us still farther back, the events of which we cannot
 " distinguish; as, when we look toward the distant horizon; we
 " see, less and less distinctly, in the long line which the sun-
 " shine of evening still illuminates, plains, and woods, and
 " streams, and hills, more distant, half melting into air, beyond
 " which our eye can find nothing,—though we are still
 " certain that other woods, and streams, and plains, are there,
 " and that it is only the imperfection of our sight which seems
 " to bound them as in another world. It is to man, when
 " he thinks upon his own beginning, as if he felt himself in a
 " world of enchantment, amid the shades and flowers of which
 " he had been wandering, unconscious of the time at which he
 " entered it, or of the objects that are awaiting him, when he
 " shall have arrived at the close of that path whose windings
 " still lead him forward,—and knowing little more than that he is
 " himself happy, and that the unknown being, who has raised
 " this magnificent scene around him, must be the Friend of the
 " mortal whom he has deigned to admit into it."*

It would, I conceive, be a waste of words, to expose further
 Mr. D'Israeli's mis-statement of the question. Not only are per-
 sons at mature age, but children, long before they are capa-
 ble of definite manifestation, different from one another, My
 little friends, Phœbe and Hannah, already exhibit distinctive
 characters; and, with reference to what I have previously said,
 this could not have been otherwise. But the right view of the
 question is, whether this difference be *innate* or *produced*; and

* Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human mind, vol. 1st page 378.

the particular circumstances attending the birth of infants, their subsequent state of health, the health and disposition of the nurse from whom they inhale the support of existence, must be regarded as considerations—certainly of the *first*, perhaps, of the *greatest* importance.*

In surveying the landscape of nature, how many a sweet bud do we behold, which never expands or ripens; and, on the contrary, how many trees mature excellent fruit, which gave no indication of early promise. So also, many youths, at school and at college, are admired as prodigies of intellect, who are never afterwards heard of; while others, who have been declared dunces in every scholastic exercise, have subsequently risen to fame and greatness! Thomson, the delightful author of the seasons, was abandoned by his preceptor for incorrigible stupidity; Campbell wrote "The Pleasures of Hope" when almost a boy—what has he done since? Cowper was forty years of age before he thought of poetry, Goldsmith was thirty before he wrote any thing; and had Byron died, when the Edinburgh Review so severely criticised his "Hours of Idleness"—had this ended *him*, as he insinuates an "Article" in the "Quarterly" destroyed poor Keats, would it have been believed, that the same person was capable of producing "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage?" It is sometimes the *first* work of an author, and not unfrequently the *last*, which in the least degree entitles him to the notice and approbation of posterity.

* "If nothing occur to excite the mind, it will become torpid; if it be frequently and strongly excited, unless in a manner that, while it excites, engenders aversion to effort, it will become active, mobile and turbulent. Hence follows, that an adequate cause for the phenomenon of genius may be found, in the incidents that occur to us subsequent to birth. Genius, it should seem, may be produced after this method; have we any sufficient reason to doubt of its being *always* thus produced?" *Godwin's Enquirer* page 14.

Men who have become illustrious are the best judges of what has made them so. They best understand the labour they have undergone, and the attention they have bestowed, in approaching the goal of eminence. Some, it is true, arrive at this by an easier road than others; and this may be explained from the known fact, that one clear and correct conception, incidentally communicated, may facilitate in an inconceivable degree, the developement of any subsequent process. Sir Joshua Reynolds was firmly convinced that study, aided by congenial circumstances, alone, made him the great painter which the world acknowledged him to be; and by far the greater portion of celebrated men, since Montesquieu first broke the spell, and exposed the long-received doctrine of intuitive genius, have declared the same conviction—substantially agreeing, that, “they did not write because they understood the subject, but that they understand the subject because they have written.”*

Nothing, perhaps, conduces more to mislead the judgement in this important question, than the equivocal application of the

* After writing the above, I met with the following well-assorted catalogue of instances, in support of this, where certainly I least expected to find it, viz. in D'Israeli's “Essays on the Literary Character”—the same work I have already alluded to!

“We must not decide on the talents of a young man by his first works. DRYDEN and SWIFT might have been deterred from authorship, had their earliest pieces decided their fate. SMOLLET, before he knew which way his genius would conduct him, had early conceived a high notion of his talents for Dramatic poetry: his tragedy of “The Regicide” was refused by Garrick, whom he never afterwards forgave, and continued to abuse our Roscius through his works of genius, for having discountenanced his first work, which had none. RACINE's earliest composition, by some fragments his son has preserved, remarkably contrast with his writings, for these abound with those points and conceits which he afterwards abhorred; the tender author of *Andromache* could not have been discovered while exhausting himself in running after *congetti* as surprising as the worst

term *Education*. We very frequently hear, that such a one "has received an excellent education," and that such another "has received no education at all"; which remarks are not, in the least degree, intended to imply any estimate of the measure

"parts of Cowley; in whose spirit alone he could have hit on this perplexing *conceit* descriptive of Aurora; "Fille de Jour, qui nais devant ton pere"—"Daughter of Day, but born before thy father!" Grison betrayed none of the force and magnitude of his powers in his "Essay on Literature," or his attempted "History of Switzerland." Johnson's cadenced prose is not recognisable in the humbler simplicity of his earliest years. Many authors have begun unsuccessfully the walk they afterwards excelled in. RAPHAEL, when he first drew his meagre forms under Perugino, had not yet conceived one line of that ideal beauty, which one day he of all men could alone execute. Who could have imagined, in examining the *Dream* of Raphael, that the same pencil could hereafter have poured out the miraculous *Transfiguration*? Or that in the imitative pupil of Hudson, our country was at length to pride herself in another Raphael? The celebrated FASIVS MAXIVS in his boyhood was called in derision "the little sheep," from the meekness and gravity of his disposition. His sedateness and taciturnity, his indifference to juvenile amusements, his slowness and difficulty in learning, and his ready submission to his equals, induced them to consider him as one irrecoverably "stupid." (Pages 69, 70, and 71.)

Mr. D'Israeli, a few pages previously, has said that, "there is something ludicrous in the result of a theory of genius which would place Hobbes and Erasmus, those timid and learned recluses, to open a campaign with the military invention and physical intrepidity of a Marlborough, or conclude that the romantic bard of the 'Fairy Queen' amidst the quickly-shifting scenes of his visionary reveries, could have deduced, by slow and patient watchings of the mind, the system and the demonstrations of Newton." But has not Mr. D'Israeli, in the foregoing paragraph, given us a number of striking instances of celebrated men acquiring and interchanging, what he terms, "their predispositions of genius,"—instances, certainly as remarkable, as although Spencer had become a Mathematician and Newton a Poet? And, with regard to "Hobbes and Erasmus, those timid and learned recluses, opening a campaign with the military invention, and

of their respective acquirements, but simply, that the one has attended schools and colleges, and that the other has not. Hence many are surprized that men of great attainments should sometimes make their appearance, such as Holcroft, who has stated,

physical intrepidity of a Marlborough," has he not told us, that FABIUS MAXIMUS, one of the greatest generals and bravest heroes Rome ever produced, was at one time, on account of "the meanness and gravity of his disposition, called in derision the little sheep."!!!

But this is not the only dereliction to be found in D'Israeli's writings. Could it be imagined that such an eloquent and decided advocate for "the innate predispositions of genius," had previously written the following chapter, which I would have introduced more in its place, had it come to my notice sooner,—on

"POETS, PHILOSOPHERS, AND ARTISTS, MADE BY ACCIDENT."

"Father Mallebranche having compleated his studies in philosophy and theology, without any other intention than devoting himself to some religious order, he little expected to become of such celebrity as his works have made him. Loitering, in an idle hour, in the shop of a bookseller, in turning over a parcel of books, *L'Hommus de Descartes* fell into his hands. Having dipt into some parts, he was induced to peruse the whole. It was this circumstance that produced those profound contemplations which gave birth to so many beautiful compositions in Physics, Metaphysics, and Morality, which have made him pass for the Plato of his age."

"Cowley became a poet by accident. In his mother's apartment he found, when very young, Spencer's Fairy Queen; and, by a continual study of Poetry, he became an enchanted of the Muse, that he grew irrecoverably a Poet."

"We owe to the deformities of Pope's person the inimitable beauties of his elaborate verse."

"Dr. Johnson informs us, that the late great Painter of the present age had the first fondness for his art excited by the perusal of Richardson's Treatise."

"Helvetius furnishes me with the following additional instances."

"M. Vaucanson displayed an uncommon genius for Mechanics. His taste was first determined by this accident; he, when very young, frequently attended his mother to the residence of her confessor; and while

that his education never altogether cost five shillings sterling! And notwithstanding the exquisitely cultivated mind, so eminently visible in every line of Burns, the great majority, even of his admirers, are still inclined to consider him as a low bred,

“she wept with repentance, he wept with weariness! In this state of disagreeable vacation he was struck with the uniform motion of the pendulum of the clock in the hall. His curiosity was roused; he approached the clock case, and studied it's mechanism; what he could not discover, he guessed at. He then projected a similar machine; and gradually his genius produced a clock. Encouraged by this first success, he proceeded in his various attempts; and the genius which thus could form a clock, in time formed a futing automaton.”

“It was a chance of the same kind which inspired our great Milton to write his Epics. Milton, ‘fallen on evil days,’ was happy to be enabled to retire; and it was in the leisure of retreat and disgrace he executed the poem which he had projected in his youth; and which has enabled our nation to boast of a work which is rivalled by none, if we except the Italians.”

“If Shakespeare's imprudence had not obliged him to quit his wool trade, and his town; if he had not engaged with a company of actors, and at length, disgusted with being an indifferent performer, he had not turned author; the prudent woollseller had never been the celebrated poet.”

“Accident determined the taste of Moliere for the stage. His grandfather loved the theatre, and frequently carried him there. The young man lived in dissipation: the father observing it, asked, in anger, if his son was to be made an actor. ‘Would to God,’ replied the grandfather, ‘he was as good an actor as Montrose. The words struck young Moliere; he took a disgust to his tapestry trade; and it is to this circumstance France owes her greatest Comic writer.”

“Corneille loved; he made verses for his mistress, became a Poet, composed Melite, and afterwards his other celebrated pieces. The discreet Corneille had remained a lawyer.”

“Thus it is, that the devotion of a mother, the death of Cromwell, deer-stealing, the exclamation of an old man, and the beauty of a woman, have given five illustrious characters to Europe.”

“I should never have done, (this great man concludes,) if I would en-

uneducated peasant—merely because he had not been systematically flogged by an authorised pedant, into a trifling knowledge of Latin and Greek, nor enabled to squander thousands in debauching both soul and body, within the walls of a university!

“umerate all the writers celebrated for their talents, and who owed those talents to similar incidents.”

“It is also well known, that we owe the labours of the immortal Newton to a very trivial accident. When in his younger days, he was a student at Cambridge, he had retired during the time of the plague into the country. As he was reading under an apple tree, one of the fruit fell, and struck him a smart blow on the head. When he observed the smallness of the apple, he was surprized at the force of the stroke. This led him to consider the accelerating motion of falling bodies; from whence he deduced the principles of gravity, and laid the foundation of his philosophy.”

“Granger observes on Ignatius Loyola, that he was a spanish gentleman, who was dangerously wounded at the siege of Pampaluna. Having heated his imagination by reading the Lives of the Saints, which were brought to him in his illness, instead of a romance, he conceived a strong ambition to be the founder of a religious order. This is well known by the appellation of the society of Jesus, or the Jesuits.”

“J. J. Rousseau found his eccentric powers first awakened by the advertisement of the singular annual subject which the Academy of Dijon proposed for that year, in which he wrote his celebrated Declamation against the Arts and Sciences. It was this circumstance which determined his future literary efforts.” (*Curiosities of Literature.*)

Is it not remarkable that D'Israeli should produce this long catalogue of “Poets, Philosophers, and Artists, *made by accident,*” in support of the doctrine of innate predispositions of genius? (see his *Essays on the Literary character* vol. 1st page 69,) and that he should quote the same from *Helvetius*, who was among the fore-most and the boldest in opposing such a doctrine? I do not recollect if Mr. D'Israeli has yet composed a chapter “on the *Inconsistencies* of authors,” but in his next series of “*The Curiosities of Literature,*” I should strongly recommend him not to neglect giving so fine an example, thus furnished by himself!!!

Had Burns been nursed in luxury and reared in affluence, it cannot be conjectured what he might have become—certainly not “*The Bard of Coila*.”*

* The “*Life of Burns*” which has recently appeared, entitles its author to deserve well of his country. The *Post* required no vindication, but Mr. Lockhart has redeemed the character of the MAN! and the character of such a man as Burns, must everlastingly be dear to every heart that can feel and appreciate.

Poor luckless child! to thee was given
 To prove the just behests of heaven;
 For, though in dark misfortune's gloom,
 On bleakest waste, 'twas thine to bloom—
 Bursting through every cloud of fate,
 Thou soar'd'st above the pamper'd great;
 And spread, amid their haughty ring,
 The sweetest note, the wildest wing.
 Yet, though thy country hailed with pride
 Thy swelling soul, and drank its tide,
 Imbibed, with rapture, all the store
 Thy true and tender heart could pour,—
 Though “quick to learn, and wise to know,”
 Thy only meed was want and woe!

But, though the shades of dread repose
 Thy “narrow house” for ever close—
 Though mute for aye thy magic lyre,
 And ever fled thy soul of fire—
 While freedom has a spark to warm,
 Or beauty has a beam to charm,
 And when the sons of wealth and pride,
 Who passed the by with heedless stride,
 Are mouldered in oblivions urns,
 Thy name shall live—neglected BURNS!—
 Thy darling lays, in every clime,
 Shall mock the power of wasting time,
 And Scotia's proudest banner wave
 Triumphant, o'er thy hallowed grave.

But this restriction of the word Education is quite unsuitable to philosophical language. Here it must be considered to embrace and imply the acquisition of every new idea—every item of added knowledge, whether communicated from under a gown and wig, or suggested by the silent stars of heaven! Even of such as have received what is termed a *regular* education, can it be said that the eminence which some of them have mounted to is purely the result of scholastic drudgery? “Thousands of impressions are made upon us,” says the profound Godwin, “for one that is designedly produced. The child receives twenty ideas *per diem*, perhaps, from the preceptor; it is not impossible that he may have a million of perceptions in that period, with which the preceptor has no concern. We learn, it may be, a routine of barren lessons from our masters; a circumstance occurs, perhaps, in the intercourse of our companions, or in our commerce with nature, that makes its way directly to the heart, and becomes the fruitful parent of a thousand projects and contemplations.”*

The doctrine which asserts that genius and, consequently, every descending grade of intellect are in-born and unalterable, is not only false but destructive. For, although much of the future man depends on the health and treatment of the child, it by no means follows, that every one who has not been born amidst a combination of happy circumstances, must necessarily continue in ignorance and apathy. If habits of attention and reflection have not been sown in spring, a greater effort of labour will, of course, be necessary to ensure a harvest; but well-directed effort will, in no season be exerted in vain. It is true, that if habits of attention and reflection have not been awakened in infancy or youth, it will sometimes be found impossible, and generally difficult, to produce them afterwards; but if

* Enquirer page 17.

a. desire to learn can at any period be induced, we have numerous instances on record of what may be accomplished. In affording examples, that, indefatigable collector, D'Israeli again stands me in good stead.

“ Socrates learnt to play on musical instruments in his old age: Cato, at eighty, thought proper to learn Greek; and Plutarch, almost as late in life, Latin.”

“ Theophrastus began his admirable work on the Characters of Men at the extreme age of ninety. He only terminated his literary labours by his death.”

“ Peter Rosnard, one of the fathers of French Poetry, applied himself late to study; but by the acuteness of his genius, and continual application, he rivalled those poetic models which he admired.”

“ One John Gelida, a Spaniard, commenced the studies of polite literature at forty.”

“ Henry Spelman, having neglected the Sciences in his youth, cultivated them at fifty years of age, and produced good fruit.”

“ Fairfax, after having been General of the Parliamentary forces, retired to Oxford to take his degrees in law.”

“ Colbert, the famous French minister, almost at sixty, returned to his Latin and law studies.”

“ Tellier, the chancellor of France, learnt logic, merely for an amusement, to dispute with his grand children.”

“ Dryden's most pleasing productions were written in his old age. Dr. Johnson applied himself to the Dutch language but a few years before his death. But on this head, the Marquis de Saint Aulaire may be regarded as a prodigy: at the age of seventy he began to court the Muses, and they crowned him with their sweetest flowers. His verses are full of fire, of delicacy, and sweetness!”

The doctrine of in-born and determinate intellectual power, has unquestionably paralysed and destroyed the exertions of many, who might otherwise have been useful to themselves and to society: and this paralyzing influence will continue to operate until the incubus of this false doctrine be finally removed, and man convinced, that, with the desire and opportunity to learn, he may, by doubling his application, recover from the future what has been lost in the past. This false belief affords, also, a never-ending apology for idleness. "I have not capacity or talent for this or that," is the uniform watch-word and salvo of the sluggard! But how many do we meet with, who are accomplished and even erudite, in all the mysteries of folly and trifling, and who have bestowed as much trouble and pains in becoming such, as might, had their attention been directed to nobler purposes, have rewarded them with the most exquisite gratification the heart can enjoy, and, perhaps, conveyed their names to posterity among the ornaments and benefactors of mankind.!

But the evil tendency of this belief will be still more apparent, when we consider the baneful influence which, since the beginning of the world, it has exerted on the softer sex—All the tyranny of kings and priests, has not inflicted half the injury upon social improvement and happiness, as that tyranny, of opinion, which has hitherto consigned the fairest and the best portion of the human family to degradation and slavery. Over all Asia and Africa woman ever has been, and is, either a drudge or a toy!—never imagined capable of more, than administering to sensuality and producing children. The poet may sing,

"Affections are not made for merchandise.—"

"What wilt ye give in barter for the heart?"

"Has this world wealth enough to buy the store

"Of hopes and feelings, which are linked for ever

"With Woman's soul?"

But, whether or not her *affections* may be saleable, her *person* has alas! been generally considered little else than an article of traffic. Throughout all Hindoostan and the surrounding countries, and I believe I may include the vast empire of China, this is literally the case.* Even in enlightened Europe, notwithstanding the splendid proofs of their acquirements which have recently appeared, the natural "*rights of women*" are far from being generally admitted. Novel writer's have, indeed,

* "In Greece, as is well known, none but Courtesans received an education sufficiently liberal to enable them to converse and associate with the men upon equal terms; and hence it became infamous to be learned, and the woman who was not ignorant could not be virtuous, or at least could never be considered so. The brilliancy of the talents, and the elegant accomplishments which often distinguished those women whose moral characters were the most abandoned, bewitched and enchanted the more polite and refined amongst the Greeks more than their beauty, and Minerva often atcheived a victory over the hearts of Philosophers, when the powers of Venus and her Son would have failed to conquer. When allurements such as these were held out to men who had left nothing but insipidity and ignorance at home, and who were so well capable of appreciating the charms of intellectual conversation, it cannot be surprising that they were often irresistible; and that Philosophy was found too weak to protect her disciples against the inroads of illicit passion. The degradation of woman was the natural consequence of such manners; their characters were underrated, their virtues overlooked; and doubt even began to attach itself to their claim to the possession of those qualities of the heart, in which they may perhaps most justly arrogate a superiority over man.—"In respect to true love." Says Plutarch, "the women have nothing to say to it!"

"Cato Uncensis, that illustrious Roman citizen and stern republican, lent his wife, while in a state of pregnancy, to his friend Hortensius, and nothing whatever is recorded of the Lady's reluctance. Plutarch gives us the whole of this disgusting arrangement, with all the faithfulness of detail: To modern ears it would appear almost incredible, but the spirit of the Roman laws sufficiently accounts for the degraded condition of the sex. "By his (the husband's) judgement, or caprice," says Gibbon, "her behaviour was approved, or censured, or chastised; he exercised the jurisdiction of life and death; and it was allowed, that in cases of adultery or drunkenness, the sentence might be properly inflicted. She acquired or inherited for the sole profit of her lord; and so clearly was woman defined, not as a *person*, but as a *thing*, that if the original title was deficient, she might be claimed, like *other moveables*, by the *use* and *possession* of an entire year." Gibbon adds in a note, that to substantiate the crime of drunkenness, it was sufficient to prove that the woman had *fasted* wine, or stolen the key of the cellar!"

Among the ancient Jews, although the women do not appear to have been household prisoners, their degradation, in other respects, was equally severe. If a wife "found no favour in her husband's eyes," he had only "to write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house!" (*Deuteronomy, Chap: 24 verse 1.*)

abundantly flattered their *beauty*, but it has only very lately been imagined, that the character of a Heroine could be in the least improved by rendering her either the fit companion and friend of an intellectual husband, or capable of instructing and forming the minds of her children. A literary young lady may be admired—she is seldom beloved. A little childish or affected *delicacy*, with some external advantages of person which quickly fade and are disregarded, constitute a much better pass-port to the hymeneal altar than all that the glorious mind of woman is capable of unfolding. They have little motive, therefore, to induce solid improvement; for it is not in human nature to labour without the expectation of reward. The consequence is, that this false and tyrannous opinion of superiority entertained by the physically stronger sex, reverts upon themselves. The chief business of man's life, veil it as he may, is to please and attract woman; and while *she* is only capable of being pleased and attracted with trifling and folly, *he* will continue a trifler and a fool!

I admit that there are many exceptions to this; and that, in some countries, the present age is beginning to award tardy justice to that sex which has been hitherto treated as drudges or play-things,—even the best informed of them, constrained to listen only to such frivolous compliments as a sensible, individual could only consider an insult to her understanding! But this change of opinion is a direct admission that the world has been long and deeply in error, which error is only part and parcel of the destructive doctrine of mind in general which I have endeavoured to refute. As, however, a juster light has at length dawned on the question as it regards the intellectual capabilities of woman, it may be reasonably hoped, that, when the sun of truth has risen higher, and man become better acquainted with his own nature and powers, the whole delusion will dissolve and be forgotten!"

Though has been said, I conceive, as a quibus in Phrenology; although the arguments, so far from being exhausted, to do the subject justice, would require a ponderous volume. The name of Helvetius, however, having been introduced, has led me to examine the opinions of that great man, as D'Israeli terms him, on the subject under discussion; and after having done so, I am induced, in conclusion, to give a few extracts, which strongly bear upon some points which I have sparingly, if at all adverted to.

"The greater or less perfection of the organs of sense has no influence on justness of thinking, if men, whatever impression they receive from the same objects, must always perceive the same connections between those objects. Now, to prove that they perceive them, I shall choose the sense of sight for an example, as that to which we owe the greatest number of our ideas. And I say, with respect to the difference of eyes, that if a fathom appears to one man shorter, snow less white, and ebony not so black, as they appear to another, yet these two men always perceive the same relations between those objects; consequently, a fathom always appears longer than a foot; the snow whiter than any other body, and ebony the blackest of all kinds of wood."

"Now, as the justness of our thoughts always consists in a clear view of the true relations that subsist between objects, and as in repeating, with respect to the other senses, what I have here said on that of sight, we shall constantly come to the same conclusion; I infer, that the greater or less degree of perfection, either in the external or internal organization, can have no influence on the justness of our judgments."

"Attention alone may engrave in the memory the subjects that, without attention, would make only insensible impressions upon us; nearly resembling those a reader successively receives of each of the letters that compose a page in a book. It is then certain, that, to judge whether the defect of memory in men an effect of their inattention, or of an imperfection in the organs, we must have recourse to experience. This teaches us that among men there are many, as St. Augustin and Montaigne say of themselves, who appear to be endued with only a very weak memory; and yet, from the desire of obtaining knowledge, acquire such a number of ideas, as to cause them to be placed in the rank of persons of an extraordinary memory. Now, if the desire of instruction be alone sufficient to enable us to know a great deal, I conclude, that the memory is almost entirely factitious. The extent of the memory therefore first depends on the daily use made of it: secondly, on the attention which we consider of the objects we would impress upon it and which without attention, as

"I have just said, would leave only slight traces that would be easily effaced; and, thirdly, on the order in which we range our ideas. To this order we owe all the prodigies of memory; it consists in uniting together all our ideas, and consequently charging the memory only with such objects as by their nature, or the manner in which they are considered, preserve between them a connection sufficient to recal each other."—

"It appears, then, that a great memory is a phenomenon of order; that it is almost always factitious; and that between those whom I call well organized, that great disproportion visible in point of memory is not so much the effect of the unequal perfection of the organs that supply it with materials, as of an unequal attention to improve it."

"In men of healthy and strong constitutions, who apply themselves to the arts and sciences, it seems as if their strength and vigour, by giving them a greater propensity to pleasure, frequently diverts them from study and reflection; and that those of a weak and delicate constitution cannot be diverted from their studies by slight and frequent indispositions. All that we can be certain of is, that, among the men animated by nearly an equal love of study, our success in measuring the greatness of their mental abilities seems entirely to depend either on the greater or fewer distractions occasioned by a difference of tastes, fortunes, and stations, and on the happy or unhappy choice of subjects on which we treat, the more or less perfect method used in composing, the greater or less propensity to reflection, the books we read, the men of taste with whom we converse, and, in short, the objects which chance daily presents to our view. It seems as if, in the concours of circumstances necessary to form a man of genius, the different capacity for attention that may be produced by a greater or less strength of constitution is of no moment. Thus the inequality of genius, occasioned merely by the different constitutions of men, is altogether impossible; and, as no exact observations have hitherto been made to determine what constitution is most proper to form men of genius, we cannot yet be certain, whether the tall or the short, the fat or the lean, the bilious or the sanguine, have the greatest aptitude of mind.

"But, though this summary answer may be sufficient to refute a manner of reasoning founded only on probabilities; yet, as this question is of great importance, it is necessary to resolve it with precision, and to inquire whether this want of attention in men is either the effect of a natural incapacity for application, or of the languid desire of instruction."

" All the men whom I call well organized are capable of attention, since
 ' all learn to read, obtain their mother-tongue, and are capable of under-
 ' standing the first propositions of Euclid. Now all men capable of com-
 " prehending these first propositions have a physical power of understand-
 " ing them all: in fact, both in geometry and in all the other sciences, the
 " greater or less facility with which we discover truth depends on the num-
 " ber, either greater or less, of those antecedent propositions, which, in
 " order to perceive it, must be presented to the memory. Now, if every
 " man well organized, as I have proved in the preceding chapter, may place
 " in his memory a number of ideas much superior to what is required for
 " the demonstration of any proposition in geometry; and if, by the assis-
 " tance of order, and the frequent representation of the same ideas, we
 " may, as experience proves, render them so familiar, and so habitually
 " present, as to recollect them without difficulty, it must follow that every
 " one has a physical power of pursuing the demonstration of any geometri-
 " cal truth; and that, after having ascended from proposition to proposition,
 " and from analogous ideas to other analogous ideas, till a person has
 ' acquired the knowledge, for instance, of ninety-nine propositions, he may
 " demonstrate the hundredth with the same ease that he did the second,
 " which is as distant from the first as the hundredth is from the ninety-
 " ninth."

" When we believe attention difficult to be supported, it is because we
 " take the fatigue of weariness and impatience for the fatigue of applica-
 " tion. In reality, if there be no man without desires, there is no man
 " without attention. When it is reduced to a habit, it becomes a want;
 " what renders it fatiguing, is the motive that determines us to it; if that
 " be necessity, indigence, or fear, attention is then painful; but, if it be
 " the hope of pleasure, attention itself then becomes a pleasure. Lay before
 " a man two written copies equally difficult to read; the one a verbal process
 ' at law, and the other a letter from his mistress; and who can doubt that
 " the attention would not be as painful in the first case as it would be
 " agreeable in the second? From this observation, we may easily explain
 " why attention is more painful to some than to others. It is not necessary
 ' for this purpose that there subsists between them any difference of orga-
 " nization: it is sufficient to shew, that here the pain of attention is always
 " greater or less in proportion to the greater or less degree of the pleasure
 " which each considers as the reward of his labour. Now, if the same
 " objects are never of the same value in the opinion of different men, it is
 " evident, that, in proposing to different men the same objects as a reward,

“they have not an equal reward in view; and, being obliged to make the same effort of attention, these efforts must consequently be more painful to some than to others.”

“We may then resolve the problem of a greater or less case of attention, without having recourse to the mystery of an unequal perfection in the organs which produced it. But on admitting, in this respect, a difference in the organization of men; in supposing, I say, they have a warm desire of instruction, a desire of which all men are susceptible; there are none but will then find that they are endued with a capacity of attention necessary to distinguish themselves in an art. In fact, if the desire of happiness be common to all men, and if it be their most lively sensation, it is evident that every man will do whatever is in his power to obtain it: now every man, as I have just proved, is capable of a degree of attention sufficient to enable him to obtain the most noble ideas. He will then make use of this capacity for attention; when, by the legislation of his country, his particular taste, education, or happiness, shall become the prize to be obtained by his attention. It will, I believe, be difficult to resist this conclusion; especially if, as I can prove, it is not even necessary for a man to give all the attention of which he is capable to be superior in one kind of study.”

“Not to leave any doubt with respect to this truth, let us consult experience, and examine the men of genius: they have all experienced that it is not to the most painful efforts of attention that they owe the finest verses of their poems, the most singular situations in their romances, and the most learned and instructive of their philosophical works. They confess that they owe them to the happy concurrence of certain objects which chance has placed before their eyes, or presented to their memory; and by comparing these, they have produced those noble verses, those striking situations, and those grand philosophical ideas; ideas which the mind always conceives with a greater promptitude and felicity, in proportion to their being more true and general. Now, if in every work these fine ideas, of whatsoever kind they may be, be in a manner the strokes of genius, if the art employed about them be not a work of time and patience, and what is called the labour of the brain, it is thence certain, that genius is less the price of attention than a gift of chance, which presents these happy ideas to all men, among whom those alone who are fond of glory are attentive to seize them. If chance be generally acknowledged to be the author of most discoveries in almost all the arts, and if in speculative sciences its power be less sensibly perceived, it is not perhaps less real: it no less presides at

"the opening of the finest ideas. Thus they are not, as I have just said, the
 "gains of the most painful efforts of the attention; and it may be asserted,
 "that the attention required in following the order of ideas, the manner of
 "expressing them, and the art of passing from one subject to another is
 "beyond all contradiction, much more fatiguing; and that, in short, the most
 "painful of all is the comparison of objects that are not familiar to us. For
 "this reason the philosopher, capable of six or seven hours application to
 "study, could not, without a very painful attention, spend six or seven hours
 "either in examining witnesses or making a faithful and correct copy of a
 "manuscript: hence it is evident, that the beginning of every science is
 "always the most thorny. It is only owing to the habit we have acquired
 "of considering certain objects, that we owe not only the facility with which
 "we compare them, but also the just and rapid comparisons we draw from
 "considering them with respect to each other. Thus, at the first glance of
 "the eye, the painter perceives in a picture the faults with respect to the
 "design and colouring: thus the shepherd, accustomed to consider his sheep,
 "finds resemblances and differences between them, that makes him know
 "them; and thus we are properly master only of the subject on which we
 "have long meditated. It is in proportion to the greater or less degree of
 "application with which we examine a subject, that our ideas of it are
 "profound or superficial. It appears that works that have long employed
 "our thoughts, and been long in composing, have greater strength, and that
 "in kinds of sciences, as in mechanics, we gain in strength what is lost in
 "time."

"But, not to ramble from my subject, I shall repeat again, if the most
 "painful attention be that which supposes the comparison of objects least
 "familiar to us, and if that attention be required in the study of languages,
 "every man being capable of learning his own language, all are consequently
 "endowed with a strength and power of attention sufficient to raise them to
 "the rank of illustrious men." (*Essays on the mind.*)

NOTE [D.] Page 68,

After Phrenologists had established the existence of certain divisions of the brain, for such purposes as those of affording the notions of Form, Size, Weight, &c. it is singular enough that they have not yet found out an organ of *Credulity*, although one would think they had not very far to go in search of it. It would, of course, become also necessary, as in the case of Hope and Fear, to construct an organ of *Scepticism*, the one to check and counterbalance the other. Mr. Combe, perhaps, may say, that believing and doubting are not original faculties, as both entirely depend on the same calculation of appreciated evidence. But will he seriously assert, that Hope and Fear are any more entitled to the high distinction he allows them, or that both of these do not equally depend upon the same calculation of future good or evil?

The Edinburgh Review has, in my opinion, incontestably shown, that these two emotions "are substantially one and the same"—that "the increment of the one, is necessarily the decrement of the other"—that "they are the two buckets in the well"—and that "it is not less absurd to ascribe them to different principles, than it would be to maintain, that the descent of the one bucket depends upon causes quite different from that which occasions the ascent of the other." Mr. Combe, in his letter to Mr. Jeffrey, makes but a miserable reply to this. Taking up the simile, he says, "I place Fear in the one bucket, and Hope in the other. In the medium condition of ordinary life they hang in equilibrio; when an object pregnant with danger presents itself, Fear mounts up and Hope sinks down; when an agreeable prospect appears, Fear descends and Hope rises.* You should (he continues, addressing Mr.

* This is exactly what Mr. Jeffrey asserts—and as Mr. Combe informs us, that the two buckets may very frequently "hang in equilibrio," they must, of course, be both suspended to one and the same balancing principle

"Jeffrey) have had only one bucket in your well, and called it
 "Fear when at the bottom and Hope when at the top."

Mr. Combe seems quite convinced, that changing the number of the buckets, completely changes the state of the question; but whether there be two buckets or one, is nothing to Mr. Jeffrey's position, provided that only one principle acts in producing both effects. To please Mr. Combe, however, let us take the simile of a *Gasometer*, which rises as it fills, and sinks as it empties; and in this case, I should think, it will scarcely be denied, that unless for the gas, the vessel which it operates upon, would neither rise nor fall. But Mr. Combe cannot, or will not understand this. "There is a maxim in philosophy," he says, "*ex nihilo nihil fit*, which in plain English, means, that something never arises out of nothing. Cold then is not a positive substance, but the mere negative of heat; silence is the negative of noise; and rest the negative of motion; accordingly, cold, silence, and rest, not being entities, cannot become agents, or exhibit active qualities; for this would infringe on the above maxim, which in philosophy is absolutely indisputable. If fear then be the mere negation of hope, it cannot be a positive feeling; it can produce no effects, and excite to no actions; or if you reverse the case, and say that Hope is the negation of Fear, then it is the mere zero of that emotion; it is nothing in itself, and can produce no consequences. But this is altogether at variance with the real phenomena of life. Fear, when violently excited, is an overwhelming passion; Hope, when high upon the tiptoe, is a

But how is Mr. Combe to reconcile this to the declared independent nature of all the organs. He tells us here, that when Fear is up, Hope must be down, whereas, if they are totally independent in their action, so far from their mutually restraining, or keeping one another in equilibrio, there is nothing more natural than that both buckets may very frequently find themselves, stuck by joint action at the top, and now the bottom of the well.

“prodigiously strong positive emotion; and both give rise to
“the most extensive consequences in human affairs.”

If Mr. Combe would look at both sides of an argument, which it appears, however, he cannot do when Phrenology is concerned, he would find that there is nothing in this, in the least degree “at variance with the real phenomena of life.” All he contends for amounts only to this, that other causes than positive substances may produce effects upon the mind—a fact which I can scarcely conceive has ever been denied. Heat melts and cold freezes, and melting and freezing are very different things, as we in this fervid zone can sufficiently testify. But does it follow from this, that because the sun produces only heat, there must exist an antagonist body for the purpose of producing cold? Mr. Combe’s illustrations have been allowed their full weight, and he is welcome to them, the utmost they prove, being, that the human mind has just as much occasion for one organ of Hope and another of Fear, as has this goodly world of ours for a cold sun as well as a hot one—or as, that because the discharge of a sixty-four pounder produces noise, there must be another let off to restore silence!

The maxim in philosophy “*ex nihilo nihil fit;*” which Mr. Combe translates “nothing never (he meant to say *ever*) arises out of nothing,” on which he rests all his defence, is not in the least degree infringed by denying that cold is “a positive substance.” Neither Heat nor Cold are substances of any kind, but relative affections of the mind—mere degrees of the very same sensation—and it is not more absurd to attribute them to different causes, than it would be to assert, that every different degree of pressure on a limb, must necessarily be produced by a positively different bandage!

* Besides heat and cold, noise and silence, Mr. Combe presses into his service *motion and rest*, which, if there be any meaning in his argument, he instals as also *positive substances!*—an effort of fancy somewhat too extravagant for rational comment.

If the maxim, under which Mr. Combe shelters himself, literally meant, as he seems to apprehend, that nothing can act upon the mind but a positive substance, his reasoning would be correct, although the maxim would be false: for, so far from the mind being only acted upon by positive substances, there is not a truth in philosophy more firmly established than the impossibility of substance acting directly upon mind at all! The maxim, however, is strictly true, for although a sensation be not a substance it is not the less an active agent—in fact, as nothing can be present to the mind but ideas and sensations, they are not merely the only active agents, but are the only species of existence of which it can have any kind of knowledge! With regard to Mr. Combe's positive and negative substances, I shall simply remark, in the very plain words of Hume, that the non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence—and that “the proposition which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be.” Darkness is the negative of light, but have we not as correct and definite an idea of the one as of the other? and can it be denied, that they respectively act upon the mind with equal intensity and equal effect? To render the maxim, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, of any service to Mr. Combe, he must first substantiate that ideas and sensations are *nothing*—an assertion which perhaps he will not consider as involving much importance, (for he seldom reflects on the consequences of any assertion,) but as it is an unquestionable truth, that ideas and sensations are the only possible objects of all our consciousness—take them away—and it will puzzle him a little, I should think, although assisted by all the phrenologists in the world, to inform us what is left behind!

NOTE [E.] Page 71,

Dr. Paterson rates very highly the opportunities he has possessed of measuring men's heads in different parts of the world;

and coercives he has, thereby, a great superiority over his fellow labourers. In Combe's "System of Phrenology," page 465, we are informed that he has favoured the Edinburgh Society with "The Phrenology of the Hindoos," wherein the cranial developments of that people, are correctly made to correspond with their prevailing character; and "the facts," we are told on which he builds, "are drawn from upwards of three thousand observations." The Doctor, however, in his search after facts, was exactly the prototype of Hazlitt's "man with only one idea;" and, wherever he travelled, and whatever he saw, his enquiry seems to have been strictly limited to *bumps, bumps, bumps!*

It never once occurred to him, that the political institutions of the Hindoos, or their climate, could in the least degree influence their habits or dispositions. He had a far simpler method of settling the question. But unless he is a Hindoo himself, and believes, that each *caste* is sprung from an essentially distinct creation—that the Bramins came from Brama's mouth, the Chehterees from his arms, the Bice from his belly, and the Seeder from his feet—unless he believes all this, he will find it somewhat difficult to account for the wide distinction of character, so plainly exhibited by these several classes of the very same community.

Had Dr. Paterson arrived in India before Phrenology was thought of—had he looked around him with a philosophical eye, instead of a phrenological one; and, instead of manipulating three thousand skulls, had he reflected on the singular institutions which have so long and so uniformly existed; had he taken into consideration the laws, the superstitions, and the customs, which, twisted together into one powerful chain, circumscribe every mental energy, within limits as narrow as they have hitherto been considered immutable—had his organ of observation been directed to these, he would have felt no difficulty whatever, in accounting for every Phenomenon in the Hindoo character, without conceiving it any more necessary to trace it to their heads than to their turbans.

On the same principle, the Doctor accounts equally well, why "a handful of Europeans overcomes in combat and holds in permanent subjection thousands, nay millions of that people." He forgets that a handful of that very people, when brought under European discipline, well-paid, well-fed, and well-furnished with the *materiel* of war, has often put to flight innumerable hosts of their own undisciplined, unpaid, unfed, and unfurnished countrymen; nor does he seem to recollect, that these "timid Hindoos," possessing such unfortunate and cowardly bumps, were deemed, by no incompetent judges, to be capable of meeting on the plains of Egypt, the finest legions of France. Whoever has witnessed a specimen of the Horse Artillery practice at Dum Dum, may soon judge for himself what kind of bumps they are, by which such "a handful of Europeans overcomes in combat and holds in permanent subjection thousands, nay millions of Hindoos."—But it is not true, that a handful of Europeans either conquered, or that they preserve in subjection, this extensive Empire; from the first commencement of our power, the aborigines themselves have assisted in this. In the Marquis of Hastings's grand campaign, for every British rank and file under his command, there were at least ten well disciplined and well behaved native soldiers.*

* In the reign of Henry 2. A. D. 1172, Ireland was first disturbed by the English; and, according to Hume, the adventurers who completed the conquest did not amount to one thousand men. Three detachments, equivalent to six hundred, who first went over, having joined, "composed a force which nothing in Ireland was able to withstand!" Another company under Raymond, consisting of "ten Knights and seventy Archers," defeated a body of three thousand Irish that had ventured to attack him." The English, in number equal to a modern regiment, took Dublin, the capital, by assault, which was afterwards besieged by several native princes with an army of thirty thousand men. "But Earl Richard making a sudden sally at the head of ninety Knights, with their followers, put this numerous army to rout, chased them off the field, and pursued them with great slaughter. None in Ireland now dared to oppose themselves to the English. "Thus," continues Hume, "by these trivial exploits scarcely worth relating, except for the importance of the consequences, was Ireland subdued, and annexed to the English crown." (*History of England.*)

Ireland, it appears from this, was at least as easily conquered as India; according, therefore, to Phrenological conclusion, the Irish must also be *Cowards*—not a bump of combativeness to be found in all the Emerald Isle!

Knowledge of any kind has never been diffused among the Hindoos. Their laws and religion, as well as their literature, science, and philosophy, such as they are, are all wrapped up within the dark curtain of the Sanscrit language, which Bramin alone dare unfold; nor will they, if they can prevent it, allow any portion of these sacred records to be revealed by translation—all exposition must come directly from their own lips—and it is no more their interest, even if they were capable, than it is that of any other order of priests, to teach any thing, whatsoever, which does not tend to preserve their servile worshippers in ignorance and delusion. But a change has “come o’er the spirit of the dream,” and it may be fondly anticipated,

That o’er this land of darkness and of woe,
By many an iron sceptre long oppress’d,
Though dimly distant, and approaching slow,
Truth yet shall dawn, and India’s plains be blest,
Where superstition marches unopposed,
Destructive phrensy in the dismal van,
On sweet society each portal closed,
And man immutably estrang’d from man—
Where the wild Widow mounts the dreadful pile,
Where tender babes are hur’d to monster’s jaws,
Where victims mad mid’st willing tortures smile,
And send-like myriads yell their earnest applause—

Man shall behold a brother’s face in every
And social order social love inspire,
The torch of reason cheerful freedom fire,
And patriot valour guard the eternal fire?
For Albion’s sons, prophetic hope can trust,
Shall wield her influence but to shield and save,
Teach, by example, to be mild and just—
Nor freedom’s children laugh at freedom’s grave,
Within these few last years a change has become visible in the habits, but more particularly in the opinions, of the upper classes of natives in Calcutta. A considerable number have entirely rejected superstition and idolatry, and are gradu-

ally throwing off the accursed incubus of rites and customs; and it requires only that a few patriotic and leading individuals should treat the whole with as much open contempt, as many of them inwardly feel and privately acknowledge, to hasten and anticipate this "consumation so devoutly to be wished." It is, however, from the rising generation that this is chiefly to be expected. The Hindoo College and other private Seminaries have already exhibited effects which, I rather think, few Europeans are fully aware of. Their eagerness to acquire knowledge, and the remarkable docility of Hindoo youth, afford every promise of future results. Not a few of them are well acquainted with the outlines of European history, literature, and philosophy, and as scarcely any thing can be acquired within the range of their own language, they study ours with the utmost avidity; and knowing the value of these acquisitions, they will naturally secure them to their posterity. A nucleus of intelligence is therefore formed which, if aided by generous legislation on the part of the rulers, will gradually expand beyond Calcutta, and ultimately yield incalculable consequences.*

* I do not, however, wish it to be understood, that these causes have, hitherto, been favourable towards the propagation of Christianity. On the contrary, I am sorry to say, that all the educated Hindoos with whom I have conversed on the subject, substantially agree with one of the most celebrated of their countrymen, who, on being introduced to Bishop Middleton, and congratulated by his Lordship on embracing the purer faith, replied, "My Lord, you are under a mistake—I have not laid down one superstition to take up another;" and they strenuously insist, that their own religion, when stripped of all its meretricious absurdities, is a system of pure Deism. Yet every intelligent native Gentleman is easily induced to admit, that the introduction of the Christian religion would be of infinite advantage to the mass of his countrymen, compared to the degrading idolatry and demoralizing division of caste, which at present prevail. The truth is, our Missionaries, though with the best of motives, were originally too eager and precipitate in acquiring proselytes. Instead of addressing themselves to the upper classes, and endeavouring, in the first instance, to persuade and enlighten them, they commenced with the most abject and most ignorant, and with relation to the state of society in this country, certainly those least worthy and least capable of appreciating their kind intentions. Some few of what is considered the refuse of the population were induced (their countrymen uniformly insist by the expectation of gain) to join the new instructors; but as such only have done so, the term *convert* has now become synonymous with every thing vile and infamous! Excepting the

If England is to continue her dominion over India, whatever difficulties may at present seem in the way, the aborigines cannot ~~for ever~~ be excluded from every share of civil or political influence. The ostensible objection has, hitherto, been their want of trust-worthiness; but a degraded people will never be otherwise. Human nature, whatever Phrenologists may say to the contrary, is always the same; and if the same motives can be created;

Missionaries themselves, no one will employ them in any capacity whatever. In fact, they are as strictly considered out-casts, treated with as much contempt, and avoided with as much abhorrence, by Christians in general, as by their own countrymen. Recently, a friend of mine, who is ultra orthodox, his wife being very ill, and her infant wasting for want of nourishment, was in great distress from being unable to procure an eligible wet-nurse. In this painful emergency a native young woman was recommended, whose appearance, health, and capability for such a duty, were considered unexceptionable; but he instantly rejected her, on discovering the fatal circumstance of her being a Serampore convert! The only proof of conversion she could adduce, was that "she might eat and drink whatever master and mistress did;" and observing some bottles on the side board, she modestly proposed to exhibit a specimen.

There is not one throughout all India who has paid attention to the subject, and whose zeal has not over-stepped his judgment, who seriously admits that a single *sincere* convert has ever yet been made; or who doubts, that the hundred thousandth part of the money which has been expended in the attempt, would not be sufficient to purchase the recantation of every individual who pretends to have forsaken those rites and customs, which are so completely identified and interwoven with every habit and movement of his existence. With regard to creeds and dogmas, the uneducated Hindoo knows little, and cares less. His religion—his every thing consists in his *caste*, and instead of what he *believes*, the only question and the only consideration is what he *casts*!

Under existing circumstances, it is very questionable whether, according to strict justice, a low untutored Hindoo should be induced to abjure his caste, unless he be previously pensioned for life! If he could be taught to understand and value the divine morality of the Christian Volume, and to guide his conduct by its benevolent precepts, loss of caste might be a blessing; but I am afraid, that much less importance has, hitherto, been attached to the moral fitness which our religion inculcates than to its mysteries and dogmas.—The Hindoos will never be converted by enthusiasts!

If, instead of endeavouring to make *new* Christians, the benevolent exertions of our countrymen and countrywomen were directed to the amelioration and improvement of the descendants of poor Europeans, East Indians, and those who are termed Portuguese, much intrinsic good might be effected. Such exertions, if it is true, would not blaze so triumphantly in certain reports, nor perhaps give so much satisfaction in certain quarters, as tales of dubious conversions; but the unprejudiced philanthropist who has had opportunities of judging for himself, will not hesitate a moment in declaring, that this were far more advantageous, both for the interests of Christianity and of general humanity.

in whatever age or country, the same moral character will necessarily follow. If instead of conducting all proceedings in the *Persian* language—a language which is equally foreign to both rulers and subjects, and for the continuance of which practice no rational argument has ever been adduced—if instead of the *Persian*, the *English* language were substituted, a powerful motive would thus be given for studying the latter, which added to others, would quickly diffuse it among all the influential natives of this immense territory; and, with the knowledge of our language, our superior policy, domestic, civil, and political, would in due course of time be sufficiently known to be fully appreciated.

But, although much may be expected from the future, the period is still distant: for, until the dreadful barrier of *caste* be to a certain degree overcome, the best intentions of the British legislature, or of the more immediate government of India, can but partially avail. Our position in this country is altogether anomalous. The conquerors of every other nation have gradually amalgamated with the conquered by intermarriage, the mutual progeny of which has become links of connection and ties natural love, which, after a few generations, have softened down those asperities and jealousies which the relative situations of the conquerors and the conquered never fail to produce. But in this country such amalgamation has hitherto been impossible. A single instance of intermarriage has never occurred but with outcasts;—to a native family of the least respectability such an alliance would be utter ruin. We continue, therefore, to live as divided and separate from the people we govern as on the first day of our arrival. We know nothing of their domestic economy; their *hearth stone* is a sanctum sanctorum which we never must pollute; the kindly results which uniformly arise from social intercourse and cheerful hospitality, are “a spring shut up, a fountain sealed;” and, while this state of things continues, we can only be considered, and can only consider ourselves, as *sojourners* in a strange land, and among a strange people.

It may be urged, that, if no other existed, the difference of complexion would be an obstacle to the intermarrying of Europeans and Hindoos. But it is an evident fact, that the being familiarized to any colour of the human form removes, or at least considerably modifies, our pre-conceived notions of beauty. Over all India females of the lowest order only are ever visible—the *Houries of the harem* are “born to blush unseen”; but notwithstanding this, not a few Europeans who have long resided in the interior, where the fair face of a country-woman seldom beams, have learned almost to prefer the delicate form, the dark eye, and even the “*nut brown*” hue, of Asia’s daughters, to what in course of time appear to them

“The pale unripened beauties of the north!”

The offspring of Europeans born and bred in this country (were it not for the notion of fancied superiority, derived from their own colour being that of the conquerors) must have comparatively little prejudice against the native complexion. They may associate with it ideas of inferiority both mental and bodily, but it cannot strike them, as it may possibly do a stranger, with any feeling of aversion or antipathy.*

* There is no feature, form, or complexion, in *the abstract*, more beautiful than another.—All the works of God are beautiful, and even what we call deformity is only a relative notion. The *taste* of a particular people however, in this respect, is not the less determinate, although it be local and conventional; but we should never cheat ourselves into the belief that it depends upon any universal principle of our nature. A European does not admire or prefer a white complexion merely because he admires that particular colour; for a fine Lady seldom appears so beautiful, or to so much advantage, as when arrayed in the deepest sable.—“Colours are beautiful, not in consequence of the mere organic operation of their physical qualities on the eye, but in consequence of their habitual association with certain simple emotions or mental qualities, of which they remind us, in a great variety of ways. Thus Blue, for example, is said to be beautiful, because it is the colour of the unclouded sky—Green, because it is that of vernal woods and summer meadows—and red; because it reminds us of the season of roses, or of the blushes of youth and innocence;—and, accordingly, when these associations are disturbed, the beauty, which they created, disappears. Green would not be beautiful in the sky—not blue on the cheek, nor vermilion on the grass. (*Edin. Rev. No 69, p. 246.*)”
Sir Joshua Reynolds, whose name is a host, was always decked in this

"The march of intellect" is even begining to operate on the native *young ladies* of Calcutta!—there is already, I am informed, some demand for European Governesses! Were European families of wealth and distinction permanently settled in this country, and considered it their only home—which is likely

subject. His paper inserted in "The Idler," I conceive, completely settles the question. The following are extracts.

"Every species of the animal as well as the vegetable creation may be said to have a fixed or determinate form, towards which nature is continually inclining, like various lines terminating in the center; or it may be compared to pendulums vibrating in different directions over one central point; and as they all cross the center, though only one passes through any other point; so it will be found that perfect beauty is oftner produced by nature than deformity; I do not mean, than deformity in general, but than any one kind of deformity. To instance in a particular part of a feature, the line that forms the ridge of the nose is beautiful when it is straight; this then is the central form, which is oftner found than either concave, convex, or any other irregular form that shall be proposed. As we are then more accustomed to beauty than deformity, we may conclude that to be the reason why we approve and admire it, as we approve and admire customs and fashions of dress for no other reason than that we are used to them; so that though habit and custom cannot be said to be the cause of beauty, it is certainly the cause of our liking it; and I have no doubt but that if we were more used to deformity than beauty, deformity would then lose the idea now annexed to it, and take that of beauty; as if the whole world should agree, that *yes* and *no* should change their meanings; *yes* would then deny, and *no* would affirm."

"Among the various reasons why we prefer one part of nature's works to another, the most general, I believe, is habit and custom; custom makes, in a certain sense, white black, and black white; it is custom alone determines our preference of the colour of the Europeans to the *Æthiopeans*, and they, for the same reason, prefer their own colour to ours. I suppose no body will doubt, if one of their painters were to paint the goddess of beauty, but that he would represent her black, with thick lips, flat nose, and woolly hair; and it seems to me, he would act very unnaturally if he did not: for by what criterion will any one dispute the propriety of his idea? We, indeed, say, that the form and colour of the *European* is preferable to that of the *Æthiopian*; but I know of no other reason we have for it, but that we are more accustomed to it."—*Idler*, No. 82.

"The prince of Anamaboo, who had been so long and laterally so much used to the *European* complexion, yet said of a certain lady a little before he left London, 'That she would be the most charming woman in the world if she was but a negro.'

"In an account of some of the farthest travels that any of our people have made up the river Gambia, we are informed, that when they came to some villages where probably no *Europeans* had ever been before, the women ran frightened and screaming from them, on taking them to be devils, merely on account of the whiteness of their complexion."—*Encyclopædia Britannica*, Article "*Beauty*."

soon to be the case—and if some of our Grandees (and they might do worse) could induce a few Rajahs &c. to break the spell, by marrying and giving in marriage, and thereby render the practice genteel and *fashionable*, there is no counting on what might follow. To many the anticipation of such a state of things may appear whimsical and ridiculous, though all that can be adduced to the contrary is the invincibility of Hindoo customs: for there is little doubt that many Europeans, and these not the least consequential, would anxiously court such alliances. The only difficulty, then, in the way of thus promoting social union and political amity, rests with the natives; but I have conversed with several of the most intelligent and respectable of them, who profess to believe that, in the course of time, all this and more may come to pass. I confess, however, that there is no one of them, at present, patriotic enough to lead the van in this, or in any other positive abjuration of caste. But let us wait and be patient—"the schoolmaster is abroad."

NOTES [F & G.] Page 82. & 86.

I have said that the convolutions, *appear* to be ramified into each other, and that a continuation of the same substance seems to extend over a great portion of the external brain; but in this I may be mistaken. Mr. Combe, however, admits that such may be the case, for in his illustration of the organ of Wonder, (page 229) he says, that Dr. Gall "states as questions for consideration, Does this convolution form part of the organ, of Imitation &c.?" Now, as these two organs are situated at a considerable distance, and belong to entirely different classes, by the same analogy, any other two, or *all the organs*, may be part and parcel of one another! The organ of Individuality, may, therefore, develop itself in the antipoda region of Amativeness, and produce a bump *there*, or *any where else*; which admission, at once, destroys every inference and pretension of Phrenology: for, if one organ interferes with, or occupies the position

of another, no particular development which the cranium may exhibit, can possibly depend on the magnitude of any individual organ.

And, if the several organs are not thus intermingled, by what other conceivable process can they have any kind of correspondence? Dr. Spurzheim says of Individuality, (page 430) "This faculty has knowledge of all internal faculties, and *acts upon them*;" but I should be much obliged by his explaining how certain portions of the brain can act upon others without being in contact; and I should further be very happy to learn, how Individuality can come in contact with Amativeness without entirely annihilating in its progress all the other organs which, according to his own showing, are posted between; and this annihilation must be still more complete, as not only Individuality, but many others, he declares, penetrate, and, therefore, occupy the whole encephalon. Certainly the Doctor will not assert that different bodies, at the same point of time, can possibly be present in the same point of space.

It might be said, in reply to this, that all the organs are concentrated somewhere into one general rendezvous, and by this means arrange their mutual concerns. But Dr. Spurzheim settles this by declaring, (page 7) "that the doctrine of a central point for all the nerves, is *neither true nor possible*, and this can "be verified by examination." And further (page 129) "The "opinion that all consciousness resides in the brain was formerly supported by the assertion that all nerves are continuations of the brain, and that they have a central point in it. "But this proof can no longer be admitted, because we have "demonstrated that neither the nerves of the external senses, "nor the spinal marrow, are prolongations of the cerebral mass, "nor are the nervous fibres concentrated in one spot; but that "every nervous system has its own origin,"*

* Physiognomical System.

Dr. Mellin stated in the Calcutta Phrenological Society, that under the frontal sinus, a *milky way* of organs was said to be situated, the external development of which could give no indication of the shape or size of the internal brain. Subsequently, I learned that anatomists in Europe hold this to be a powerful objection to Phrenology. I collected, therefore, a considerable number of Skulls, (for these are not scarce articles on the banks of the Hoogly,) and sawed them across, immediately above the eye-brows. I am very willing to submit the whole for inspection, when, on the slightest examination, it will become evident, that any inference regarding the figure or magnitude of the brain, drawn from the convexity or concavity of the *outer plate*, is a palpable absurdity—an imposition which Phrenologists ought to be ashamed of.

Beyond this evident fact, I am not qualified to refute Phrenology by illustrations drawn from Anatomy or Physiology; but it appears to me something strange that, while the advocates of that hypothesis declare that all the efficacy of the organs depends upon their mere *brute size*, they should, nevertheless, give more space to "Amazeness" and a few other contiguous organs which, they insist, are "*propensities common to man with lower animals*," than to all the numerous host of "Knowing and Reflecting faculties." In Mr. Combe's plates "Cautiousness" alone occupies more field than four other organs situated in another quarter, each of which, he asserts, performs a far more important duty.

Perhaps they will reply, that these very small, although very consequential, organs *make up in quality* what they want in quantity; which would just be saying, that their favourite science is a tissue of nonsense—for, if they admit that quality or fineness of structure has any thing to do in the matter, they abandon the whole. The magnitude of an organ can indicate nothing, if one

only half its size, but of a finer structure, is equally powerful and efficient.*

Spurzheim and Combe's plates and also DeVillè's bust are now before me; from which it appears, that the situation they have given to certain organs in the occiput embraces part of the cerebrum and part of the cerebellum, although these two portions of the encephalon are completely divided! But has not Bell and Majendie proved that the cerebellum, as a whole, performs *one* important and independent duty, no less than giving origin to all the nerves of motion? Let *Doctors* decide this. I have no pretensions.

NOTE [H.] Page 91.

I am not aware, whether, in Dr. Paterson's "Phrenology of the Hindoos," he states having found the organ of "Veneration" extremely developed in the three thousand skulls he so carefully manipulated. But is not this said faculty of Veneration exactly another name for *ignorance*? Phrenologists do not affirm that it venerates the *Creator of the universe*, or even eminent men; but any thing whatever—cows, monkeys, garlick, kings, &c. which custom and superstition have fixed upon. Mr. Combe says (page 201) that "it gives reverence for great names and authorities in religion and philosophy, and thus *often presents a strong obstacle to the progress of truth*"—and (page 202) "This faculty, when unenlightened, produces every kind of superstition, as worshipping beasts, and stocks, and stones."—It appears to me little else than blasphemy to assert, that the all-benevolent

* I have said that Phrenologists *may* take up this position, but I find that the reverend Mr. Welsh, an eminent authority in the cause, has already said, "Thus if it [the organ of colour] were larger, or of a finer structure, or more active, the perception of colour would be more delicate, or quick, or pleasing." and further, "the same remarks may be applied to all the organs." Bravo, reverend Sir! What now becomes of Dr. Gall's splendid inductions? Size, fineness of structure, or activity, you explicitly say, entirely stand instead of each other—"Call you this backing your friends"?

Deity should entail upon his creatures a propensity so derogatory to himself, and so contrary to his express commandments. !*

* I have said, in the text, that "an illiterate Hindoo is perfectly satisfied that a black stone is the Eternal Deity!" but I am afraid that the illiterate Mussulman, who holds all images and symbols in utter abhorrence, has scarcely more correct notions of the Supreme and Eternal God. I am here tempted to introduce a paper, presented to me by my excellent and valued friend, Rammohun Roy—a man whom no eulogy of mine could elevate. The "Discourse" has certainly no connection with my particular subject, but its general interest, I trust, is sufficient apology for my intruding it:—

"Discourse on the Spiritual Worship of God, delivered by Ramchandra Shurma, before a Religious Society in Calcutta, maintaining the Doctrines of pure Brakmunism, on Wednesday, the 6th of Bhadru, 1750 Shukabda, corresponding with the 20th of August, 1828 of the Christian Era. Translated from Bengallee by Tarachand Chukrurries."

"GOD IS ONE ONLY WITHOUT AN EQUAL."

"In whom abide all worlds and all their inhabitants."—Moonduk Oopunished.

"Thus he who mentally perceives the Supreme Spirit in all creatures, acquires perfect equanimity, and shall be absorbed into the highest essence, even into the Almighty."—Munoo.

We know from these plain authorities that every thing exists in a state of dependence on the Supreme Being; hence when a person worships any object as God, such worship amounts to an adoration of the Supreme Being. We constantly see that those who worship stones, or trees, or rivers, or particular images, worship them not merely as stones, or trees, or rivers, or images, but as God or as objects in which they suppose God to be present. To hate and reproach such persons, therefore, is unjustifiable on the grounds both of reason and religion. Although these persons, according to the precepts handed down to them from one generation to another, are engaged in worshipping the unlimited Supreme in a limited form, yet it cannot be said that such worship is in no way an adoration of God; for when a man sleeps on a bedstead, or on a lofty building, or on a tree, it is the earth alone which, though not directly, yet in fact, forms his support. We also find it expressly declared in the Veds "To whom, that is to God alone, all austerities are directed."—Kuth Oopunished.

Nevertheless it is repeatedly inculcated in the Veds and in the Institutes of Munoo, that the direct worship of God is in every respect the most excellent.

NOTE [J]. Page 92.

I intended to have analyzed Mr. Combe's celebrated Chapter "On the modes of activity of the Intellectual faculties"—but I

Thus "The Supreme Spirit alone is to be worshipped,"—The Veds, "Of all those duties, the principal is to acquire the knowledge of the Supreme Spirit: that is the most exalted of all sciences, because it alone ensures immortality,"—Munoo.

The superior excellence of this species of worship rests on three undisputed grounds. The first is revelation; for the Veds, the Institutes of Munoo, and all Scriptures of acknowledged authority, describe the knowledge of the true God as superior to every other kind of knowledge.

The second ground is that of reason; for it is agreeable to reason that he who is eternal and omnipresent should be acknowledged to be the author of the eternal and boundless universe; on the other hand it is not reasonable that a constituent portion of the universe should be supposed to be the cause of the universe. More especially, as in the spiritual worship of the Supreme Being, all outward ceremonies being discarded, the most essential duties of the worshipper consist in endeavouring to control his passions and affections, in such a manner as is calculated to promote his just objects and to benefit others, without injury to himself or to his neighbours; it hence follows, that such worship alone can be the source of social prosperity and the means of obtaining future bliss.

The third ground is that of experience, by which we find that other sects of worshippers are engaged in disputes, and sometimes even in wars one with another; for as, among the different sects that worship God under particular names and forms, each considers the being bearing the name and form adopted by him in worship, as the author of the universe and ascribes to him all superiority, this naturally gives rise to contention. As for example, one* who considers a being of a male form to be the author of all and superior to every other being, is involved in contention and strife with another† that makes a being of a female form the author of the universe and regards her as superior to all others; and in like manner, we daily witness the disputes between the people of India‡ who worship God in one male form, and those of foreign countries§ who pay adoration to God in another male form.

The spiritual worship of the Supreme Being, on the other hand, being not confined to any names or forms, but directed to Him only as the author of the

* A Voishunvu—† A Shaktu.—‡ Brahmuns—§ Missionaries.

find that, to expose it effectually would require much more writing than its destruction would compensate for. Besides, I could not make myself easily understood but to those who have studied the science of mind, and such can require no aid of mine in detecting its sophistry and absurdity.

I shall make one extract, however, because it is connected with my *grand* objection to their doctrine. Mr. Combe, quoting Dr. Spurzheim, says (pages 413 & 414)

“Pleasure and pain are affections of every faculty. Every faculty, when indulged in its natural action, feels pleasure;

universe, there can be no ground for contention between such worshippers and any of the other sects; who when inclined to contend with the former (the worshippers of the Supreme Being) might be thus addressed by them:—
 “Whether you worship a being bearing a male or a female form or any other existence, you do so under a persuasion that the object of your worship is the author and regulator of the universe. Now, if the object of your worship be the author of the universe, then he is the being whom we also (the spiritual worshippers of the Deity) adore. You have therefore no reason to contend with us.” Thus the adorers of God in spirit have no ground of animosity towards any of the other sects of worshippers, since they are persuaded that whatever may be the object which the latter worship, they must regard it as God. It is therefore clear that the spiritual worshipper of God can feel no animosity towards any of the other sects, nor can indulge in contention with them, both of which are to be highly reprobated in religion; as is clearly stated in the aphorisms of the venerable Govind Acharyu:—“By the following and other texts of the Veds, viz. ‘From whom all these objects proceed, &c., ‘He who cannot be described, &c.’ it is evident that whatever is the cause of the universe is the Most High, and is the object of worship. Among those who worship different objects distinguished from each other by names, forms, and other similar qualities, one person contends with another, but they cannot justly contend against the spiritual worship of God.”

I now, in conformity with our principles, pronounce a benediction on those present in this assembly who are willing to receive it, by reciting the following ancient stanza.—“May he who has made the swan so beautifully white, and the parrot of a golden hue, and has painted the peacock with variegated colours, preserve every one of you.”

“GOD IS ONE ONLY WITHOUT AN EQUAL.”

"when disagreeably affected feels pain: consequently, the kinds of pain and pleasure are as numerous as the faculties."

Here it is again unequivocally asserted, that only the *thirty-fifth part* of the mind feels a particular pleasure or pain. I have already shown, that to feel and to be conscious of a feeling is one and the same.—Now, as it is here again declared, that what Phrenologists choose to call *the mind*, is a collection of thirty five distinct consciousnesses, it follows, that they again declare that the mind of man consists of thirty-five distinct, and, therefore, responsible existences.

NOTE [K] Page 123.

In the Edinburgh Phrenological Journal (page 200,) there is a "Dialogue between a Philosopher of the old school and a Phrenologist," in which the latter comes off triumphantly, by convincing his opponent that, in place of likening the human mind to a *trumpet*, which he asserts is the *old theory*; every thing regarding this incomprehensible principle becomes evident and simple when illustrated by a *piano-forte*! I should like, however, to know what *Philosopher* ever compared the human mind to a trumpet, or to any thing else—Regarding its pretended affinity to a piano-forte, I shall only refer to what I have already said under Note C. page 135.

NOTE [L] Page 123.

Although the system of Phrenology is a system of pure Materialism, and may, therefore, be imagined to lead to dangerous consequences, it would be unjust as well as unphilosophical to object to it on that account; for if any thing can be incontrovertibly proved to be *true*, none but bigots can scruple to believe it, whatever may be the consequences—otherwise Galileo was justly persecuted for asserting the true theory of the Solar System, because, in his day, it was conceived, by ignorant priests, to militate against certain passages of Scripture.

But no objection I have made to Phrenology, would be, in

the least degree, obviated by its advocates adopting the doctrine of materialism in its widest and most unqualified extent; as, by their present hypothesis, every one of their pretended organs would still continue to possess a separate and unconnected consciousness, and be, therefore, a separate and unconnected being.

NOTE [M] Page 126.

A respected friend has suggested "that I have mistaken Mr. Welsh's view of Phrenology, and, consequently, misstated his arguments: for that, although Spurzheim and Combe declare the 35 faculties to be independent *parts* of the mind, Mr. Welsh, in the extract I have quoted from Mr. Combe's work, and which is all of his writings we have seen, has not committed himself, by any such absurdity—that so far from asserting the faculties to be different parts of the mind, he has only said, that 'different portions or organs of the brain are connected with the primitive feelings of the mind'—instead of the whole brain being the organ of every individual feeling or state of the mind, that it performs each of these changes by means of a particular portion of the encephalon, as its allotted organ." My friend is of opinion, "that this involves no more difficulty, in the conception, nor more interferes with the mind's simplicity and indivisibility, than the metaphysical doctrine of the whole encephalon being only one single organ." He adds, however, that, "as the mind cannot be in two states at the same time, it still remains for Mr. Welsh to prove, that each state has a corresponding organ, and is manifested by the assigned organ, and no other."


But, with all due deference to my respected friend's opinion, I cannot discover how Mr. Welsh can escape. He is not only found in the array of Phrenologists, and defending their general position, but, as a Metaphysician, placed in the front-rank whenever such a weapon is conceived to be necessary.


If Phrenologists really asserted, that each state of the mind

requires the interference of a different organ—or, in the language of my friend, that the mind performs each of its changes by means of a particular portion of the encephalon—this would be very nearly admitting Dr. Hartley's theory of Vibrations. It may be, that every change in the state of the mind is accompanied with some change in the brain or nervous system; but if every such change is produced by "a particular portion of the encephalon," *thirty-five* such portions will scarcely suffice. The mind may possibly undergo a million of changes every hour, and as no one of its states can be absolutely similar to another, the number of organs would thus, instead of being limited to thirty-five, require to be multiplied to such an extent, as to our powers of conception, would be almost equivalent to the notion of infinity!

Besides this, Mr. Welsh explicitly declares, that "a multitude of organs, may be all affecting the mind at the same instant, and in that case, a variety of feelings will be experienced." Now, what does the Reverend Gentleman mean, by the mind experiencing a variety of feelings at the same instant? Can it be any thing else than that Hope and Fear, Love and Hatred, Destructiveness and Benevolence, &c. may be all felt by the mind at the same absolute moment—and that all the organs, as they individually *feel*, are also individually *conscious* of that feeling, and, therefore, individual and independent entities? Dr. Thomas Brown, who seems to be his *Magnus Apollo*, has repeatedly said,—“To suppose the mind to exist in two different states, in the same moment, is a manifest absurdity.” Let Mr. Welsh reconcile this to the possibility of the mind experiencing a variety of feelings at the same instant, and I shall willingly admit that I have dealt with him too freely, and cheerfully retract every sentence I have written against Phrenology.

FINIS.







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